S E C R E T NAIROBI 001484

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SO KE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR TO YUSUF: ALLIANCE AGAINST TERROR NOT
DIRECTED AT TFG

Classified By: Amb. William M. Bellamy, Reasons 1.4 (C) and (D).


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: In a March 31 meeting with Somali
Transitional Federal President Abdullahi Yusuf, Ambassador
reassured Yusuf of our support for the Transitional Federal
Government, specifying that our support for counter-terrorism
activities in Mogadishu were directed only at foreign
terrorist elements. Yusuf appreciated the approach and
clarification, and stated his ongoing willingness to work
with the USG in the war against terrorism. He was somewhat
evasive on the possibility of Ayr sub-clan members being
willing to turn over foreign Al Qaeda elements to him, but
assured the Ambassador that if any such transaction were to
occur, he would remit these individuals to the USG. END
SUMMARY.


2. (S/NF) Ambassador Bellamy, accompanied by SIMO elements
and poloff, met briefly with the Somali President in Yusuf's
Nairobi home on March 31. (The meeting was brief by
necessity, as Yusuf had to depart for a meeting with Kenyan
President Kibaki.) The Ambassador reassured Yusuf of the
USG's support for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).
The return of governance to Somalia is, he said, the only
long-term solution to the terrorism problem in Somalia.
However, there is an immediate short-term need to deal with
the terrorist threat - specifically the ongoing presence of
Al Qaeda elements within Somalia - which has unfortunately
led to the recent fighting in Mogadishu. The alliance of
warlords engaged in this fighting is in no way directed
against the TFG. Rather, these individuals have been
explicitly told that our support for them is only for
counter-terrorism activities.


3. (S/NF) Yusuf replied that he had never refused
opportunities to cooperate with the U.S. He had demonstrated
his stand against terrorism by kicking AIAI out of Puntland.
He had also enjoyed strong cooperation with the U.S. through
the Puntland Intelligence Service. He asked repeatedly that
the U.S. convince the warlords in question to join the
government so all could fight the terrorists together. The
terrorists, he noted, were not working solely against the
U.S.


4. (S/NF) Yusuf noted a problem now for the U.S. in
Mogadishu. Residents there, he said, believe the target is
Islam, thus creating an antagonistic attitude toward the U.S.
He wondered aloud why the U.S. would want to start an open
war in Mogadishu. He quickly noted that he did not feel he
could criticize our actions until he heard directly from us
about recent events.


5. (S/NF) The Ambassador expressed appreciation for Yusuf's
readiness to support us and said we would value his
recommendations. He noted that it is not within the power of
the USG to deliver ministers to the TFG. We would push the
individuals in question in that direction, but do not have
the luxury of time to wait for all to be on board in the TFG
before undertaking counter-terrorist activities. The
Ambassador advised Yusuf that the USG was evaluating its
actions in Mogadishu and would retain close contacts with the
TFG to advise of any potential new developments. SIMO would
remain the lead point of contact for these issues.


6. (S/NF) SIMO chief discussed a need to communicate with the
Ayr elders regarding the hostilities in Mogadishu. Yusuf
responded that he had advised the Ayr not to keep terrorists
in their midst. SIMO chief asked whether the Ayr could
deliver the Al Qaeda elements to Yusuf. Yusuf did not answer
directly, saying first that there would have to be trusted
intermediaries, then saying there was a man in Baidoa who has
useful information for the U.S. He did, however, say that if
he were to get the foreign elements of interest to us, he
would hand them over.


7. (S/NF) COMMENT: This meeting appears to have adequately
reassured Yusuf that our intentions are not to destabilize
the TFG. While he tried at times to argue that we should use
our influence to coerce wayward ministers to toe his line, he
is at least savvy enough to recognize that this will, at
best, be a longer-term process. Yusuf's own authority and
reach are, at this time, still quite limited. END COMMENT.
BELLAMY