IRAN: FM SHARES NUCLEAR CONCERNS, QUESTIONS U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 000590 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR T, NEA, NEA/ARPI, NEA/RA NSC FOR S.HADLEY CENTCOM FOR CCJ5 CJCS FOR DJ5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016 TAGS: PREL MNUC IR MU SUBJECT: IRAN: FM SHARES NUCLEAR CONCERNS, QUESTIONS U.S. APPROACH REF: MUSCAT 134 Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo. Reason: 1.4 (b, d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In his April 9 meeting with U/S Joseph, Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi argued that rather than getting sucked into divisive debates about Iran's WMD capability a la Iraq, the U.S. needs to change the tack that has led to other recent conflicts and instead seek compromises, such as permitting Iran an R&D program to enrich uranium. He was open to sending signals to Iran via enhanced cooperation with the USG, but said that such signals should be accompanied by positive incentives. He urged Washington to appreciate Oman's deep concern over a possible conflict "next door." End summary. ¶2. (C) Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ambassador Robert Joseph and delegation, accompanied by Ambassador and Pol/Econ Chief, paid a call April 9 on Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi to outline a broad strategic approach to dealing with Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons both as part of a cooperative effort with other GCC states and bilaterally. Our approach, he said, must use all tools at our disposal, including a number of defensive measures such as participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative, missile defense, increased training exercises and declaratory policies. The FM was joined by Ambassador Mohammed Taher Aideed, Chief of European and American Affairs Department, and Mohammed al-Hassan, the Minister's Political Affairs Director. Apparently eager to begin a strategic dialogue on Iran with the U.S., the Minister engaged his guests for nearly two hours. ¶3. (C) The Under Secretary and his party briefed the FM on abundant evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program, noting actions by the IAEA and UN Security Council as further testimony to the growing international consensus that Iran's WMD program must be stopped. The Under Secretary also reviewed how a nuclear armed Iran would only exacerbate Iran's lengthy record of malfeasance in foreign affairs, destabilizing neighbors, perpetrating human rights abuses, and support for terrorism. -------------- On the Heels of Larijani's Visit -------------- ¶4. (C) Bin Alawi called the confrontation over Iran's nuclear program "a big crisis." He shared details of the Sultan and his April 8 meeting with Secretary General of Iran's Supreme Council for National Security Ali Larijani, who assured the Omani government that its uranium enrichment program was for purely peaceful purposes, completely transparent, and subject to IAEA supervision. Larijani also briefed Oman on the genesis of Iran's nuclear energy program, claiming that the USG promoted the idea during the Shah's regime but reneged on a deal to supply nuclear fuel for two reactors. -------------- Proof Less Important Than Peaceful Solution -------------- ¶5. (C) The Minister acknowledged that the USG and Iran disagreed on whether Iran had a weapons program, and that the international community likewise was divided on the subject. Regardless of the current situation, the FM said he was convinced that Iran would indeed pursue WMD if it felt it were under threat, and would not retreat from investments in its nuclear infrastructure made thus far. The important question, he said, was how best to resolve this problem for the sake of peace and stability. Bin Alawi argued passionately that the USG approach of seeking UNSC action will only push the situation closer to military confrontation. "We have enough crises in the region, and we don't need more." ¶6. (C) Refusing to be drawn out as to whether he believed Iran had a weapons program, the FM retorted that, "even if you have proof, we still need to find a compromise solution." He characterized Larijani as being open to dialogue with the U.S. and Baghdad to promote stability in Iraq, for instance, as well as disavowing any Iranian hostile intent. The FM opined that, after the massive casualties of the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran has an obvious self-interest in avoiding further conflict. ¶7. (C) Referring to his brief to the former U.S. Ambassador following his January visit to Iran (reftel),Bin Alawi reiterated that the time is ripe to draw Iran into a binding arrangement. The fact that Iran still publicly disavows a desire for WMD gives the FM hope that confidence-building measures and security guarantees could ultimately dissuade it from completing a weapons program. Satisfying Iran's aspirations to play a bigger role in the international arena might be further inducement, he suggested. But the FM was adamant that UNSC sanctions and threats to its security will only make Iran accelerate its drive for WMD. "We need to freeze this escalation." ¶8. (C) U/S Joseph reiterated that Iran is already pursuing WMD, pointing out that Iran itself was the one that abandoned diplomatic efforts with the EU-3 in January after rejecting numerous inducements to cooperate. The Under Secretary also argued that UNSC action, such as the recent Presidential Statement, is further continuation of diplomatic efforts. The FM rejected the UNSC as a helpful avenue, however, saying that path did not work in the Iraq case and will not work with Iran. But unlike Iraq, the FM argued that Iran "can be seen from our shores," and