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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA1006
2006-07-31 16:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

FRANCE REFUTES OFFICIAL CHAD SUPPORT FOR DPA

Tags:   CD  PGOV  PREL  SU 
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VZCZCXRO6563
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1006/01 2121622
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 311622Z JUL 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4164
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1228
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0287
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1499
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1906
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0281
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1296
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0792
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0851
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
						C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001006 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016
TAGS: CD PGOV PREL SU
SUBJECT: FRANCE REFUTES OFFICIAL CHAD SUPPORT FOR DPA
SPOILERS

NDJAMENA 00001006 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001006

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016
TAGS: CD PGOV PREL SU
SUBJECT: FRANCE REFUTES OFFICIAL CHAD SUPPORT FOR DPA
SPOILERS

NDJAMENA 00001006 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. Allegations by SLA leader Minni Minawi
concerning Chad's support for DPA spoilers are false,
according to the French Ambassador to Chad. He understands
that President Deby's brother Daoussa Deby, and Mahamat Ali
Nasser, Minister of Territorial Administration, are (with
Libyan support) abetting the National Redemption Front (NRF)
by channeling weapons from Libya, encouraging Chadian
deserters to join the NRF ranks, and asking local authorities
to help with recruitment. However, with French forces on the
ground in Eastern Chad, France could say authoritatively that
regular Chadian army forces were not deploying into Sudan
against DPA signatories. The French Ambassador believed that
Daoussa Deby and Mahamat Ali should be placed on the UN
sanction list before President Deby's August 8 inauguration
in order to ensure that neither would be given a governmental
position in Deby's next administration. In a separate
conversation, N'djamena-based SLA/MM representatives claimed
that GOC pressure against Minni loyalists had increased
following Minni's visit to Washington. The SLA/MM
representatives expected to be evicted from their
GOC-provided quarters in the near future. End Summary.


2. (C) French Ambassador to Chad Jean-Pierre Bercot called
the Ambassador July 28 to express his concerns that SLA
leader Minni Minawi's claims of Government of Chad (GOC)
involvement in attacks on DPA signatories were being taken at
face value. Bercot was further concerned that observers
(including his own colleagues at the French Embassy in
Khartoum) were describing the situation as a full-fledged
proxy war between Chad and Sudan. On the contrary, stated
Bercot, as Deby would be the principal beneficiary of peace
in Darfur, it would be "incoherent" to think that he would
work to destabilize it. Furthermore, as verified by French
troops on the ground in Eastern Chad, there were no National

Redemption Front (NRF) rebel bases in Chad, nor was the
Chadian army deploying in support of the NRF in Sudan.
Furthermore, Chadian helicopters were not picking up NRF
wounded and flying them back to Chad as has been alleged by
Sudanese authorities. Bercot stated that he could provide
these assurances as France knew at any given time the exact
location of Chad's armed forces.


3. (C) Bercot did recognize that President Deby's brother,
Daoussa Deby, and the Minister of Territorial Administration,
General Mahamat Ali Nassour, were most likely aiding the NRF
by encouraging Chadian deserters to join the NRF ranks,
channeling weapons to them (from Libya), and encouraging
local authorities (prefets, governors) to recruit for the
NRF. President Deby, according to Bercot, did not support
these actions -- it was clear that he had nothing to gain
from continued crisis in Darfur -- but he was not strong
enough domestically to stop them.


4. (C) Concerning the Chad/Sudanese relationship, Bercot
stated that Deby had no intention of implementing the Tripoli
accords (despite assurances to the contrary that might be
made). A strong monitoring force on the border would be an
impediment to the transfer from an AMIS peace-keeping force
to a UN peace-keeping force -- and there was no confusion in
President Deby's mind as to which he would prefer to see.
Bercot believed that it would be better to delete references
to the Tripoli Accord from the draft UN Security Council
Resolution for the same reason


5. (C) Concerning the role of Sudan, and recent announcements
that the GOC and the Government of Sudan were on the path to
reconciliation, Bercot acknowledged that this was the first
step towards resuming diplomatic relations. At the same
time, he cautioned that President Deby had no desire to move
too fast. In particular, he had no wish to be upstaged by
either President Beshir or President Quaddafi at his August 8
inauguration (he apparently invited neither, but Bercot
wouldn't put it past Quaddafi to arrive in his plane with
Beshir on board).


6. (C) Delving into Libyan meddling in Chad, Bercot stated
that Quaddafi wanted to "control Deby" for the next five
years. To that end, he was using Daoussa Deby as a wedge to

NDJAMENA 00001006 002.2 OF 002


split the Zaghawas. And he was paying off inhabitants of
Chad's northern regions -- members of the Goran and Tubu
tribes, who were disgruntled over perceived favoritism to
Zaghawas, Arabs and southern Chadians. Bercot pointed out
that the northern regions (Borku, Ennedi and Tibesti) were
risky areas and essentially ungovernable. It would be
impossible for the GOC to maintain a position for more than a
couple of days if those regions chose to rise up.


7. (C) Bercot concluded by stating that it was "high time"
that the UNSC added Deby frere and Mahamat Ali Nassour to the
sanctions list. This was particularly urgent in order to
deny them cabinet positions in the new government that
President Deby is expected to form after his August 8
inauguration.


8. (C) In a meeting the same day with EconOff, members of
the Sudanese Liberation Movement faction loyal to Minni
Minawi (SLM/MM) accused the GOC of denying medical and
financial assistance, as well as shelter to SLA members loyal
to Minni in N'djamena. The members claimed that the GOC had
frozen all bank accounts belonging to SLA/MM loyalists in
N'djamena, and were tracking and interdicting any private
contributions from Sudan to these members. They also stated
that members of the Police Intelligence Unit and associates
of Daoussa Deby were forcing the SLA members and families to
vacate their current residences shortly. They claimed that
pressure against Mini loyalists had increased in the past few
days, particularly following Mini's visit to Washington.

COMMENT:


9. (C) Along with the French, we are skeptical that Chadian
helicopters are flying missions in Sudan. However, we feel
that Ambassador Bercot glosses over the fact that, while
peace in Darfur is in President Deby's interest, Deby may
also see it in his interest to allow others to continue to
support the JEM and the G-19 on the grounds that "the enemy
of my enemy is my friend."


10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
WALL