OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER: TIME NOT RIGHT FOR GCC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000841 E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM PREF IR IZ LY MU SUBJECT: OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER: TIME NOT RIGHT FOR GCC MISSION TO TEHRAN REF: A. MUSCAT 734 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. MUSCAT 809 ¶C. MUSCAT 792 Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The timing is not right for an Oman-led GCC mission to Tehran, Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusef bin Alawi told the Ambassador in a late evening meeting May 26. He predicted that such a mission, if not properly planned and timed, would entangle GCC governments in unproductive deliberation and debate with Tehran. On Iraq, he said that the security situation in Baghdad does not allow for a visit of a senior Omani official to Iraq. However, he suggested that the U.S. urge Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki to visit Riyadh to secure public support from King Abdullah for his new government. Having just returned form his visit to Libya, Bin Alawi said that while formal diplomatic relations with Tripoli will resume, Oman is unlikely to open an embassy there until next year. On the ongoing security operations in the southern Dhofar region to round up illegal migrants, the Minister claimed the government must now figure out what to do with the captured illegal Somalis, who cannot be returned to their home country. End summary. Time Not Right for GCC Mission to Tehran -------------- ¶2. (C) Bin Alawi repeated previous statements (ref A) made by him and by MFA Under Secretary Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi to the Ambassador that an Omani-led GCC mission to Tehran would prove useful only if the timing were right and plans for managing the issues were very carefully drawn. In Oman's view, he said, neither exists at the moment. Therefore, for the time being, there will be no mission to Tehran. While pointing out that Oman does not, in principle, oppose such a mission, he expressed doubts that any mission in the foreseeable future could produce meaningful results, either on the various bilateral issues of GCC states or on regional issues. ¶3. (C) Bin Alawi said the other GCC countries have not pressured the Omanis to move forward on the Omani-led mission idea, but he expected the matter would be raised again when GCC foreign ministers meet early next month for their regular session. According to Bin Alawi, Oman will argue against a GCC-Iran face-to-face as it would confer on Iran "too much status and power," referring to the adverse perception of a 
joint delegation of six regional governments seemingly appealing to one. (Note: Per Bin Alawi, the last "high-level" GCC delegation to meet with Iran occurred shortly after the 1991 Gulf War and "accomplished nothing.") Bilateral discussions remain the preferred approach in Oman's view. ¶4. (C) The Minister said, "we know the Iranians better than the others (GCC states) and they (the Iranians) would manipulate this to their advantage and put us all in an awkward position." He said that the Iranians would no doubt come prepared with "appropriate" responses and proposals to GCC issues, tying up GCC governments in a useless diplomatic exercise. Moreover, he said, the Iranians would likely attempt to address individual GCC state issues, e.g., the UAE islands dispute, in the broader GCC-Iran context. "Why wold we (the GCC) want to get tangled up in a messthat would lead nowhere and produce nothin?" Bin Alawi concluded that the GCC mission would only make sense if the EU-3 negotiations with Iran on the nuclear portfolio made significant progress. The Ambassador underscored that irrespective of manner, the Iranians must be made to understand that the issue of their nuclear program is not just with the U.S. or other Western governments; it's a concern of the entire international community. The Minister agreed, asserting that the point has been made on several occasions in Omani bilateral discussions with the Iranians. Oman, Libya Resuming Diplomatic Relations -------------- ¶5. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's query on his recent visit to Tripoli, Bin Alawi said he arrived in Tripoli the day after we announced the resumption of U.S.-Libyan diplomatic relations. The Libyans were "sky high" over the announcement, he said. The primary reason for his visit -- the first by an Omani minister on a bilateral mission since the Sultan went in 1973 -- was to open doors for Omani business in Libya's rapidly expanding market. However, Oman probably will not open an embassy in Tripoli for another year, although Tripoli may send an ambassador to Muscat soon. Qadhafi still has "issues," commented Bin Alawi, e.g., he will not visit Italy until Rome apologizes for its occupation of Libya and he is still trying to figure out how to get back on Saudi Arabia's good side. Iraq: New PM Should Visit Riyadh Soon -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador commended the Minister on the Omani government's positive public statement (ref B) on the formation of a new Iraqi government and on the Sultan's message of congratulations to Prime Minister Maliki and suggested that it would be a good time to reconsider a high-level visit to Baghdad. The Minister said he understood the need for such visits by Arab, and particularly GCC, governments but no visit of a high-level Omani is planned; security makes it "just too risky." However, he suggested that the new Iraqi prime minister should visit Riyadh soon to secure the public support of King Abdullah. He asked the U.S. to urge Maliki to visit Riyadh "and get on Abdullah's good side as soon as possible," especially to get Saudi support for addressing the Iraqi government's problems with the Sunnis. Dhofar Operation: What To Do With Somalis -------------- ¶7. (C) Bin Alawi would not comment on the government's ongoing security operations in Oman's southern Dhofar region (ref C),initially intended to round up illegal Somalis. However, he did not dispute the Ambassador's recounting of reports that have come to the Embassy's attention. He indicated that the "problem in Salalah" has been wrapped up, but some illegals have taken refuge in the mountains outside Salalah. He disclaimed reports of armed resistance, but acknowledged the government now has a new problem: what to do with hundreds (comment: maybe over 1,000, per some reports) of Somali illegals who cannot be returned to Somalia. "We're working on that," he said. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Left largely unsaid in Bin Alawi's argument against the proposed GCC mission to Tehran is Oman's reluctance to jeopardize its essentially issue-free relationship with Tehran. Such a mission, regardless of intent, would inevitably be saddled with the several bilateral issues GCC states currently have with Tehran, which Oman would prefer not to deal with and believes should be left to bilateral channels. Moreover, issues of primary concern to regional governments and to the U.S. -) Iran's nuclear weapons development program, active opposition to Middle East peace and support for terrorism )- would receive short shrift by Tehran. GRAPPO