YBA POSES QUESTION RE IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000134 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA, NEA/ARPI, EB/ESC NSC FOR DNSA HADLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016 TAGS: PREL EPET ETTC IR MU UN UNSC SUBJECT: YBA POSES QUESTION RE IRAN REF: A. 05 MUSCAT 02 ¶B. 05 MUSCAT 1304 ¶C. 05 MUSCAT 1644 (NOTAL) ¶D. 05 MUSCAT 1876 ¶E. 06 MUSCAT 130 Classified By: AMBASSADOR RICHARD L. BALTIMORE III. REASON: 1.4 (B,D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (U) Please note action request in para 8. ¶2. (C) Begin Summary: Notwithstanding the January 30 P5 2 Statement, the Omanis believe the key to a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis may lie in a slight delay before referring the Iranian case to the UNSC, even if no action is called for until March. They base this belief on a series of meetings that Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Bin Alawi had over the past 48 hours in Tehran and feel that such a move could yield some ancillary positive political benefits elsewhere in the region as well. End Summary ¶3. (C) Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi (YBA) met with the ambassador on February 1 re his recent trip to Iran. In YBA's view, "all the people relevant to the decisionmakers" were surprisingly forthcoming in their conversations with him. Dismissing Muscat's bilateral relationship with Tehran as secondary, YBA reported that there were two really important issues he was most concerned about: (1) Nuclear developments and (2) Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East. -------------- NUCLEAR ISSUE -------------- ¶4. (C) YBA confirmed that this was the primary concern of his interlocutors. The Iranians told him that they had accepted the Russian offer in principle one month ago but they remained concerned about specific details that Moscow never made clear. Two outstanding areas still to be agreed upon are: a) technical - exactly where would the enrichment take place and over what period of time? and b) legal - outstanding questions concerning sovereignty, the possibility of forming a joint venture, plus territorial questions. -------------- IRANIAN BEHAVIOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST -------------- ¶5. (C) YBA said he stressed the need for the Iranians to reconsider their own foreign policy and the need for reform in their approach to the West. He said he was direct and specific in focusing on the core problems in the Middle East and suggested that the Iranians were acting more like thugs than a regional and historical power. He believes that the Iranians need to employ some confidence building measures with the West if they are serious about abandoning their confrontational approach to Western interests. All of his interlocutors, from Rafsanjani to Mottaki, reportedly conceded this point but claimed they were currently totally preoccupied with the nuclear question. YBA was told that Tehran is prepared to initiate a package of policy shifts and that YBA's should "tell your friends that we are ready to change," but not under foreign pressure. -------------- WHAT NEXT? -------------- ¶6. (C) YBA believes that there is a small but realistic chance that if the Iranians had a few more weeks (he specifically mentioned three) before the IAEA refers their case to the UNSC, the Russians would have an opportunity to clarify some crucial aspects of their offer and the Iranians would make good on their offer to reform their foreign policy re other matters in the region. He noted an Iranian law that requires the government to suspend all cooperation with the IAEA if Iran is referred to the UNSC, regardless of whether immediate action is taken on it in New York. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador reminded YBA the Iranians have clearly been told what they have to do, i.e., reinstate the full suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, resume negotiations with the EU-3 in good faith, cooperate with the IAEA, and implement the Additional Protocol. The Ambassador also stressed the need for the Iranians to understand that their non-responsiveness to the IAEA Board and the fact that they were found in non-compliance with their NPT safeguards obligations in September 2005 are major sources of the current tension and that the key to resolution lies in Iranian hands. -------------- ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶8. (C) YBA said he understood the points made in para 7 above and was familiar with the P5 2 Statement. Nonetheless, he would like an official response from Washington re exploring the admittedly slim possibility of making headway in getting the Iranians to start to reform their general foreign policy in exchange for a delay of several weeks before referring the nuclear issue to the UNSC. Please advise. BALTIMORE