A/S FRAZER MEETS KENYA FM TUJU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002757 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MASS KISL SO SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER MEETS KENYA FM TUJU Classified By: A/S Frazer, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a June 21 meeting with Kenya' s Foreign Minister Raf ael Tuju, Assistant Secretary Frazer END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary Frazer noted that she came to Kenya at the s pecific direction of Secretary Rice to consult with our Kenyan allies on Somali a. A/S Frazer explained the genesis of the International Contact Group for Som alia and its composition, emphasizing that the group is a Norwegian initiative t o share information and coordinate positions among selected states and internat ional organizations. FM Tuju pointed out that IGAD has authority from the Af rican Union to lead African diplomatic efforts to bring peace and governance to Somalia. ¶3. (C) Tuju emphasized the importance to Kenya of a Somali settlement g iven a long shared border and Kenya's own ethnic Somali population. Tuju said that Kenya's ethnic Somalis give his country "channels of communication" to all Somali factions, including the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). He urged a policy of constructive engagement with the UIC at this early juncture and stre ssed the utility of policy coordination among members of the international commu nity. Tuju lamented the many unknowns at this time: Does the UIC intend furth er expansion?, What is their attitude toward Baidoa and the TFIs? Are exte rnal forces represented in the UIC's military wing? ¶4. (C) On the arms embargo, Tuju pointed out that this policy was adop ted prior to "our arrival in power." He said "the arms embargo must be qualified , some way must be found to give teeth to the TFG, but not necessarily by tota lly lifting the arms embargo." Tuju advocated a relaxation of the embargo that would permit training o f security elements to support the TFG. "The TFG is a creation of IGAD. We can exact legitimate influence over it to see that such arms are not abused ." ¶5. (C) Turning to Somaliland, Tuju stated that "Somaliland recognition is on the table" of the African Union. He repeatedly referred to "British Somali land," underlining Somaliland's claim that its long-sought independent status does not cross AU red lines as regards the maintenance of inherited colonial bou ndaries. Tuju praised the Somaliland administration for its "pragmatic, open-min ded" attitude, its record of responsibly controlling its territory under ele cted governments, and its policy of not seeking to expand beyond the histori c borders of British Somaliland. Tuju recounted his understanding of British Som aliland having agreed to merge with Italian Somaliland soon after independence, but emphasized that the merger was never formally ratified. "The marriage did not work out, just as was the case with the attempted merger between Senega l and Gambia. In such cases, the two parties should revert to their former independent status." ¶6. (C) A/S Frazer returned the conversation to the current situation be tween the UIC and the TFG. She mentioned that she had resisted facile comparison s between the Taliban and Somalia's Islamic courts, but the stories coming out of Somalia now are making her reconsider her views. She spoke of the decisiveness of NAIROBI 00002757 002 OF 002 extremists, their ability to act quickly and seize initiative while mod erates consult. Tuju advocated robust engagement with the "moderate majority" within the UIC. Tuju said that the TFG had urged his government not to speak to Somaliland or to the UIC, but this approach is mistaken. "We told the UIC not to attack Baidoa. They followed our counsel." Tuju recommended an "op en-minded approach toward the UIC, while not being nave, don't close doors." Tuj u continued "there are both extremists and moderates among our Muslims. We strengthen the moderates. We do not marginalize them all." ¶7. (C) A/S Frazer concurred with Tuju's strategy, noting that an early push against the extremists risks forcing the moderates to close ranks with them. But in the end, she emphasized, neither we nor the region can accept a Taliban- style takeover of a state in the Horn of Africa. While it makes sense to first build up the moderates before crushing the extremists, "what to do when even the moderates are against you?" A/S Frazer stressed that the TFG and the U IC must acknowledge the existence of active al Queda cells in Mogadishu and the ir responsibility for rendering to justice members of those cells. ¶8. (C) A/S Frazer and Tuju discussed evidence that Eritrea is arming a nd funding anti-TFG elements, including within the UIC. They agreed that the upcoming Arab League-sponsored talks in Khartoum between the TFG and th e UIC will provide a welcome opportunity to begin to answer key questions abo ut the UIC leadership, such as "Who are they?" and "What do they want." ¶9. (S/NF) FM Tuju then requested a private one-on-one meeting with A/ S Frazer. During that discussion, Tuju raised Kenya's anti-terrorism legislation, explaining that the first draft had language amounting to "racial profi ling" of Muslims, for example, identifying terrorists by their mode of dress. T he bill will require extensive reworking. He also expressed concern about the state of Kenya-U.S. relations, opining that they have never been worse. He asso ciated this state of affairs to Kenya's refusal to allow Wilson airport to be used as an exit for fleeing Somali warlords and for the confusion surrounding t he Assistant Secretary's request to meet President Kibaki. (The meeting d id not occur despite being confirmed by State House but not the Foreign Minist ry.) Finally, FM Tuju asked that greater respect be given to Kenyans seeking visas at the Mission. ¶10. (U) Assistant Secretary Frazer cleared this message. BELLAMY