BIN ALAWI CONVOKES U.S., EU AMBASSADORS TO REVIEW MESHAAL VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 000554 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA, NEA/IPA, NEA/ARPI E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2016 TAGS: SUBJECT: BIN ALAWI CONVOKES U.S., EU AMBASSADORS TO REVIEW MESHAAL VISIT REF: MUSCAT 527 Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs delivered a three-point message to visiting Hamas Political Chief Khalid Meshaal on April 3-4: Hamas must concentrate on building a viable and stable Palestinian state; must join the PLO and (implicitly) submit to previous PLO agreements with Israel; and must communicate more positive messages to the international community in order to be taken and treated seriously. Bin Alawi told Meshaal that Oman would not alter its current relationship with Israel, consisting largely of continuing contacts and communications. No direct request for financial assistance was made by Meshaal, and Oman offered none. Bin Alawi predicted "significant movement" on the part of the Hamas government "within the month" but shared no specifics. Oman, whose officials have never before met with Hamas, is still assessing Hamas and the new Palestinian government, but bin Alawi said he believes that "engagement" with Hamas may be having a moderating effect on Hamas' attitudes. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The MFA convoked U.S. and EU Ambassadors/Charges on April 5, 2006, to receive a briefing from Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi (bin Abdulla) (YBA),on the recent visit of Hamas Political Chief, Khaled Meshaal. The EU was represented by ambassadors of the U.K., Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and Austria and the Dutch Charge. MFA Under Secretary Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi also attended. The meeting lasted approximately one hour and was devoted entirely to the recent visit of Meshaal. -------------- First Contact -------------- ¶3. (C) YBA said that he met Meshaal at the airport and spoke with him extensively in his car and at a meeting location that he did not disclose. He conditioned his remarks to the assembled ambassadors by saying that this was the first time that an Omani official had met with a representative of Hamas. Moreover, the Omanis, after this initial meeting, continue to gauge and "take the measure of" Hamas and the new Hamas government. However, he said, his first impression of Meshaal was that he was a "pragmatic thinker" and a person of strong character. He opined that the time Meshaal had spent in Jordan in the 1990s and his apparent relationship with then King Hussein had had a moderating effect on his thinking and political outlook. YBA also said that Meshaal appeared to advocate a moderate Islamist vision for the region and recognized the need for stability. YBA said that Meshaal's other meetings with Omani officials were largely ceremonial, including that with Deputy Prime Minister for Ministerial Council Affairs, Sayyid Fahd bin Mahmud al Sa'id. -------------- Oman's Message to Hamas -------------- ¶4. (C) Bin Alawi said that he communicated three important messages to the Hamas representative. -- First, in the view of Oman, all the thinking and planning of the Hamas government must focus on building a viable Palestinian state. Hamas must show that it is able to establish a proper governing system to both Palestinians and to the international community in order to be taken seriously. -- Second, Hamas must join the PLO. The PLO had embraced the Oslo process and subsequent measures in the peace process. It is important that Hamas, as the elected government, join the PLO now. YBA said that he applied "serious pressure" on Meshaal for Hamas to join the PLO and that Meshaal voiced no objections to this. However, he said, Meshaal argued that the PLO must reform before Hamas may join it. YBA countered that this would take too long and Hamas must join the PLO now. Meshaal listened and said that Hamas would take Omani views into consideration. -- Third, the Hamas government must begin to communicate "positive messages" to the rest of the world. This was critically important to the international community's ability to take the new government seriously. -------------- Meshaal: Need Israeli Concessions -------------- ¶5. (C) YBA said that he found Meshaal "forthcoming," not only because of Hamas' need for financial aid, but also because Hamas has begun to see that Arab support for the new Palestinian government will be based on positive actions on the three points communicated by the Omanis. Nevertheless, bin Alawi acknowledged that Hamas has a great deal of skepticism regarding the peace process. He said that Hamas believes the Palestinian Authority (PA) has heretofore made "all the concessions" with little reciprocation by the Israeli side, citing the example of discussions and negotiations that ARAFAT and, more recently, Abu Mazen have had with the Israelis with little result. Meshaal reportedly repeatedly complained that the absence of Israeli concessions is making life "miserable for the Palestinian people." YBA said that he did not argue with Meshaal on this point but interjected that the Palestinians have not been blameless and that