TFLE01: LEBANON CRISIS COMPLICATES IRAN NUCLEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 001174 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/ARP E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2016 TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL AORC MU SUBJECT: TFLE01: LEBANON CRISIS COMPLICATES IRAN NUCLEAR FILE REF: STATE 119436 Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a July 30 meeting with the Ambassador, MFA Under Secretary Sayyid Badr said the crisis in Lebanon is SIPDIS complicating the Iran nuclear matter and may even harden Tehran's position. He urged that greater emphasis be placed on continuing diplomatic efforts to build trust in the region, which he views as the key to resolving the current crises in Iran and Lebanon. Sayyid Badr criticized the U.S. position on Lebanon as being too close to Israel and cautioned that a forthcoming MFA statement on the Lebanese crisis might be surprising, though balanced in urging for further negotiations. End Summary. -------------- P5 1 OFFER: BE PATIENT -------------- ¶2. (C) On July 30, the Ambassador delivered reftel points to Ministry of Foreign Affairs Under Secretary (deputy-secretary equivalent) Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi. Sayyid Badr agreed that the package offered a promising step in opening constructive dialogue with Iran, but questioned the need for quick action. He advised that the international community should be patient in waiting for Iran's formal response, which it has promised by August 22. By doing so, Sayyid Badr reasoned, the international community would be able to ensure that all members were fully on-board with the package. Sayyid Badr stated that should the Iranians miss this deadline, the international community would then be better placed to consider further UN Security Council measures. -------------- MATTER OF TRUST -------------- ¶3. (C) Sayyid Badr pointed out, however, that the ongoing crisis in Lebanon will complicate the matter and could even harden Tehran's position. He surmised that the current Lebanese crisis contributed to feelings of deep mistrust in Iran. Given this environment, where there were no assurances or guarantees, he predicted that the Security Council would face an uphill battle in convincing Iran to abandon its uranium enrichment program. Sayyid Badr suggested that the best course of action would be to reassure Iran that it might restart its enrichment program for peaceful purposes once confidence was established within the international community. Absent a sufficient level of trust, however, Sayyid Badr predicted that Iran would continue to shun efforts to integrate itself into the international community. -------------- END IN SIGHT? -------------- ¶4. (C) Sayyid Badr used the Iranian impasse to segue into a discussion of the Lebanese crisis, where deep mistrust had dampened the effectiveness of previous peace initiatives. Sayyid Badr questioned whether the Israeli government could move away from "old-fashioned" thinking in addressing the changing dynamics of regional conflicts, in which mobile militias have replaced organized armies as Israel's main adversaries. Sayyid Badr predicted that even if Israel destroyed Hezballah, instability would continue as smaller Hezballah-like organizations rise to fill the void. ¶5. (C) In the absence of a strong resolution of the core issues driving these conflicts, Sayyid Badr was pessimistic about the chances of a lasting peace ever taking root in the region or even a short-term resolution of the Lebanon crisis. In this respect, Sayyid Badr urged the international community to "come to grips with this." He criticized the international community for being "disturbingly" weak in responding to these crises, arguing that greater emphasis needed to be placed on holding regional actors to already agreed upon commitments such as UN Resolution 1559 as well as 442 and 338. Sayyid Badr argued that the solution would not be found through conflict, but rather through continued emphasis on already-established diplomatic efforts. -------------- UNCOMFORTABLE POSITION -------------- ¶6. (C) In the interim, Sayyid Badr expressed his concern that the Lebanese crisis placed U.S. allies like Oman in a difficult position vis-a-vis public sentiment, which is increasingly supportive of Hezballah. In this regard, Sayyid Badr criticized the U.S. stance as being too closely aligned with the Israeli position and cryptically cautioned that the U.S. "shouldn't be surprised" when it reads future Omani government press statements concerning the Lebanese crisis. The Ambassador urged that any Omani statement be balanced, in particular holding Hezballah responsible for instigating the violence and acting contrary to UNSC 1559 and the Taif Accords. Sayyid Badr reassured the Ambassador that any statement coming from the Ministry would be "balanced" in stressing the need for a negotiated settlement. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) Like others in the region, the Omani government is facing enormous public pressure to take a position condemning Israel's actions in Lebanon and U.S. support for Israel. The onslaught of patently biased media reporting in which Israel and the U.S. are held entirely responsible for the crisis and resulting casualties, Arab governments are criticized for inaction, and Hezballah is increasingly lionized, is making the normally reserved Omani leadership very nervous. At a diplomatic reception last evening, one MFA official took the Ambassador aside to caution that "something must be done" as the U.S. will "suffer the most" from the crisis. Despite Sayyid Badr's assurance, we would not expect a balanced statement from the Omanis. However, neither would we expect direct criticism of the U.S. Nevertheless, the Omani government is once again feeling the heat from its public for its close relationship with the U.S. GRAPPO