ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRAZER'S MEETING WITH SOMALI

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 002758 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR EAID KISL SO SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRAZER'S MEETING WITH SOMALI PARLIAMENT SPEAKER SHARIF HASSAN SHEIKH ADEN Classified By: A/S Frazer, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a June 21 meeting with Somali Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, Assistant Secretary Frazer highlighted U.S. priorities for Somalia and SIPDIS expressed concerns about territorial expansion by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Sharif Hassan had similar concerns about the nature of the UIC. He believed dialogue was the best avenue for addressing Somalia's current problems, but was non-committal about expectations for the upcoming Transitional Federal Institution (TFI) - UIC talks in Khartoum. He expressed his opposition to the use of troops from front line states to intervene in Somalia and asked that the U.S. continue to use its leverage with these governments to block such action. Frazer advised that the U.S.G. is in the process of identifying additional resources to enhance our engagement with Somalia, but our ability to engage remains hindered by the presence of three al Qaida members in Mogadishu. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer met June 21 in Nairobi with Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, Speaker of the Somali Transitional Federal Parliament. Frazer informed the Speaker of the outcome of the recent Contact Group meeting, emphasizing the group's strong endorsement for assisting and empowering the TFIs. She also highlighted the U.S. priorities of supporting the Somali people with humanitarian assistance, ensuring regional stability and countering the terrorist threat emanating from Somalia. She expressed concerns about Union of Islamic Court expansion, and raised questions about the nature of the Union and its intentions. She urged greater inclusivity within the TFIs, noting a particular need to reach out to the Ayr sub-clan. ¶3. (C) Sharif Hassan appreciated and shared our concerns regarding the nature of the UIC. He cautioned against understimating the linkages and intricacies of Somali society. His firm belief was that the most practical way to address Somalia's current problems was through dialogue. While there are elements within the UIC that may be hostile to dialogue, these are a small minority within the group. His aim would be to place emphasis on the prospects for a positive partnership with the UIC. The worst thing the TFIs could do, he said, would be to deny the existence of the UIC. ¶4. (C) Regarding negotiations with the UIC, Sharif Hassan expressed a desire to have discussions with the group, but said it was hard to determine the affiliations and intentions of the group's leadership. He concurred that the UIC likely had as part of its strategy a desire to establish itself as an alternative to the TFIs. However, if the TFIs act responsibly, they could limit the UIC's ability to present itself as a counter force. ¶5. (C) Sharif Hassan noted the UIC was able to use the issue of IGAD troops as a propaganda weapon. He advised against using the proposed IGAD Mission for Somalia (IGASOM) or front line states to help stabilize Somalia, instead floating the possibility of using a UN force, with logistical support from the front line states. He asked that the U.S. continue to use its leverage to block the entry of troops from the front line states. In addition, he noted that the reasons for the UN arms embargo must be removed. ¶6. (C) When asked what the U.S. might do to transition from the current state of relations, Frazer responded that we would start with greater diplomatic support for the TFIs. She advised that we are in the process of trying to obtain greater resources for engagement, and would ultimately like to find a means of establishing a presence in Somalia. In addition, our position on the arms embargo is under review. She pointed out, however, that the presence of three al Qaida members in Mogadishu complicates our ability to engage in Somalia. Our ability to influence front line states will also be affected by the actions of the UIC. If the UIC stops its expansion, the U.S. may be able to continue to hold off external intervention, but the front line states are clearly and prudently engaged in contingency planning to be prepared, if necessary, to respond to further advances. ¶7. (U) This message was cleared by Assistant Secretary Frazer. BELLAMY