IAGGA REPORT FOR KENYA

UNCLAS NAIROBI 001111 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR INL/C/P DIANE KOHN, AF/E USAID FOR AFR/DP E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON KCOR KCRM PGOV KE SUBJECT: IAGGA REPORT FOR KENYA REF: State 30961 Mission Nairobi's response to reftel follows below, and has also been conveyed to State/INL/C/P by separate e- mail. Government Efforts -------------- The performance of the Government of Kenya (GOK) in 2004 and 2005 was mixed at best, with steady progress on the institutional and legal fronts juxtaposed with a serious lack of high-level political commitment to combating corruption. In April 2004 serious allegations of grand- scale graft at the highest levels of the sitting Kibaki administration surfaced in connection with the so-called Anglo-Leasing procurement scandals. Eventually, five officials were charged; their cases are still pending in court. Investigations against more senior leaders ended at that time without any further arrests or prosecutions. The GOK's credibility in the war on corruption collapsed in early 2005 when John Githongo, the President's anti- corruption czar, resigned and went into self-imposed exile. Soon thereafter, the highly-regarded Director of Public Prosecutions was fired and the local director of Transparency International was forced to resign. In early 2006, Githongo went public with his Anglo-Leasing evidence, which directly implicated several key ministers, presidential advisors, and influential businessmen. Under intense pressure from the public and the media, one implicated minister was left out of the cabinet following a reshuffle in December, and two others resigned in February 2006. However, the GOK has not acted against others directly implicated in the scandals or their cover-up. Further, it is widely believed that high-level prosecutions are being delayed or blocked by the Attorney General in response to political considerations. Investigation and prosecution of alleged high-level complicity in multi-ton cocaine shipments through Kenya have similarly stalled. Progress was also mixed regarding follow up on corruption perpetrated under the previous Moi Administration. In 2004, the GOK released a Land Commission report, which includes two annexes revealing names of high-level former and current GOK officials implicated in the "irregular" acquisition of public lands. Substantial action to recover illegally acquired land has yet to be taken, however. Some money associated with the Anglo-Leasing scandals was returned mysteriously to the GOK in 2004. However, other efforts to recover the proceeds of corruption hidden earlier overseas, as detailed in a report compiled and completed in 2005 by Kroll Associates, have yet to yield results. In February 2006, the GOK released the Goldenberg Report, which recommends action against dozens of businesspeople and members of the former administration in connection with a massive financial scandal from the early 1990s. As a result of the report's findings, one implicated minister in the Kibaki administration was forced to resign. On the institutional front in 2004, the National Anti- Corruption Campaign Steering Committee was appointed, along with the leadership of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC). The KACC, the country's leading graft investigative body, became fully staffed and operational in mid-2005 and has launched dozens of investigations and forwarded files for prosecution to the Attorney General's Office. In April 2005, in response to pressure from civil society and development partners, the GOK prepared a 12-month anti-corruption action plan, and in some areas such as public expenditure management reform and civil service reform, important progress has since been made. Further, the GOK pushed through two important bills in Parliament late in 2005 dealing with privatization and government procurement. If effectively implemented, the laws have the potential to eliminate or sharply narrow loopholes through which corruption has traditionally flourished in Kenya. Finally, Kenya has both signed and ratified the UNCAC, while it has signed but not yet ratified the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC). Law Enforcement and Legal Systems -------------- Throughout 2004 and 2005, the USG continued support to the specialized unit on anti-corruption, economic crimes, serious fraud, and asset forfeiture within the Department of Public Prosecutions (DPP). As a participating institution in the GOK's Governance, Justice, Law, and Order Sector (GJLOS) Reform Program, the DPP contributes to the key result area focused on reducing corruption. The USG assistance to the DPP contributes towards the professional prosecution of criminal corruption cases through: an improved case tracking system; the development of specialized curriculum and delivery of subsequent training; the provision of direct technical assistance through a Resident Legal Advisor and short- term technical experts; enhanced monitoring and evaluation; the establishment of a reform program secretariat; and the acquisition of reference materials SIPDIS and related equipment for a dedicated research facility. Transparent Governance -------------- In 2004, the USG's key anti-corruption partner was the Department of Governance and Ethics (the DGE),within the Office of the President and led by John Githongo (see above). In collaboration with the Kenya chapter of Transparency International (TI-Kenya, also a USG grantee),the DGE hosted an international experts meeting in 2004 on the challenges that "new governments" face when tackling corruption fQowing a political transition. USG-sponsored activities with the DGE included the design of several anti-corQtion measures such as a system for the collection, storage, and analysis of public officers' asset declaration forms, a public complaints unit, an assets restitution division, and a national baseline survey of citizens' views of corruption. Following Githongo's resignation, which called into question the GOK's commitment to fighting corruption within its own ranks, the USG ended its support to the DGE, and the GOK subsequently disbanded the office altogether. Assistance to the Parliament continued to further strengthen the legislature's oversight capacity. With an emphasis on oversight committees, the USG trains legislative staff, including researchers, so that the committees may more effectively hold the Executive to account. USG support also facilitates Parliament's outreach to civil society and the private sector to solicit citizen's views and expert opinions when considering and amending legislation. USG funds are being used to build Parliament's in-house budget analysis capacity and will enable Parliament to provide more substantive input into the budget process. As part of this, Parliament is expected to shortly establish both a Parliamentary Budget Committee and a Budget Office. Civil Society -------------- As the GOK's progress in combating graft has waned, the USG has maintained support to civil society organizations (CSOs) that monitor government performance and advocate for accelerated reforms. Since 2004, the USG has awarded grants to Transparency International-Kenya (TI-K),the Center for Governance and Development (CGD),the Kenya Institute for Supplies Managers (KISM),the Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR),and the Kenya chapter of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ/K). USG support to CSOs enhances non-governmental advocacy capacity and increases the public demand for anti-corruption reform. Furthermore, to strengthen CSOs such as TI-Kenya and other groups engaged in policy reform, advocacy, and GOK monitoring, the USG is launching a program to strengthen CSOs' technical skills and sustainability through a training and capacity building component. The program will engage new non- governmental partners in anti-corruption efforts, including private sector coalitions, professional associations, membership organizations, and faith-based groups. Advocacy -------------- Improving governance and assisting in the fight against corruption are major themes of the U.S. Mission in Nairobi in both its private and public diplomacy. The U.S. decision to halt funding for certain governance- related activities following the Githongo resignation was announced in a major and widely read public address by the Ambassador on the theme of corruption and good governance. U.S. Mission leadership has also been instrumental in keeping governance concerns front and center in the broader donor dialogue with the GOK and in making improved governance and tangible GOK actions against corruption a prerequisite for improved GOK-donor relations. In 2004, the U.S. revoked the visa of a former high-level Kenya official for his central role in grand scale corruption under the previous administration. In 2005, again to plaudits from a majority of Kenyans, the USG similarly suspended entry into the U.S. of a standing minister in the Kibaki administration. BELLAMY