SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER GENERAL JOHN P.

S E C R E T MUSCAT 001600 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS CENTCOM FOR GENERAL ABIZAID FROM AMBASSADOR GRAPPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016 TAGS: PARM PREL PTER KNNP MARR MASS MNUC MOPS OVIP MU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER GENERAL JOHN P. ABIZAID REF: MUSCAT 1369 Classified By: AMBASSADOR GARY A. GRAPPO FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Embassy Muscat and I warmly welcome your return to Oman. Oman remains a strong friend and ally in the Global War on Terrorism, but prefers to maintain a low profile and is reluctant to deploy its forces in support of OIF or OEF. Our continued engagement with the Omani security forces continues to grow and deepen, especially in the area of border security. Regional threat issues remain a prominent concern for the Omani leadership; however, Oman's perspective on the threat posed by Iran often is different than that of the USG and even its GCC partners. Iraq and the Israel-Palestinian conflict are the two other key regional concerns for Oman. Preparations for the Oman-hosted GCC exercise in Jan-Feb 2007 have consumed the Omani military, but may prove to be a springboard for better regional security cooperation. Our IMET and FMS operations are active and significant, and we have had some success in using other DoD programs, such as 1033 counter-terrorism funds, to assist Oman's efforts to control its border. End Summary. Regional Security Concerns -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) While neither the political nor military leadership wants to describe Iran as a threat (they are quick to remind us that "Iran is not an enemy"),Omani officials have indicated that they are very concerned with Iran's nuclear ambitions. In one candid conversation, a senior officer remarked that the Omani military could not decide which was the worse option: a strike against Iran's nuclear capability and the resulting turmoil it would cause in the Gulf, or inaction and having to live with a nuclear-capable Iran (and the probable reaction from Saudi Arabia and Egypt to pursue their own capabilities). However, during the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) meeting in Muscat last month, the Omani leadership made it clear that they do not see SEW with Patriots as a priority. They agree that SEW, to include a maritime aspect, would be extremely beneficial, but they view any Iranian reaction as being asymmetrical, not via missiles. OMC is working to include the GSD military pillars into the annual JMC. ¶3. (S/NF) The Omani leadership remains concerned with Iraq's future and will want to hear your views on the situation there, and more importantly on what direction the U.S. will now take in Iraq. The same holds true for Afghanistan/Pakistan, especially as Oman is seeing an increase in illegal smuggling of people (mostly migrant workers) and drugs coming from Afghanistan/Pakistan, often with Iranian involvement. ¶4. (SBU) While U.S. military engagement with Oman remains strong, there have been other important developments in the bilateral relationship. The U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement was ratified by the U.S. Congress earlier this year and signed by the President on September 26 and by the Sultan days afterwards. The target date for implementation is January 1, 2007. As Oman drives toward industrialization and economic diversification, several billion dollars of U.S. investment have poured into Oman in the past few years, including from Dow Chemical (petrochemical complex),Bechtel (aluminum smelter) and Occidental Petroleum. Oman has also been a recipient of USG reform assistance efforts under the Middle East Partnership Initiative, which focuses on judicial, educational, economic and political reform, as well as women's empowerment. Furthermore, Oman is an active participant in two port/cargo security programs sponsored by the USG: the Container Security Initiative (administered by the Department of Homeland Security),which pre-screens containerized cargo being shipped to the U.S.; and the Department of Energy's MegaPorts Initiative, which is working to install equipment at Omani ports to identify nuclear material. Foreign Policy Context -------------- ¶5. (S) Though not a major financial donor, Oman supports USG efforts to promote security and political stability in Iraq. Iraq's Foreign Minister met with his Omani counterpart in Muscat on November 14, 2005; the Omani government has completely forgiven Iraqi debt. The Sultanate has publicly condemned several high-profile terrorist attacks, while stressing religious tolerance at home. Determined to maintain normal relations with Iran, Oman supports efforts to discourage Tehran's nuclear weapons programs through dialogue, rather than confrontation. Oman has used its ties with Tehran to urge the Iranians to adopt a more conciliatory approach and to accommodate Western concerns over its nuclear activities. Conversely, senior Omani government officials advise us that sanctions against Iran will likely prove counter-productive and may strengthen hard-line attitudes in Tehran. Oman closed the Israeli Trade Mission in Muscat in 2000 during the Second Intifada, but supports the Roadmap process and still maintains good communications with Israeli officials. ¶6. (S) Oman and