TFLE01: LEBANON CRISIS COMPLICATES IRAN NUCLEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 001174

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2016
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL AORC MU
SUBJECT: TFLE01: LEBANON CRISIS COMPLICATES IRAN NUCLEAR
FILE

REF: STATE 119436

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In a July 30 meeting with the Ambassador, MFA Under
Secretary Sayyid Badr said the crisis in Lebanon is

SIPDIS
complicating the Iran nuclear matter and may even harden
Tehran's position. He urged that greater emphasis be placed
on continuing diplomatic efforts to build trust in the
region, which he views as the key to resolving the current
crises in Iran and Lebanon. Sayyid Badr criticized the U.S.
position on Lebanon as being too close to Israel and
cautioned that a forthcoming MFA statement on the Lebanese
crisis might be surprising, though balanced in urging for
further negotiations. End Summary.

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P5 1 OFFER: BE PATIENT
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2. (C) On July 30, the Ambassador delivered reftel points to
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Under Secretary (deputy-secretary
equivalent) Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi. Sayyid Badr agreed that
the package offered a promising step in opening constructive
dialogue with Iran, but questioned the need for quick action.
He advised that the international community should be
patient in waiting for Iran's formal response, which it has
promised by August 22. By doing so, Sayyid Badr reasoned,
the international community would be able to ensure that all
members were fully on-board with the package. Sayyid Badr
stated that should the Iranians miss this deadline, the
international community would then be better placed to
consider further UN Security Council measures.

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MATTER OF TRUST
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3. (C) Sayyid Badr pointed out, however, that the ongoing
crisis in Lebanon will complicate the matter and could even
harden Tehran's position. He surmised that the current
Lebanese crisis contributed to feelings of deep mistrust in
Iran. Given this environment, where there were no assurances
or guarantees, he predicted that the Security Council would
face an uphill battle in convincing Iran to abandon its
uranium enrichment program. Sayyid Badr suggested that the
best course of action would be to reassure Iran that it might
restart its enrichment program for peaceful purposes once
confidence was established within the international
community. Absent a sufficient level of trust, however,
Sayyid Badr predicted that Iran would continue to shun
efforts to integrate itself into the international community.

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END IN SIGHT?
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4. (C) Sayyid Badr used the Iranian impasse to segue into a
discussion of the Lebanese crisis, where deep mistrust had
dampened the effectiveness of previous peace initiatives.
Sayyid Badr questioned whether the Israeli government could
move away from "old-fashioned" thinking in addressing the
changing dynamics of regional conflicts, in which mobile
militias have replaced organized armies as Israel's main
adversaries. Sayyid Badr predicted that even if Israel
destroyed Hezballah, instability would continue as smaller
Hezballah-like organizations rise to fill the void.


5. (C) In the absence of a strong resolution of the core
issues driving these conflicts, Sayyid Badr was pessimistic
about the chances of a lasting peace ever taking root in the
region or even a short-term resolution of the Lebanon crisis.
In this respect, Sayyid Badr urged the international
community to "come to grips with this." He criticized the
international community for being "disturbingly" weak in
responding to these crises, arguing that greater emphasis
needed to be placed on holding regional actors to already
agreed upon commitments such as UN Resolution 1559 as well as
442 and 338. Sayyid Badr argued that the solution would not
be found through conflict, but rather through continued
emphasis on already-established diplomatic efforts.

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UNCOMFORTABLE POSITION
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6. (C) In the interim, Sayyid Badr expressed his concern that
the Lebanese crisis placed U.S. allies like Oman in a
difficult position vis-a-vis public sentiment, which is
increasingly supportive of Hezballah. In this regard, Sayyid
Badr criticized the U.S. stance as being too closely aligned
with the Israeli position and cryptically cautioned that the
U.S. "shouldn't be surprised" when it reads future Omani
government press statements concerning the Lebanese crisis.
The Ambassador urged that any Omani statement be balanced, in
particular holding Hezballah responsible for instigating the
violence and acting contrary to UNSC 1559 and the Taif
Accords. Sayyid Badr reassured the Ambassador that any
statement coming from the Ministry would be "balanced" in
stressing the need for a negotiated settlement.

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COMMENT
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7. (C) Like others in the region, the Omani government is
facing enormous public pressure to take a position condemning
Israel's actions in Lebanon and U.S. support for Israel. The
onslaught of patently biased media reporting in which Israel
and the U.S. are held entirely responsible for the crisis and
resulting casualties, Arab governments are criticized for
inaction, and Hezballah is increasingly lionized, is making
the normally reserved Omani leadership very nervous. At a
diplomatic reception last evening, one MFA official took the
Ambassador aside to caution that "something must be done" as
the U.S. will "suffer the most" from the crisis. Despite
Sayyid Badr's assurance, we would not expect a balanced
statement from the Omanis. However, neither would we expect
direct criticism of the U.S. Nevertheless, the Omani
government is once again feeling the heat from its public for
its close relationship with the U.S.
GRAPPO