SOMALIA: PRESIDENT AND SPEAKER COOPERATING, PRIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000428 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, EUR, NEA STATE PASS AID LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2025 TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID PREL MOPS ASEC KPAO SO KE SUBJECT: SOMALIA: PRESIDENT AND SPEAKER COOPERATING, PRIME MINISTER THE ODD MAN OUT REF: (A) 05 STATE 174136, (B) NAIROBI 260 SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Somali President Yusuf told Ambassador January 29 that he and the Speaker of the Parliament continue to work together to implement the "Aden Declaration" they signed January 5, calling for the parliament to begin work inside Somalia. The Prime Minister and two key political/clan allies are proving to be obstructionist, insisting that the parliament must meet in either Mogadishu or Jowhar, knowing full well that it will be impossible to secure Mogadishu in the indeterminate future. The PM's recent actions set him outside those groups that appear to be talking in good faith about resuscitating the TFIs. END SUMMARY PRESIDENT YUSUF: "I'M FOLLOWING YOUR ADVICE." -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador met January 29 with the President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG),Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. The President recalled his September 16, 2005 meeting with AF DAS Yamamoto in New York (reftel A),in which DAS Yamamoto had urged Yusuf to engage in dialogue with other Somali leaders and to act to unite the members of the divided Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). Yusuf stated that he had taken the advice to heart, had reached out to the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, and had come to an agreement with him to work together. ¶3. (C) President Yusuf thanked Ambassador for his recent interventions with various members of the TFIs, expressing special appreciation for the Ambassador's communication with former Transitional National President Abdiqassim Hassan Salad. Yusuf opined that Abdiqassim and his Hawiye Haber Gedir Ayr clan were at the root of the Islamist opposition to the TFIs, and that seeking a way to draw political figures away from the more militant Jihadists was critical at this juncture. ¶4. (C) The President noted his recent series of meetings with the Speaker, as well as with Mogadishu-based warlord/Minister for National Security Mohammed Qanyare Afrah, and Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi. He stated he was doing his best to bring the TFIs into some kind of functioning existence in Somalia, with the key agenda item of broad reconciliation among clans and factions. He said it was clear that the Speaker sought to convene the parliament in his home region of Bay, and was pushing for the town of Baidoa as the venue, while the PM was adamant about holding all meetings of the TFIs in his "interim capital" of Jowhar. Yusuf committed to mediating between them, stated they would meet as a threesome just after Ambassador departed that day, said they would stay in discussion until they had reached an agreement on a venue for the parliament, and predicted they would be ready for announcement of the venue on January 30. MANY INTERLOCUTORS, SAME MESSAGE -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador commended the President on his recent successes in reaching out to his opponents, and on the agreement with the Speaker in Aden, Yemen. Ambassador pointed to his recent meetings with the Speaker and Prime Minister, and communications with the principal warlord/Ministers and the former TNG President, emphasizing that each of these "heavyweights" shared responsibility for selling reconciliation to their constituents. Ambassador stressed that no one person, group, or institution could lead Somalia isolated from the others. ¶6. (C) Ambassador underscored that the USG was not able to provide any kind of security guarantee regarding the various concerns different parties had related to the venue NAIROBI 00000428 002 OF 003 of a session of parliament. That said, Ambassador promised that as the Somalis moved toward designating the venue, we would be attentive to reactions, and would urge all external parties to be supportive of the parliamentary meeting. PRIME MINISTER -- BECOMMING THE PROBLEM -------------- ¶7. (C) A few hours after the Ambassador's meeting, Somalia Watcher began receiving from the President's staff hourly telephone reports on the meeting among the President, PM, and Speaker. The three came together at 11:00 AM, when the President reportedly instructed the Prime Minister and Speaker to work out their differences, to settle on a venue, and to report the results to him. Presidential