Saudi Arabia are the only GCC states that have not yet signed NATO's Istanbul Cooperative Initiative, though we continue to encourage Omani officials to give it serious consideration. The Omani government has assured us of its adherence to the principles of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),and sent observers to the PSI exercise "Anatolia Sun" in May. It declined, however, to participate in "Leading Edge" earlier this month, citing late notice and preparations for GCC military exercises, and is reluctant to publicize its support for PSI. The Sultanate signed an Article 98 agreement with the U.S. in 2004, and during both the JMC and the DCDRUSCENTCOM visit, Oman was encouraged to send an SNR/LNO to CENTCOM and/or participate in other coalition activities. While military leaders understand the benefit of open coalition operations, the final political decision to raise the Omani flag in Tampa has not yet been made. Domestic Counter-Terrorism Efforts -------------- ¶7. (S) Border control is one of Oman's top priorities. From May-July 06, Omani forces conducted operations to round-up illegal aliens in the country. The combined force, led by the Royal Army of Oman with the assistance of the Air Force, police and the Sultan's Special Forces, was quickly surprised by the scope of the problem. When finished, they had arrested over 7500 persons, the vast majority of whom were economic migrants or workers with expired visas or work permits, along with some smugglers. Most surprising was the admission by the RAO CDR that they had suspected al-Qa'ida members would be arrested, though the operation reportedly did not result in the detention of any such persons. Since then, the Royal Oman Police Coast Guard (ROPCG) is reporting an increase in the number of smugglers and economic illegals arrested with some now coming from the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. OMC works with the various military and police services to enhance Oman's ability to both monitor and police its borders. One result of these operations is the realization among most of the leadership in the Sultan's Armed Forces that they have much to learn in combined/joint operations. OMC is working to assist in this area. ¶8. (S/NF) The Omani security and intelligence services are professional, well-funded and motivated. While there have been no reported incidents of international or domestic terrorism in Oman, there were arrests of an Ibadi extremist group in 2005, members of which included military, clerical, and private citizens. One of those arrested was previously convicted in the attempted murder of two British nationals in two separate incidents, one in 2003 and one in 2004. Also in 2005, two Omani citizens accused of participation in extremist activities were repatriated from abroad, one of whom was arrested while attempting to conduct a suicide operation against coalition forces. While Oman is continually challenged by the threat from extremists hiding among the significant and increasing number of economic migrants and narcotic smugglers that pass through Gulf countries, including Oman, there is little evidence that al-Qa'ida or other terrorist organizations transit Oman in significant numbers. Nevertheless, Oman with its relatively open and welcoming society and increasing numbers of Western tourists, remains vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Confident in its security forces and procedures, however, Omani officials continue to argue, "It can't happen here." Overall Mil-Mil Programs -------------- ¶9. (S) Operations and WRM: Oman has fully supported all access, basing and over-flight requests we have made. NAVCENT flies P-3 patrols from Masirah Island on an irregular single-ship deployment basis. We are enhancing the method in which we share information from these flights with the Omani Navy and Coast Guard. NAVCENT has also begun to use Al Qarin bombing range when US aircraft carriers transit off the coast. CENTAF's War Reserve Materials (WRM) sites at Seeb, Masirah and Thumrait are robust and active. The closure of the military side of Seeb will be a phased reduction starting in 2010 and completion by 2025. This new timeline may be an opportunity to budget funding for construction of the US side of the new airbase, al Masanah. The Omanis would like CENTAF to be a part of this base to include relocating Seeb's WRM site. Funding, though, appears to be an issue. ¶10. (S) Exercises and Engagements: Oman has been preparing, during the latter half of this year, for the GCC exercise it will host in Jan 07. RAFO has requested from the Executive Coordinating Agency (ECA) to borrow equipment to support a bare-base airfield for the exercise. We are working hard to accommodate this request; however, it is contingent on the Oman Ministry of Defense signing the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). Should the ACSA not be signed in time, it may cause some embarrassment to the RAFO as it attempts to change the exercise scope just as the GCC participants begin to arrive. The GCC exercise appears to be designed to be a true test of the SAF's ability to work in a combined/joint atmosphere. OMC believes that when the GCC exercise concludes, the Sultan's Armed Forces, while maintaining high tactical and operational standards, will be even keener to develop joint/combined proficiency. While most major exercises were canceled this