KENYA AVIAN INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS UPDATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000950 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: TBIO KFLU SENV ECON EAGR EAID PREL PGOV KE SUBJECT: KENYA AVIAN INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS UPDATE REF: A. 05 NAIROBI 4829 (NOTAL) ¶B. 05 NAIROBI 5318 (NOTAL) ¶1. Summary: To date, Kenya has no confirmed cases of H5N1 Avian Influenza, but suspect samples from flamingos, as well as poultry samples from Uganda, are being analyzed by CDC-Kenya. Kenya does have a valuable interagency AI Task Force, and a cadre of well-trained technical officials who should respond well to possible AI outbreaks. U.S. agencies in country, CDC, US Army Medical Research Unit - Kenya, and USAID, provide guidance and assistance to both the task force and technical agencies. Kenya's preparedness plan addresses most critical needs, but high-level political support for both funding and response is lacking. Also of concern are reports that commercial airlines are refusing to transport possible virus samples for testing. End Summary. ¶2. This report updates ref A information on Kenya's preparedness to respond to any possible outbreak of Avian Influenza. To date there has been no confirmed case of H5N1 virus in Kenya. CDC-Kenya is currently testing samples from a small die-off of wild flamingos and is also testing samples from dead chickens from farms in Uganda near the Kenyan border. -------------- The National Avian Influenza Task Force -------------- ¶3. The Kenyan government has taken some positive steps in preparing for the possibility of an Avian Influenza (AI) outbreak in the country. Kenya's National Avian Influenza Task Force (NAITF) was established in October ¶2005. It met for the first time on 26 October and has met 8 times since then. The composition of the NAITF is inclusive of relevant ministries and has the active participation of GOK technical experts. It is co-chaired by the Director of Medical Services (senior technical officer in Ministry of Health),the Director of Veterinary Services (similar in Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development),and the Director of the National Operations Center (Office of the President). The Task Force includes representation from other GOK ministries, international organizations, research groups, civil society, and the private sector. Mission representatives from CDC, DOD, and USAID regularly attend these meetings. ¶4. The NAITF has established six sub-committees: surveillance and epidemiology; communications and awareness; laboratory and research; infection prevention and control; case management; and coordination and resource mobilization. All committees meet regularly and report to the Task Force -------------- Kenya's Preparedness Plan -------------- ¶5. The NAITF has completed a National Strategic Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan for Avian Influenza (EPP). This includes goals and objectives of each component represented by the various subcommittees and fairly detailed short-term (6-month) workplans and budgets. The Task Force is also working on medium-term (6 months to 2 years) and long-term (2-5 year) plans and budgets. The plan was presented in Beijing at the January World Bank Pledging Conference on Avian and Human Pandemic Influenza and was identified by the World Bank as a model for Africa. We are encouraging the GOK to create a public website with its AI preparations and other information, and to post their plan. -------------- Budgeting for AI -------------- ¶6. Kenya's Task Force has drafted a number of budgets, both long and short term. The long-term budget presented in Beijing was for $800 million, but included a worst- case human epidemic requiring massive treatment costs. The medium-term (about one year) budget presented on 23 February 2006 is for about Ksh 250 million (about $3.5 million). A draft Cabinet memo identifies Ksh 39 million from the Ministry of Health budget and Ksh 35 million from the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development budget that are available immediately. While there is still discussion concerning specific budget lines this overall amount is probably appropriate. ¶7. The draft budget outlines funding from the following NAIROBI 00000950 002 OF 003 sources: -- The GOK (MOH and MOLFD) has already reprogrammed about $1.1 million into avian influenza (see above); -- USAID/Kenya will have about $850,000 in FY06 funds. About $100,000 are available now, the rest should arrive by July; -- USAID/REDSO has additional funds for regional activities, several of which will be based in Kenya; -- additional funds are anticipated from CDC for regional activities, several of which may be based in Kenya; -- The World Bank will allow reprogramming of existing project funds and should have additional funds pending Board approval and a lifting of the freeze on Kenyan funding; -- The EU is including Kenya in a multi-country request; -- WHO may get funds from various donors pledged in Beijing; -- FAO has requested funding from its donors; -- The Kenyan Red Cross has contributed Ksh 1 million ($14,000). -------------- Current Readiness -------------- ¶8. In many respects, Kenya is quite prepared to deal with the immediate response needs to news of a possible AI outbreak. Among the country's strengths: -- a strong level of understanding and commitment from technical officials at key ministries and agencies; -- good experience in dealing with animal diseases, and significant numbers of veterinary staff currently in the field, including almost 400 Veterinary Officers; -- the likelihood of early disease detection, in part due to an early start awareness creation activities, especially in agriculture. There have also been wider public education campaigns, including the publication of public call-in hotlines; -- the pre-positioning of staff and equipment for a quick response, including appropriate sampling, to bird die- offs; and -- a current ban on the importation of poultry and other birds. ¶9. Kenya does have a number of remaining weaknesses in its AI preparations, which need to be addressed quickly. These include: -- a clear commitment to making AI a policy priority at Minister level and above; -- the creation of detailed implementation plans in case of a serious outbreak, including undertaking simulation exercises; -- establishing a compensation policy and fund; -- verifying effective animal quarantine measures; and -- (while beyond the mandate of the Task Force),an action plan to deal with the economic and nutritional impact of an epidemic. -------------- USG Resources -------------- ¶10. This mission has an interagency task force that meets on a regular basis. Thanks to the presence in Kenya of CDC, US Army Medical Research Unit - Kenya, and medical professionals at USAID's Office of Population and Health, the USG contribution to the NAITF is substantial. CDC/Kenya staff has traveled to Nigeria to help with that country's response to the AI outbreak and will be able to provide valuable insight to both the GOK and the Mission on developing an effective action plan. We will modify our tripwires (Ref B) accordingly. NAIROBI 00000950 003 OF 003 ¶11. CDC/Kenya also hosts one of the most sophisticated testing laboratories in Africa (Biosafety level 3),and has offered its services to other African countries that might need assistance in testing samples from possible AI outbreaks. Over the years, CDC/Kenya's work with technical staff from a number of Kenyan ministries has also helped create a valuable cadre of health care professionals and technicians who we expect will provide an effective response to an AI outbreak. ¶12. Post's public affairs section is preparing our public website to include a page dedicated to useful information about AI, including hopefully a link to the GOK's preparedness plan. Our Consular Affairs office is prepared to issue an appropriate warden message should H5N1 be confirmed in the country. -------------- Are the Airlines on Board? -------------- ¶13. We have heard that Kenya Airways is reluctant to transport samples from other African countries to Nairobi for testing at CDC and/or GOK labs. It was also reported that British Airways and Emirates have also been reluctant to transport samples. It is important to impress upon international airlines that if samples are packaged and labeled according to IATA regulations they have an obligation to transport these, as well as a moral duty to help control this epidemic. It is clear that Kenya Airways, and likely other air carriers as well, have not thought about their role/responsibility in dealing with possible disease emergence, not to mention how they will respond to human cases. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶14. Post is well prepared to deal with possible AI contingencies, and at the technical level, Kenyan agencies should respond well. However, it is difficult to say how the highest levels of government will respond to a new crisis, should H5N1 land in Kenya. The Kibaki administration is in disarray and is facing tremendous pressure from on-going corruption-related investigations. One role we have taken on is to encourage additional support from donors, who, to date, have not been engaged. We will continue to work with the highest-ranking, responsive, officials to encourage critical thinking and planning appropriate for the necessary disaster management mentality. BELLAMY