SOMALIA: COURTING AND POSTURING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 003004 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SO SUBJECT: SOMALIA: COURTING AND POSTURING REF: NAIROBI 2873 NAIROBI 00003004 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: PolCouns Larry Andre, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: European members of the IGAD/AU mission to Somalia came away with the impression that the Islamic Courts in Mogadishu are much more organized than the government in Baidoa. The Transitional Federal Government seems to have no clear idea of what it must do to implement the National Security and Stabilization Plan, nor does it appear adequately prepared to face the Courts in the next round of dialogue in Khartoum. The Courts met the mission with representatives of multiple sectors of Mogadishu society, including women and the TFG-appointed governor, in a clear attempt to create an impression of their inclusiveness. It was apparent, however, that the Courts were calling the shots within this group. All interlocutors in Mogadishu opposed any intervention by foreign military forces, particularly those from Ethiopia. Italian Envoy Rafaelli subsequently traveled to central Somalia, north of Mogadishu, to meet individually with Hassan Dahir Aweys, a meeting that has raised some eyebrows in the international community and hackles in the TFG. Some elements within the TFG seem increasingly inclined to ditch the dialogue and pursue a military option against the Courts, primarily to protect their own positions. END SUMMARY. BAIDOA -------------- ¶2. (C) Italian Special Envoy Mario Rafaelli and European Commission Head of Delegation Eric Van der Linden provided members of the diplomatic corps a read-out of their participation in the IGAD/AU mission to Somalia (reftel). Travelers were underwhelmed by the TFG, with Rafaelli describing these meetings as "totally useless." The ministers stressed the importance of implementing the National Security and Stabilization Plan, but seemed to have no particular thoughts on what they must do to achieve this. In a private meeting, President Yusuf agreed that it was important for the group to travel to Mogadishu, but asked that they meet with representatives of all different groups while there. In a subsequent, more public, meeting, Yusuf issued a lengthy tirade about the terrible situation in Mogadishu, stating his belief that the radicals are pushing aside what moderates may be there. Yusuf requested a briefing from the group after they completed their travels. The EC and Italy stated to other diplomats in Nairobi that they would like this briefing to take place in Nairobi with only Yusuf present. There are concerns that Yusuf will be swayed by those elements within the TFG who are not keen to pursue dialogue because it could lead to changes within the cabinet. MOGADISHU -------------- ¶3. (C) The delegation found Mogadishu a changed city. There were no roadblocks in the vicinity of the hotel at which they conducted meetings, and travelers were escorted by only one technical (as opposed to eight a year ago). Rafaelli noted that, prior to meeting with the delegation, the Courts convened a meeting of representatives from various segments of Mogadishu society to work out a common position. This group included the Courts, civil society, women, traditional elders, business, and the Mogadishu government (appointed by the TFG). There were approximately 20 statements from the Mogadishu group, each strictly limited to three minutes. All speakers were strongly opposed to foreign intervention, particularly by Ethiopia. Rafaelli said this meeting created the impression that the Courts are very capable and well-coordinated. He noted some evident contradictions within the group (Kenyan Ambassador Affey, an ethnic Somali, had advised that the individual translating for the group was adding a radical twist to each of the interventions). While the Courts were keen to have all represented groups speak, they nonetheless emphasized their overall leadership role. Court leaders apparently stated that they do not wish to become the government, but could or would not state precisely what they expect their role to be. Court officials indicated they were including the TFG governor and his council in this meeting because they had shared opposition to the warlords, but this did not imply that the governor represented the people of Mogadishu. ¶4. (C) Van der Linden noted that the Mogadishu presentations appeared half prepared and half spontaneous. The Courts were clearly trying to create an image of themselves as "basically good guys." Van der Linden noted that, while there were NAIROBI 00003004 002.2 OF 002 quite a few moderate elements present, the extremists clearly have the upper hand. Rafaelli pointed out that the Courts appear to recognize that if they are able to return Mogadishu to a level of functionality within three months, they will be a de facto counterweight to the TFG. Asked if there was any sense that the Courts would be willing to play a role in the TFG, Rafaelli stated that they would like representation in parliament, particularly the seats of the recently sacked ministers. ¶5. (C) Rafaelli and Van der Linden emphasized that the international community must continue to support the TFG, but the government must, in turn, play a stronger game in order to effectively counter the Courts. In particular, the government must develop a clear agenda for what it hopes to achieve at the next round of talks in Khartoum. Rafaelli stated the government does not seem to fully comprehend what has transpired in Mogadishu and is therefore not adequately responding to the situation. He expressed concerns that some in the government may be inclined to exploit divisions in Mogadishu and spark new rounds of fighting, rather than pursue dialogue. ITALY FLIES SOLO -------------- ¶6. (C) Rafaelli subsequently returned to central Somalia on July 8 to meet individually with Hassan Dahir Aweys. This meeting was originally prepared with the concurrence of President Yusuf, some weeks before the preparation of the IGAD mission. Rafaelli's decision to proceed with this meeting, particularly raising Aweys' profile with an individual meeting so close after the Mogadishu meeting, has raised some eyebrows in the international community and hackles in the TFG. We do not yet have a read-out from the Italians on this discussion. ADVOCATES OF A MILITARY OPTION -------------- ¶7. (C) In a July 10 discussion with Presidential Chief of Staff Dahir Mirreh Jibreel, Mirreh had little to say about the upcoming dialogue in Khartoum. He advocated heavy financial investment from the U.S. to help create a national security force. Poloff pointed out that there remain legal restrictions on direct assistance to the government and that his proposal to create a national security force is the work of years, not an activity that can immediately counter the organizational threat posed by the Courts. Mirreh's stance is apparently shared by Prime Minister Gedi and Planning Minister Abdirazak Osman "Jurile", who, according to the EC's Walid Musa, are advocating a military solution and rejecting a resumption of the dialogue in Khartoum. (Gedi and "Jurile" are particularly threatened by the dialogue, as they are the most likely to lose their positions in a cabinet shuffle.) Musa advised that the European Union will be issuing a strong statement emphasizing that it will not provide assistance to any entity that has rejected dialogue. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) It is interesting to note that, following the visit of various delegations into Mogadishu the week of 3 July (IGAD/AU and UN),the Islamic Courts Union on 9 July undertook an attack on a Saad clan member, Abdi Awale Qeybdid. Mogadishu today is certainly not as peaceful as the ICU made it seem last week. The situation in Mogadishu remains extremely fluid, with more fighting likely in the coming weeks. END COMMENT. ROWE