Ambassador's Discussion with CIC Foreign Secretary Addow

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 005399 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2026 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC MOPS SO ET KE KM SUBJECT: Ambassador's Discussion with CIC Foreign Secretary Addow Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: During a December 29 meeting in Nairobi, the Islamic Court (CIC) Foreign Secretary Ibrahim Addow told Ambassador Ranneberger that the CIC is willing to resume dialogue with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to find a political solution to the current crisis in Somalia. Addow was unrealistic in asking for US support for the Khartoum dialogue process and withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. The Ambassador made clear that the Khartoum process has been overtaken by events. He told Addow that if moderates elements of the Islamic Courts wanted to be part of the future of Somalia, they need to reach out to TFG President Yusuf. Addow emphasized Sheikh Sharif's leadership of the Courts and said he is willing to talk. He maintained that if the Courts are attacked in Kismayo they will have no choice but "to go underground," with resulting guerrilla warfare. In a private exchange, the Ambassador urged Addow and the Courts' leadership to cooperate to take action against the three high-value targets. Addow was not forthcoming on this. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Ranneberger, joined by Polcouns and Regional Affairs Chief, met with Council of Islamic Courts' (CIC) Foreign Secretary Ibrahim Addow, who was accompanied by two lower-level CIC officials, at his residence on December ¶29. Addow is a graduate of American University in Washington, D.C., and a U.S. citizen. -------------- CIC Down But Addow claims Not Out of the Game -------------- ¶3. (C) Addow began by expressing his appreciation for the time and effort the US is expending to help resolve the crisis in Somalia. While acknowledging that the CIC is not the whole solution to Somalia's ills, Addow asserted that its success in bringing peace and stability to Somalia, something which in the two plus years of its tenure the TFG was unable to achieve, made it a necessary part of any solution to the Somalia crisis. Addow asserted that the CIC ordered their forces to withdraw rather than to fight in populated areas which would put the population at risk. He stressed that the CIC's withdrawal should not be construed as a victory for the TFG, but rather that the CIC still holds the hearts and minds of the population and that popular support for the CIC remains undiminished. Ethiopia's current "control" of territory is only a result of force, the Ethiopians are seen as an occupying force, and there will be "endless conflict" if Ethiopian forces remain. He insisted "they (the Ethiopians) are standing on a volcano that can erupt at any moment." Addow said that the Courts will fight if attacked in Kismayo and will then "go underground" and initiate a guerrilla-type struggle. ¶4. (C) The CIC foreign secretary presented Ambassador Ranneberger with three requests. One, that there should be an immediate ceasefire. Two, Addow insisted that Ethiopian troops must withdraw from Somalia territory. And three, he said that it is imperative that dialogue resume in Khartoum as soon as possible. -------------- Opportunity Now -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador Ranneberger told Addow that they were unrealistic positions, overtaken by events. He told Addow that moderate elements of the CIC who reject terrorism might still be able to be part of Somalia's future, but they need to reach out to President Yusuf now. The Ambassador reviewed in detail U.S. views on the current state of play, emphasizing U.S. interest in seeing a broad-based, inclusive national government based on the TFI and Charter. He emphasized to Addow that the window of opportunity for dialogue is very limited, and therefore time is of the essence. The Ambassador suggested that Kenya could probably help to facilitate such contacts, if the leadership of the Courts was committed to working within the TFI/Charter framework. -------------- CIC Willing to Negotiate with Yusuf -------------- ¶6. (C) Pressed on the dialogue issue, Addow eventually stated that the CIC is ready and willing to talk with President Yusuf on power-sharing. Addow said that divisions within the TFG would make achieving any sort of accommodation difficult. He explicitly cited PM Gedi as a roadblock. In arguing for a formal process involving NAIROBI 00005399 002 OF 002 the Arab League, the U.S. and EC, Addow showed himself to be unrealistic about dialogue. Addow nevertheless said several times that CIC "leader" Sheikh Sharif would be willing to talk with Yusuf. When the Ambassador said that any such discussion would have to be without preconditions, Addow did not further argue the point. -------------- HVTs -------------- ¶7. In a one-on-one talk, the Ambassador urged Addow and the other moderate leadership of the remaining Courts structure to take action against the high value targets. Addow was not forthcoming. He said only that it was difficult to convince many within the Courts to do something for the U.S. The Ambassador underscored the importance of the HVTs and pointed out the taking appropriate action is in the interest of the Courts. -------------- Addow and the Kenyans -------------- ¶8. Addow called the Ambassador on the 29th to report on his meeting with Kenyan Special Envoy Affey. Affey told Addow that the Kenyan position on Somalia was "to wait and see." Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Addow oscillated between bravado and a chastened recognition of the Courts' fading role. The fact that he stressed Sheikh Sharif as the leader of the Courts, and downplayed Aweys' role, is interesting and may indicate real interest in quick, direct dialogue with Yusuf, in part to prevent a final onslaught against the Courts. The Courts have at best limited capability to conduct serious guerrilla warfare, but they may have the capability to cause significant difficulties for some period to come. The Kenyan cold shoulder to the CIC is not surprisingly, but the Kenyans have been closely engaged on Somalia. They are in frequent touch with the Ethiopians and with us on the evolving situation and have emphasized their interest in working closely with us to achieve shared objectives of an inclusive national government for Somalia. RANNEBERGER