OMANI ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAQ

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 001588 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016 TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR IZ MU SUBJECT: OMANI ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAQ REF: STATE 181228 Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (S) Summary: Oman has not pursued proactive engagement with the Iraqi government due to a lack of strong tribal, economic or religious ties with Iraq, geographic distance, and a cautious foreign policy that seeks to avoid playing a highly visible role on contentious issues. Omani concerns about security in Iraq, combined with a limited Iraqi diplomatic and commercial presence in Muscat and a dearth of senior Iraqi visitors, also contribute to Oman's low-key posture toward Iraq. Stepped up engagement by Oman will likely depend on an improved security environment in Iraq, a more active Iraqi embassy in Muscat to include a defense attach, Arab League and/or GCC moves to enhance ties with Baghdad, identification of specific (but low-profile) opportunities for distinct Omani contributions, and a clear and consistent message from Washington reinforced by senior-level USG visitors. The paragraphs below respond to reftel questions. End Summary. ¶2. (S) While Oman, like other Arab countries, remains very concerned about the situation in Iraq, it nevertheless feels somewhat removed and insulated from events there. Given Oman's weak ties to Baghdad, its desire to avoid controversy, and its tendency to defer to GCC members with more of a vested interest in Iraq, it will be difficult to convince the Omanis to become more actively engaged under current circumstances. ¶A. Diplomatic/Political Engagement: Oman is not opposed to opening a diplomatic mission in Baghdad, but would only consider doing so if the security situation in the Iraqi capital improves markedly. The opening of operational embassies in Baghdad by the other GCC states would likely hasten an Omani decision to establish a diplomatic presence in Iraq. Oman is likewise open to receiving high-level visitors from Baghdad (Iraq's Foreign Minister came to Muscat in November 2005) and can be expected to welcome them with all appropriate courtesies. The onus for such visits will be on Iraq, however, as Oman will not lobby Baghdad to send a senior official to Muscat. Oman would likely back resolutions at the United Nations or other multi-lateral fora supporting the Iraqi government if there were Arab consensus in favor of such moves. ¶B. Financial Assistance: Oman has completely forgiven �00A;Iraq's debt, but concerns about corruption in Iraq and the Omani government's traditionally tight purse-strings make a financial contribution above Oman's original USD 3 million Madrid Donor conference pledge unlikely. A significant increase in the donations of other GCC countries might prod Muscat to up its contribution. ¶C. Security Assistance: It is highly unlikely that Oman could be persuaded to send troops, military/security advisors, or weapons or ammunition to aid the Iraqi government. Neither will it contribute instructors to current multi-lateral efforts to train the Iraqi armed forces and police. Historically, Oman has avoided participation in all peacekeeping-related exercises despite the otherwise ideal suitability and capability of its armed forces. Oman might, however, consider participating in a security training program formally administered by the United Nations or Arab League that succeeds in attracting instructors from most other GCC states. The Omani military and police might also accept a small number of Iraqis to train and study at its staff colleges, although payment of related costs would have to be worked out. The lack of a defense attach at the Iraqi Embassy in Muscat seriously hampers the development of Oman-Iraq security/military ties. ¶3. (S) Engaging the Omanis on Iraq: U.S. messages to Oman on support for Iraq should be clear and consistent. Ideally they should focus on the potential benefits to the region from greater engagement with Baghdad, and avoid trying to pressure the government to assume a more active role. Extension of the GCC 2 (Jordan and Egypt) consultative mechanism with Washington to discuss Iraq and other regional issues could help significantly to reinforce our message on this subject. Visits by high-level USG officials are especially important and necessary if we are to persuade senior Omani cabinet ministers and, most importantly, the Sultan, to step up Oman's engagement on Iraq. MUSCAT 00001588 002 OF 002 ¶4. (S) Possible Contributions: Oman is most likely to make a contribution to Iraq if it believes it could meet a specific, definable and achievable need that does not require a major undertaking, can be managed in a low-key manner attracting little public attention, and is not already being covered by its GCC partners or other states. Accordingly, the U.S. could work with Iraq to help identify well-defined opportunities for Oman to make a distinct contribution to the building of a secure and stable Iraq. For example, if some Iraqi civil servants require training abroad to perform specific duties, the U.S. and Iraq could consider approaching Muscat to fulfill this training need. A more dynamic and better informed Iraqi diplomatic mission in Muscat would facilitate efforts in this regard, as well as help strengthen overall Oman-Iraq relations. ¶5. (S) Syria: Oman recognizes and is wary of Syria's unhelpful role regarding Iraq, but has limited ties with Damascus and no real influence with the Syrian leadership. In line with its policy of supporting cooperative dialogue between all countries, the Omani government would most likely welcome improved relations between Iraq and Syria, particularly as this could benefit the security environment in Iraq. ¶6. (S) Iran: Like other Arab countries, Oman is troubled by negative Iranian influence in Iraq, as well as by Iran's nuclear ambitions. However, fears voiced by some Sunni Arab leaders of Iran-led efforts to aggravate sectarian conflicts in the region, starting with Iraq, do not resonate deeply in Oman as a majority of Omanis are Ibadhi Muslims and the local Shiah minority (who comprise no more than 5 percent of the population) are well integrated into Omani society. Reflecting its good relations with Tehran, Oman supports engagement and dialogue between Iran and other countries, including Iraq. It would accordingly favor stronger official ties between Tehran and Baghdad, provided this does not come at the expense of stability and security. As both Oman and Iran value their bilateral relationship, Oman could serve as a helpful, behind-the-scenes advocate for more constructive Iranian behavior toward Iraq. GRAPPO