SOMALIA: DONORS PREPARE TO SUPPORT SECURITY FOR THE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001094 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPARTMENT FOR AF, EUR, NEA STATE PASS AID LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID PREL MOPS ASEC KPAO SO KE SUBJECT: SOMALIA: DONORS PREPARE TO SUPPORT SECURITY FOR THE INTERIM SEAT OF PARLIAMENT REF: NAIROBI 1082 SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Donors and UN agency representatives have enthusiastically endorsed a Security Plan for the Transitional Federal Parliament's (TFP) interim seat in Baidoa. A March 7 fact-finding trip may have generated commitments of funds sufficient to finance the entire plan - - including the very sensitive problem of feeding cantoned, but not demobilized, militias. END SUMMARY BAIDOA "UNDER CONTROL" -------------- ¶2. (SBU) A small group of donors led by the Somalia Donors' Group (SDG) chair (currently the representative from Denmark) traveled to Baidoa March 7. The team explored possible responses to the Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) request for assistance to provide medium term security to the temporary seat of Parliament (reported reftel). Participants in the trip reported their findings to the SDG March 8. The group included representatives of Denmark, Italy, and the Delegation of the European Commission, and UN staff from UNDP, UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), and the Acting UN Resident Coordinator. The overall impression of the group was that the three principle warlords in the area -- Minister of Agriculture and Committee Chairman Hassan Mohamed Nur (AKA "Shatigudud"), Adan Mohammad Nur (AKA "Adan Madobe"),Minister of Justice, and Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade, MP -- were cooperating well to ensure the town was "under control". ¶3. (SBU) The participants recommended that the UNDP Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) Programme undertake to implement virtually all aspects of the plan related to policing of the town. Representatives from the Delegation of the European Commission stated that the EC stood ready to provide significant financing to the UNDP-implemented elements. (NOTE: An accurate budget has not yet been outlined for the security plan, but UNDP estimates that the policing elements account for some 70% of the total plan cost, with cantonment for militias making up the other 30%, excluding food costs - - see below. END NOTE.) ¶4. (SBU) The 30% of the plan that would not be under UNDP implementation consists largely of infrastructure development at militia cantonment sites -- shelter, water, sanitation, and health clinics. The donor team observed what they estimated to be 2,000-2,500 militiamen under the command of Habsade, Shatigudud, and Adan Madobe, camped 25 kms southeast of Baidoa at a defunct military base in the town of Daynuunay. The team described the site as a roughly 6 kms square un-demarcated tract of empty land, with no amenities -- the men (and some women) were sleeping in the open, on the ground. The team was unable to visit a second site, where they were told another several hundred "freelance" militiamen were encamped. ¶5. (SBU) UN representatives briefed the SDG that the UN Bureau for Conflict Prevention in Geneva was preparing to fund the costs and guide implementation of the cantonment site infrastructure project, under certain conditions. First, the cantoned militiamen's arms would have to be controlled, by the police units that UNDP would pull together from the militias of the three principle warlords. Second, the militiamen would all have to be registered, in a verifiable manner. Last, the UN would commit to a project lasting 6 months, for a total of 3,000 encamped militiamen, in two camps (vice four requested). FOOD -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Once the UN and donors had determined how policing NAIROBI 00001094 002 OF 002 and cantonment infrastructure needs might be met, there remained the most expensive and sensitive element of the Baidoa Security Committee's plan -- feeding cantoned militiamen. Donors made it clear to the Baidoa Security Committee that they could not meet this cost, roughly estimated at $1 million for 2 camps for 6 months (vice earlier estimates of some $2 million for 4 camps). Most of the donors in the SDG are constrained by the provisions of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, which severely limits the feeding of militias and armed forces outside of a formal demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration program (DDR). Donors and UN agencies agreed that the Baidoa security plan could not be seen as "DDR", but was rather an attempt to park armed militias away from the center of political action to reduce the threat of confrontation, and so could not be used as a justification for a militia feeding. ¶7. (SBU) SDG members agreed that significant efforts to overcome these constraints, which the SDG chair called "serious technical problems", were justified in order to show strong political support to the continued work of the TFP. The team reported that President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed had committed to producing sufficient funds to feed the encamped militias for the first month, drawing from League of Arab States (LAS)-provided assistance. He suggested that a second month might be covered, especially if he were able to tap funds from the Somali business community. Donors suggested that the President should lobby the LAS for a longer-term funding commitment to the cantonments' food requirements. The LAS representative to the Donor Group thought that his authorities would be very open to such a commitment. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (SBU) European and LAS donors appear to be ready to move forward rapidly to make the Baidoa Security Committee's plans a reality. This would establish a loose framework and basic essential security infrastructure for at least the next 3-6 months. Donors on the Baidoa trip were very complimentary of the way in which the principle warlords Habsade, Shatigudud, and Adan Madobe had organized their requests, conducted the meetings, and cooperated among themselves to sell their plan to the donors. END COMMENT. BELLAMY-