again urged the USG to appreciate Oman's "deep concern" over the prospect of a conflict "next door." Oman, he said, is imploring Iran to take a reasonable stance, but cannot succeed alone in such dialogue. He pointed optimistically to IAEA DG El Baradei's planned April 13 visit to Tehran as a welcome Iranian reaction to UN pressure, but said any further pressure would simply push them closer to a weapons program. After the Under Secretary expressed the USG's commitment to the UN route in dealing with Iran, Bin Alawi again reacted strongly, saying, "Threats and sanctions never work! All U.S. wars start out that way." He urged that we learn from the past and find a better way to avoid conflict. He also suggested finding a way to improve the effectiveness of the IAEA, rather than risk having it dissolve into divisive disputes as happened prior to OIF. "See what results you got? Let's learn from experience and not land in the same mess." -------------- -------------- Defensive Measures to Impede Iran WMD and Ballistic Missile Programs -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) U/S Joseph told the Foreign Minister that Iran is at a critical juncture in its uranium enrichment development, making it vital that Iran not be permitted to retain a single centrifuge. On this there could be no compromise. He also argued that without threat of UN action, Iran will proceed full-speed with its weapons program. International pressure has demonstrably slowed Iran's program. He underscored that the Administration will not tolerate a nuclear armed Iran. The Minister agreed, saying "Nobody will tolerate it." But he also pointed out that Russia and China, while perhaps opposed to Iran attaining nuclear weapons, cannot be trusted to support the U.S. in preventing it from happening and may even seek to enmesh the U.S. in untenable positions. The North Korea situation, he pointed out, has still not been resolved despite the six-party talks. Moreover, the FM said the IAEA Board of Governors was still deeply divided over Iran, notwithstanding recent lopsided votes. He said some BOG members had confided to him that they voted to report Iran to the UNSC as a result of political pressure, and not out of conviction with the substance of the U.S. and EU argument against Iran. ¶10. (C) U/S Joseph told the Foreign Minister that the number of states convinced of Iran's WMD intentions is growing rapidly as Iran's accelerated drive to enrich uranium makes clear its intention to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. He therefore pointed to the need for a number of international cooperative efforts to support diplomacy, defend ourselves, and effectively apply pressure on Iran to seek a diplomatic solution. The Under Secretary highlighted three kinds of actions: denial and interdiction efforts, including public endorsement of the Proliferation Security Initiative and participation in PSI exercises, closure of Iranian front companies, and cooperation on denying the financing of proliferation; defensive measures such as air and missile defense, counterproliferation exercises, and declaratory policies regarding Iranian use of WMD and closure of the Strait of Hormuz; and counterproliferation planning, such as consequence management training. All of these things would send a serious signal to Iran and put pressure on the regime to reach a diplomatic solution. The Minister stated that Oman does not oppose sending signals to Iran, but noted we should be careful that the signals do not push Iran to develop nuclear weapons. The FM added that these signals should also be accompanied by offers to rehabilitate Iran's standing with the international community. ¶11. (C) The Minister said Oman would look at any proposal the United States has. He said that Oman supports PSI "100 percent" and would look at whether Omani might publicly endorse the PSI, but noted it might have political risks. At U/S Joseph's suggestion, he said his ministry would consider sending a representative to a PSI High Level Political Meeting hosted by Poland in June. Moreover, Oman agrees that the NPT and nuclear safeguards architecture is porous and needs strengthening. The FM argued for some international mechanism to help poor nations obtain affordable access to nuclear power as another way to limit proliferation concerns. The Under Secretary said the USG strongly supports those ideas and has already launched initiatives, such as the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP),to address them. The Minister welcomed receiving further information about the Partnership. He described Oman's great concern over keeping open the Strait of Hormuz, and preserving the modus vivendi delicately achieved over the years with Iran on that score. -------------- Continuing Conversation in Washington -------------- ¶12. (C) At the close of the meeting, the Minister thanked U/S Joseph for the frank exchange of views, underscoring that Oman is committed to its cooperation with the U.S. even if sometimes there are differences of opinion. His message was "tough" because Oman cares deeply about the need to avoid crisis with Iran. In the event of war, Oman would suffer, but America's other GCC allies would suffer even more given their domestic sectarian issues and large expatriate Iranian populations. The Minister said he looked forward to a possible meeting with Secretary Rice during his upcoming visit to Washington. ¶13. (U) Participants U.S.: Under Secretary Robert Joseph Gary A. Grappo, U.S. Ambassador to Oman Jason Ellis, Senior Advisor Gregory Richard, Senior Advisor Patricia McNerney, Senior Advisor Nikhil Ramchand, NSC Director Michael Snowden, Political/Economic Chief ¶14. (U) The Under Secretary's party cleared this cable. GRAPPO