there have been many mistakes made on both sides. -------------- Financial Assistance: No Request, No Offer -------------- ¶6. (C) On the subject of PA finances, Meshaal said that the Palestinian Finance Ministry is broke and carrying 700 million USD in PLO and PA debt. The only current source of funding for the PA is taxes and fees collected by the PA itself, which average on the order of 35 million USD (NFI). Meshaal also reportedly raised the question of U.S. assistance, telling YBA that the Americans will channel all of their aid through humanitarian organizations but that this will take too long to meet the PA's immediate needs. Later in the briefing, the French ambassador raised the question of financial support for the Palestinians. YBA responded that there was no direct request from Meshaal to the Omanis and no Omani aid was offered. YBA told the chiefs of mission that Oman recognizes the Palestinian Authority and works through the Arab League to support the Palestinian Authority. All of Oman,s assistance is channeled through the Arab League. -------------- Quartet Conditions -------------- ¶7. (C) In response to a question from the British ambassador on Hamas meeting the conditions of the Quartet for engagement with the U.S. and EU, YBA said that Oman's approach is to urge Hamas to become a member of the PLO, which has recognized Israel's right to exist and has accepted all previous commitments made to Israel. Oman believes that getting Hamas to join the PLO is the proper mechanism for Hamas' acceptance of the Quartet's conditions. Moreover, in the view of the Omanis, Hamas' acceptance of these conditions before joining the PLO would undermine the effectiveness and integrity of the PLO. -------------- Hamas, Abbas Working Well Together -------------- ¶8. (C) The Italian ambassador asked YBA for his sense of the decision-making process of the Hamas government. YBA indicated indirectly that the Hamas government and Abbas appear to have a good working relationship, which probably predated the Palestinian elections. Bin Alawi said that Abbas may be philosophically and politically closer to Hamas' thinking, particularly in areas like corruption. He said that Hamas appears determined to stop corruption but commented that, in his view, this will not be easy, although Hamas probably will have a freer hand than does Abbas. -------------- Omani-Israeli Relations Unchanged -------------- ¶9. (C) The French ambassador asked about Omani contacts in dealings with the Israeli government. Bin Alawi said that the Omanis hosted a very successful visit of an Israeli delegation in February and that contacts and communication are "almost daily" between the Omani and Israeli governments. MFA Under Secretary Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi interjected that he had just completed a phone conversation with an Israeli official to review Meshaal's visit. -------------- Hamas Determined To Control Violence -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador asked if there had been a discussion with Meshaal on the Quartet's requirement that Hamas renounce violence and terrorism. YBA responded that Hamas recognizes the practical necessity to address this critical issue and is "determined" to control violence in Palestinian territories as well as cross-border violence. However, bin Alawi volunteered that he was skeptical in the near term that Hamas, the organization, will renounce its "right to resist the occupation." The Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs opined that treatment of this issue by Hamas will require very skilled handling on its part and that Hamas will attempt to link action on this particular condition to further Israeli concessions. He said that Meshaal told him Hamas wants an Israeli government that will negotiate "seriously" with the Palestinians. In that vein, he said he detected some optimism on Meshaal's part in the differing positions of the Israeli political parties Kadima and Labor with respect to Israeli withdrawal from West Bank settlements. ¶11. (C) YBA concluded his briefing of the ambassadors opining that there may be important "positive movement" by the Hamas government within the next month. The Ambassador asked if there was something specific in Meshaal's comments that led him to this view. YBA said that he "gathered" this as a result of his extensive conversation with Meshaal and that the purported action would be taken in coordination with President Abbas. Bin Alawi said that the two sides agreed to keep channels of communication open and that the Omanis will continue to assess and take stock of Hamas. Hamas has begun to moderate some of the positions it took immediately after the Palestinian elections, said bin Alawi, and that this clearly had come as a result of ongoing consultations with Arab and other governments. In the Omani view, this demonstrates that engagement with the Hamas government is working. ¶12. (C) Comment: Several of the EU ambassadors told the Ambassador that today's brief by bin Alawi was unprecedented in their tenure in Oman. The ambassadors concluded that the Omanis clearly wanted to alleviate possible concerns of the U.S. and the EU with respect to the recent visit of Meshaal and Oman's policy toward the Hamas government. GRAPPO