ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRAZER'S MEETING WITH SOMALI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002761 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MASS KISL SO SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRAZER'S MEETING WITH SOMALI PRESIDENT ABDULLAHI YUSUF Classified By: A/S Frazer, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a June 21 meeting with Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf, Assistant Secretary Frazer spelled out the U.S. priorities of support to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and the people of Somalia, enhancing regional stability, and countering terrorism. Frazer and Yusuf discussed expectations for the upcoming Khartoum meeting between the TFIs and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC),noting the powerful symbolism of the TFIs' unified participation and urging Yusuf to effectively utilize this opportunity for dialogue. Frazer expressed grave concerns over the possibility that a foreign stabilization force would mobilize anti-TFI sentiment, especially if comprised of troops from front line states. Yusuf considered Ethiopia no different from any other African state in terms of its appropriateness for involvement in Somalia, but ultimately reverted to an appeal for broader international support for lifting the arms embargo as a necessary step toward implementing the IGAD stabilization force, which involves the use of Ugandan and Sudanese troops. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer met Somali Transitional Federal President Abdullahi Yusuf June 21 in Nairobi. Frazer opened the discussion by noting the recent meeting of the Somalia international Contact Group in New York to foster more effective coordination on issues and activities related to Somalia. She advised that future meetings of the group would include IGAD and the League of Arab States. She spelled out for Yusuf the U.S. priorities of support to the Transitional Federal Institutions, support for the people of Somalia, ensuring regional stability, and countering the terrorist threat. She stated for Yusuf the U.S. call for forces in Somalia not to expand beyond current positions and to engage in dialogue to determine a way forward. Frazer advised that the U.S. is keeping an open mind about the composition and potential activities of the Union of Islamic Courts. ¶3. (C) Yusuf expressed appreciation for both the Contact Group's statement and U.S. policy. Referring to the upcoming Khartoum meeting between the TFIs and the UIC, Yusuf had concerns about who may be attending from the Courts' side. If the representatives were unknowns, they would have no real power to negotiate. If they were from among the "fanatics" in the UIC, discussions would not be possible because these individuals are unwilling to reach agreement on anything. Yusuf hoped the U.S. agreed that talks would only be possible with moderates in the UIC. ¶4. (C) Frazer noted that the travel of the three leaders of the TFIs - the President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament - to participate in the Khartoum talks sends a powerful signal of unity in the government. It is now important to work with the moderates in the UIC as well. She further appealed to Yusuf to expand the TFIs' outreach to civil society, the business community, clan leaders, and grassroots entities in order to make the TFIs more inclusive and representative, thus enhancing the government's legitimacy. Yusuf responded that Somali leaders do not want to divide their people anymore. However, it would be important to separate the moderates in the Courts from the extremists. ¶5. (C) Addressing our regional security priority, Yusuf said his government is friends with all countries in the region. However, he went on to note that Eritrea is not cooperating with the TFIs, and has gone as far as to train and infiltrate foreign fighters in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia. He questioned why Eritrea had not been cited for its violations of the U.N. arms embargo. ¶6. (C) Frazer engaged Yusuf in a discussion of the role of a stabilization force in Somalia. She advised Yusuf that the view of many outside Somalia is that external forces could actually mobilize the Somali people against the TFIs and help the UIC hardliners. The front line states are particularly problematic in this regard, exposing Yusuf to accusations that he is not his own man and is an agent of PM Meles. Yusuf responded that there should be no difference between Ethiopia and other African states with regard to participation in a stabilization force. Because of the extensive common border, Ethiopia has a legitimate interest in events inside Somalia. Frazer replied that the U.S. understands Ethiopian national security interests in the region. NAIROBI 00002761 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Yusuf then left off the Ethiopian argument, expressing his hope that the U.S. would help with the deployment of the IGAD Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) by supporting the lifting of the arms embargo. Uganda and Sudan would be able to assist Somalia, provided the international community does not block their activities. How, he asked, could the TFIs tackle the Islamists without external support? Frazer appealed to Yusuf to provide the U.S. with a copy of the recently-passed National Security and Stabilization Plan so we could better understand how IGASOM would support this plan. Yusuf agreed to provide a copy of the plan. He advised that IGASOM forces would be used to protect the capital and help train and organize a Somali national security force. Disarmament activities would be the responsibility of the TFIs, not IGASOM. ¶8. (U) Assistant Secretary Frazer cleared this message. BELLAMY