OFFICIAL CORRUPTION: PRESIDENT KIBAKI UNLIKELY TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000527 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2016 TAGS: ECON EAID EFIN KCOR PGOV PREL KE SUBJECT: OFFICIAL CORRUPTION: PRESIDENT KIBAKI UNLIKELY TO ACT REF: NAIROBI 494 Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM M. BELLAMY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Judging from his remarks to a small group of Ambassadors February 2, President Kibaki does not/not see a need for decisive action in the face of the growing public outcry over official corruption. Kibaki derided his former top adviser on corruption, John Githongo, calling him "a peculiar man" who was "writing reports to himself at the instigation of his friends." The President confessed that he had not asked for Finance Minister Mwiraria's resignation and had no immediate plans to seek any other resignations. He wants the "independent" Kenya Anti- Corruption Commission to continue its inquiries. ¶2. (C) Thus Kibaki intends to ride out the storm. The likely result is further loss of public confidence in the Kibaki administration and increasingly strained relations with donors. While many Kenyans cling anxiously to the hope that President Kibaki will return to the vision and restore the sense of direction that marked the beginning of his Presidency three years ago, this hope now looks increasingly forlorn. The President has said nothing since the beginning of the corruption crisis and does not apparently sense a need to do so. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (C) At our request, Chiefs of Mission from the U.S., U.K., Sweden, Canada and Germany called on President Kibaki February 2. Kibaki was alone. I opened discussion by summarizing a letter to Kibaki from eleven foreign missions (reftel) that notes the seriousness of the corruption charges detailed in the Githongo report and the need for strong executive action to restore international and local confidence. The other COMs made brief supportive statements. ¶4. (C) Kibaki's reply was lengthy and vague. He spoke of the dismissal of judges two years ago, and how this had "been a good start." He lamented the present slowness of the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) in investigating cases, but then attributed this in part to disputes over which government body should have prosecutorial authority ) a dispute for which he offered no solution. He said his administration was "very serious" about fighting corruption and "knows what needs to be done." He added however that he felt he had a good cabinet team and that "changes in this area would be difficult." 
¶5. (C) After some mild complaints about "diplomats going too far in their public statements," Kibaki turned to the subject of his former Permanent Secretary for Ethics and Governance, John Githongo. Kibaki claimed Githongo "never sent me any memoranda" and "did not speak frankly to me." (NOTE: In fact, the Githongo report details the time, date, place and content of Githongo's numerous briefings of President Kibaki on the Anglo-Leasing scandal. END NOTE). Kibaki complained that Githongo was a "peculiar person" who "was involved with many people we do not know." In short, it was hard for Kibaki to fully credit Githongo's reporting. In any case, he had no intention of replying to Githongo. ¶6. (C) The Canadian, German and Swedish COMs all vouched for Githongo's credibility and urged the President to take seriously the information provided by him. They urged strong Presidential leadership, and suggested having senior officials implicated in the scandal step aside. The German Ambassador urged the GOK to release the long-delayed Goldenberg Report on corruption under the Moi regime and to seek the resignation of current ministers implicated in the Anglo-Leasing scandal. ¶7. (C) Surprisingly, Kibaki allowed that he had not asked for Finance Minister Mwiraria's resignation (reftel). "I didn't have the facts," Kibaki said. Mwiraria thus resigned on his own initiative. The President then said it might be a good idea if Attorney General Wako stepped down. (NOTE: Wako is not directly implicated in the Anglo-Leasing scandal, but has long been disliked by President Kibaki and his inner circle. END NOTE). ¶8. (C) Again COMs gently pressed Kibaki to consider having ministers and suspected civil servants step aside while energetic, independent investigations are conducted by the KACC. Kibaki insisted that the KACC was totally independent, that the KACC was not under any pressure from State House or Cabinet. The KACC could question anyone, he said, but that did not mean officeholders should resign while investigations are underway. "We can't judge these people just because they have been mentioned in a report," he said. ¶9. (C) I told the President that a number of us could independently confirm details in Githongo's report. I gave him the names of three businessmen and three senior GOK officials who were without doubt at the heart of the Anglo- Leasing scandal. Kibaki shrugged this off: "I can't just tell people to resign on the basis of a report." He then said that Githongo "wrote this report to himself and at the instigation of his friends. It's not valid. He (Githongo) is not Jesus Christ. He has his own reasons." ¶10. (C) Further attempts by COMs to call for strong executive leadership were waved off by Kibaki who urged that we: ¶A. Wait for publication of the Goldenberg report, which would be published soon; and ¶B. Have confidence in the ongoing investigations of the KACC. ¶11. (C) Kibaki added that, regardless of the findings made in the Goldenberg report, he would not/not allow prosecution of former President Moi or his family. ¶12. (C) In a curious conclusion to the meeting, Kibaki pointed to the UK high commissioner and asked "And what about your Ambassador?" After a few moments of confusion, it was understood that Kibaki was referring to former UK High Commissioner Edward Clay whose open letter to World Bank President Wolfowitz had been published in the UK and Kenyan press. When told that Clay was now retired and simply expressing his own views, Kibaki disagreed, saying this kind of criticism could only have been orchestrated by HMG. ¶13. (C) COMMENT: The conclusions drawn from this hour-long meeting are that Kibaki intends to downplay and/or dismiss the Githongo report, brush off further criticism and questions, and pursue a minimalist approach in the fight against corruption. Release of the Goldenberg report may cause some embarrassment, but it also diverts attention from the Anglo-Leasing scandal that is much closer to Kibaki's administration. Dumping Attorney General Wako, while possibly a popular move, is also largely unrelated to Anglo-Leasing. Beyond these moves, Kibaki is likely to refer as much as he can to the KACC who modus operandi to date has been to conduct leisurely and non-transparent investigations which, despite the President's disclaimer, are finely attuned to guidance from State House. ¶14. (C) It is an understatement to say Kibaki is missing an important opportunity. By seizing the reins and taking the lead on combating corruption, he would score major political gains across all classes and tribes in Kenya, thus positioning himself for another successful run at the Presidency next year should he so choose. By opting instead for denial he risks a further narrowing of his base of political support, increasing loss of public confidence, and troubled relations with donors. END COMMENT. BELLAMY