staff reported at 3:45 PM that the Prime Minister and Speaker had concluded their discussions and reported to the President, that the President had committed to implement their decision to the letter, and that the decision would be announced to the world the afternoon of January 30, in Nairobi. However, staff declined to state what the PM and Speaker had decided. ¶8. (C) Later reports indicate that this rosy set of events began to deteriorate almost immediately after the three men took their leave of each other -- if, in fact, the original reports had ever been true. By 9:00 PM, the same Presidential staffers were calling Somalia Watcher, requesting intervention with the Prime Minister. These reports indicated that Prime Minister Gedi had begun a telephone campaign against the decision he had supposedly just reached with the Speaker and the President -- that Baidoa would be the venue for parliament's first session inside Somalia. Gedi was supposed to have first called his fellow Hawiye Abgal Warsangeli clansman, Mohamed Omar Habeb (AKA "Dheere"),self-proclaimed "Governor" of Middle Shabhelle Region and the "interim capital" of Jowhar. Dheere was reported to be furious that the parliament might convene anywhere in the country except Jowhar. Gedi was also reported to have begun rallying MPs present in Nairobi against a meeting in Baidoa, stressing uncertainties related to security arrangements. ¶9. (C) Somalia Watcher called Prime Minister Gedi late January 29 to express concern over the wildly conflicting reports regarding the meeting on the parliamentary venue, to ask the PM's opinion on where the process stood, and to urge consensus building and compromise. Gedi stated that there had not been a decision reached that day among himself, the Speaker and the President, opining that the three had no authority to decide such important matters by themselves. He said that he had made it clear when he left the President's residence that he would seek to consult with MPs, claiming that there had not been adequate discussion with them to date. Last, he said there would be a meeting of all available MPs convened at the President's Nairobi residence for January 30, at 10:00 AM, to continue talks. ¶10. (C) Somalia Watcher reiterated our message of the past several weeks, urging compromise and calling attention to the extensive consultative work the President and Speaker had already done, as well as our January 17 suggestion to the PM (reftel B) that he had a personal responsibility to poll his MP-allies and to deliver them to whatever venue achieved consensus. COMMENTS: -------------- ¶11. (C) Reconvening Parliament remains anything but a done deal. Current evidence seems to point to the Prime Minister, the Middle Shabhelle "Governor", and the Jowhar- based Minister of International Cooperation Abdirizak Osman Hassan (AKA "Jurile") as creating the nucleus for a group of "spoilers" in the TFIs, seemingly intent on ensuring NAIROBI 00000428 003 OF 003 either (a) that parliament meet in Jowhar, or (b) that parliament not meet at all. The PM's supposed backtracking on his agreement with the Speaker and President comes two days after his January 27 attempt to block the visit of National Security Minister Qanyare to Kenya. Qanyare was held at the Nairobi airport for two hours while Somali MPs and members of the international community negotiated with Gedi, pleading with him to reverse his request that the GoK refuse Qanyare an entry visa. Qanyare had come to Nairobi for the first time since mid-June 2005 specifically to meet with President Yusuf. (President Kibaki was previously aware, and supportive, of this meeting.) ¶12. (C) There is no doubt that Baidoa poses extraordinary obstacles on the security front as a venue for the TFIs, as does any town in Somalia. It is also brutally clear that it is politically impossible to use either Mogadishu or Jowhar as the venue for this first session of Parliament. As this point cannot possibly be lost on PM Gedi, it leaves many to believe he seeks to scuttle this attempt to bring together the TFIs. Less clear is what he believes he accomplishes by blocking the convening of parliament. He avoids removal from office through a parliamentary no confidence vote. He also ensures that there is no credible hope that the TFIs can unite to govern the country, guaranteeing the continuation of a "paper state" -- unless all the various parties capitulate to his and Dheere's pressure. This is only a viable option for him if he is assured continued support from members of the international community, no matter what he does -- if there is a source of funding, e.g., Italy, that will declare him the legitimate embodiment of the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions. END COMMENTS. BELLAMY