TFLE01: IRAN MOVING TO BECOME REGIONAL POWER SAYS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 001169 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2016 TAGS: PARM PREL MU IR KNNP SUBJECT: TFLE01: IRAN MOVING TO BECOME REGIONAL POWER SAYS SULTAN'S ADVISOR REF: STATE 119436 Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Oman supports the P5 1 incentive package (reftel) to Tehran and has communicated its recommendation to the Iranian government that it accept the offer, according to the Sultan's Special Advisor for Cultural Affairs and frequent "special envoy" of Sultan Qaboos to Iran, Abdul 'Aziz al-Rowas. Al-Rowas told the Ambassador July 26 that he believes that chances of Iranian acceptance of the offer, however, are "fifty-fifty." The P5 1 offer is seen by Tehran's hardliners as part of the "U.S. plan for regime change" in Tehran. The former Information Minister also said that Tehran has forged an alliance with Damascus, Hezballah, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan to challenge the U.S. and its allies in the region, beginning with Lebanon, and Iran's nuclear program is part of its strategy to assert its role in the region. End summary. ¶2. (C) Al-Rowas told the Ambassador that Oman supports the P5 1 incentive package (reftel) to Tehran and has communicated its recommendation to the Iranian government that it accept the offer. However, he opined, chances of Iranian acceptance of the offer at the moment were "fifty-fifty." According to the former Information Minister, the Iranian leadership is led by hardliners who fear U.S. plans for regime change in Iran. In his interactions with Iranian leaders, he said, the subject is always raised and, therefore, the P5 1 offer is seen by many of them as part of the U.S. plan to undermine the current leadership in Tehran. In his view, the U.S. and others will have to offer another sign of good intentions to alleviate Iran's firmly held fears about the West, for example, by unfreezing Iran's frozen accounts/assets in the U.S. ¶3. (C) Al-Rowas also said the Iranians have argued that the U.S. had approved Iranian nuclear research and development under the Shah and that, therefore, their actions were "consistent with previous U.S. policy." Nevertheless, al-Rowas expressed the view that development of nuclear weapons )- or, at least, the research necessary to create such a program )- was a clear intention of Iran's current leadership. Such a program, he argued, was essential to the current leadership's plan for asserting Iran's role as a regional power. In doing so, he said, they are aware that they must challenge the U.S. in the region, which they are fully prepared to do. ¶4. (C) Broadening the discussion to the current crisis in Lebanon, al-Rowas, known as a frequent critic of U.S. policy in the region during his 22 years as Oman's powerful and influential Information Minister (1979-2001),said Tehran has forged an alliance with Damascus, Hezballah, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan to challenge the U.S. and U.S.-allied governments in the region. Tehran was directing large amounts of financial support and military weapons and expertise to all of them and sees the current crisis in Lebanon as a critical moment for "claiming regional leadership and handing Israel and the U.S. a major defeat." He predicted that Iran would not accept Hezballah's defeat in the current confrontation with Israel and would do everything necessary to ensure Hezballah's survival. ¶5. (C) Al-Rowas likened the current confrontation in Lebanon and the broader clash between Iran and its allies on one hand and the U.S. and its regional allies on the other to World War II, asserting the West and moderate Arab governments would have to eradicate extremist forces from the Middle East "just as you did the Nazis in Europe" in WWII. While the Iranians and Hezballah had probably miscalculated the Israeli response to Hezballah's kidnapping of the Israeli troops, he said, Israel's reaction would be insufficient to eliminate Hezballah. Israel and the West have seriously underestimated Hezballah's power, resources, planning and determination. Considerably more military resources, "including NATO troops," would be required to defeat Hezballah. Moreover, he said, to gain Arab support for such an effort, it would have to be combined with a concerted and determined effort to establish an independent Palestinian state; otherwise, Arabs could never support such an overwhelming force in the region; its presence would have to be tied to a solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. "I don't think either the U.S. or other western governments are prepared for this yet," he concluded. ¶6. (C) Comment: Al-Rowas dodged several attempts to get him to spell out a role for moderate Arab leaders and governments in the current crisis, for example, by speaking out more forcefully against and condemning Hezballah. Al-Rowas was in agreement that Iran and Hezballah's actions are clearly destabilizing to the region and contrary to the interests of moderate Arab governments, and he acknowledged that an immediate ceasefire would be tantamount to declaring Hezballah the victor. However, he offered no ideas for confronting Hezballah's challenge. After one awkward pause in the discussion, the customarily reserved former minister confessed, "Hezballah -- and Iran -- have already won," referring to the rapidly growing support in the Arab street and media for Hezballah. GRAPPO