year, OMC was able to schedule a number of smaller seminars and training events, such as ARCENT's artillery and counter-IED seminars. JCETS are scheduled for early next year and OMC hopes to integrate counter-IED training into the biennial SAFE HANDLING ordnance disposal training to capitalize on the increased attention that counter-IED training is receiving across the security services. ¶11. (U) IMET/CTFP/NESA: FY06 IMET program was USD 1.089M with Oman sending 27 students to the U.S. 5 students were sent under the CTF Program. FY07 IMET request is USD 1.135M and no student has been sent to training to date. For FY07 no military and no Foreign Ministry official have yet gone to the NESA Center. There are 49 Omani NESA alumni. Foreign Military Sales -------------- ¶12. (C) FY06 FMF is USD 13.86M, a decrease from FY05's USD 19.84M. However, proposed FMF for FY08 calls for an increase to around USD 26M. Numerous FMF cases are working to include NVDs, Naval and Coast Guard boats, M-16 rifles, Javelin and TOW-IIB. Key FMF cases are: a. (U) F-16s: Eleven of the 12 aircraft are in country, with the last aircraft being the test plane now undergoing retrofitting. Prior to the Sep/Oct 06 delivery of the last five aircraft, RAFO discovered foreign objects (excess parts/trash) overlooked during production. Lockheed Martin delayed deliveries while it increased Quality Assurance procedures. RAFO has asked both OMC and LM to look at re-compensation for inspection and replacement procedures caused by sloppy manufacturing. Case value is USD 750M. b. (U) Mobile Field Hospital: A high-visibility FMF case with delivery scheduled for Dec 06; one month before the Omanis intend to use the hospital at the GCC exercise in 07. OMC is working daily with USASAC to insure timely delivery as this case is followed by CDR Royal Army of Oman and COSSAF. Case value is USD 3.1M. c. (U) Tropospheric Scatter Network (Troposcatter) and 1kW HF Radios: Omani officials cite these cases when they complain about the slow nature of FMS. These systems will provide integrated national C2; they gained in priority after the Omani operation to roundup illegal immigrants. Company design of system requirements and availability have taken two years. LOAs are still pending. d. (C) Counter Narcotics/Counter Terrorism/Border Security: The Royal Oman Police, parent organization of the ROP Coast Guard, used Article 1004 funding to upgrade the command and control facility at ROP/HQ and to obtain secure HF radios for Coast Guard boats and stations. The radio upgrade was completed this month. ROP and OMC are working to obtain additional 1004 and 1033 money to institute further border control and counter narcotic/terrorism programs. ¶13. (S/NF) Bilateral Intel Exchanges: Oman and the U.S. have an active intelligence exchange program that is now focused on Iranian military activity. In March 06, CCJ2 conducted an Affiliation Seminar with joint Omani security force representatives focused on Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. With the demise of the ELINT information sharing program (Cluster Spectrum),due to aging U.S.-provided equipment, Oman is looking to acquire new ELINT/SIGINT equipment to fill the gap. This desire has grown stronger in light of global tensions with Iran. ¶14. (C) Omani officials will likely ask you for an update on the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as current U.S. thinking on Iran. They may also press for an opinion on the recent U.S. Congressional elections and how the results may influence U.S. foreign policy and security in the region. In addition to briefing Omani officials, your visit to Muscat will afford us an important opportunity to gauge the views of senior Omanis, and the Sultan in particular, on Iran and other regional issues. Below are some questions that you may wish to raise during your proposed meeting with the Sultan, as well as with Minister Responsible for Defense Affairs Badr Saud al-Busaidi and the COSSAF (LTG Nabahani): ¶A. Meeting with Sultan Qaboos bin Said -- What is your view on Iran's long-term ambitions and strategy in the region? -- What threat does Iran pose to Oman and/or its neighbors? -- What is your opinion of the Iranian leadership? -- If Iran were to obtain a nuclear weapon, what would be the reaction of Arab states? Of Oman? -- In what way, and under what circumstances, could Oman make further contributions to Iraq's security and stability? -- How do you view the fight against terrorism and extremism as progressing? -- How can we better support the Lebanese government in light of the challenges from Hizballah and Syrian-backed forces? ¶B. Meetings with Defense Minister and COSSAF -- What do you hope to achieve in the upcoming GCC exercise? -- What are your most pressing border security concerns? -- Do you foresee any instance in which Iran would pose a security threat to Oman? -- Do you have a strategy or contingency plans to defend against possible Iranian attacks? -- What kind of threat might Iran, especially if it obtains nuclear weapons capability, pose to other GCC states? -- What is your view of the Iranian military leadership? Who is the most competent? The most political? ¶15. (U) In conclusion, the overall Oman-U.S. military-to-military relationship is solid. The day to day interaction is candid with a spirit of helpfulness on both sides. We look to strengthen this already great relationship. GRAPPO