NINEWA: SHAMMAR TRIBAL LEADER ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSUL 000045 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/14/2016 TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR SUBJECT: NINEWA: SHAMMAR TRIBAL LEADER ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION, PROVINCIAL POLITICS AND SECURITY MOSUL 00000045 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State. REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Western Ninewa Sunni Arab tribal leader Sheikh Abdullah Al Yawar believes all ethnic and political groups in Baghdad are responsible for failings with the new government formation. He believes the last government's problems were not only the fault of Prime Minister Al Ja'afari, but also that of the Kurds, Shia, and Sunnis. He recommends that sectarian parties -- allowed to participate he claims "thanks" to the USG -- should put aside their prejudices for talks to resume. Abdullah wants provincial elections to occur as soon as possible, but recommends that the tribal community -- the "true voice" of the people -- play a larger role in the government. He predicts the Iraqi Islamic Party will win the vote in Mosul, and the tribal community in western Ninewa. Abdullah says Coalition Forces cannot leave Mosul because Iraqi Security Forces are not fully prepared. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) PRT Leader and PolOff met with Sunni Arab Sheikh Abdullah Homaidi Aljeel Al Yawar, Shammar tribal leader in western Ninewa, in Rabiya on April 7. Al Yawar (more commonly known as "Sheikh Abdullah") inherited the throne after the death of his father (by the same name) in 2003. Al Yawar's interest is in general contracting. He has had direct ties with local politicians and previously supported cousin and vice president Sheikh Ghazi Al Yawar, although the relationship has soured over the past year. -------------- TRIBAL PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION -------------- ¶3. (C) Sheikh Abdullah said he was confident a solution would be found to the impasse over central government formation. Prime Minister Ibrahim Al Ja'afari failed, he said, but not all of those failings were completely his fault. Shia and Kurdish political parties were to blame too, said Abdullah. He claimed all political parties would need to come together soon to help settle the problem or more blood, money, and time would be lost. The USG was also at fault, claimed Abdullah, for allowing "religious" parties to participate in the democratic process. Such parties should "thank the U.S." for allowing them to exist, but also sectarian groups should take the lead with reconciliation, he said. The Kurds did not like Ja'afari, claimed Abdullah, because he did not take their side in settlement of Article 58 and the "Kirkuk issue." Sunnis disliked Ja'afari too because they accused the Shia of "killing Sunnis," he said. Abdullah said these disagreements could be easily overcome if sectarian parties realized they were working for the benefit of the new government. Abdullah recommended the USG closely monitor any talks in the formation of the new GOI. -------------- PROVINCIAL POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT -------------- ¶4. (C) Abdullah claimed the Ninewa economy was in shambles and the provincial government was "nowhere to be found." Sunnis were as much to blame for problems in Ninewa as the Kurds, claimed Abdullah. They could accuse others, such as the Kurds and Shia, but not themselves, he said. He recommended that provincial elections take place as stipulated in the TAL, 60 days after the formation of the new government. Early elections were important because the current provincial government was not representative. Abdullah suggested that any provincial election take place over two days instead of one, since it would allow more people to get to the polls. Given the security situation in Mosul, claimed Abdullah, it was unreasonable to expect voters to travel into unsafe areas in one day to vote. Abdullah claimed that any new Ninewa government should also include tribal leaders, since they were the true voice of the people in the province. Abdullah claimed that he had been in talks with IIP members who were seeking his support for the provincial elections. [NOTE: Abdullah withdrew his public support for cousin Vice President Ghazi Al Yawar during last year's national election, claiming Al Yawar reneged on promises to improve the province]. Regardless, he said, Mosul would vote in favor of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),which he considered the strongest MOSUL 00000045 002.2 OF 002 political party in the province, and tribal leaders would fare the strongest in western Ninewa. However, any new government would have to consider representation from Ninewa's extensive minority community, such as the Yezidis and Christians. -------------- SECURITY FORCES IN NINEWA -------------- ¶5. (C) Abdullah rejected calls by many politicians in Mosul for the immediate removal of Coalition Forces (CF) from the city. "Who will protect it?" asked Abdullah. The time was not right for such a decision, he said. Besides, the Iraqi Army (IA) was not ready to take over, claimed Abdullah. He accused the USG made mistakes with formation of the IA by "training militias," such as the Badr Brigades and Peshmerga. As a result many in the IA were "not officers," since they were not trained in a military academy or training college, he said. Western Ninewa needed CF, said Abdullah. Even the IIP realized this. Abdullah claimed the Shammar tribe gave a list of potential IA candidates to CF to pass to the Ministry of Interior in Baghdad (MOI),but that "no one" was contacted. Abdullah said many Shammar left the IA between 1991 and 2003 after the Kuwait War and because Saddam Hussein was using the IA to kill the Kurds and Shia, he said. Since the tribal community was asked after the fall of the regime to not form militias, members of the tribal community should be allowed to serve in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), he said. Abdullah, who claimed he was very close to the Yezidi community in Sinjar, said members of that community came to him to express their frustration that they could not join the ISF. He said the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in the area prevented the Yezidi from doing so. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) Abdullah, a powerful businessman and tribal leader, considers himself the "true" voice of the Shammar (and even Yezidi) community in western Ninewa. His reach into politics is mostly centered on the Rabiya city council, but as mentioned earlier, he claimed he did play an important role with helping Ghazi Al Yawar get elected in January 2005. His older brother Fazil served as Ghazi Al Yawar's staff assistant for some time before he was removed from his position late last year. Perhaps, for that reason Abdullah switched his allegiance to the IIP. He claims his family has been in talks with the IIP for years, and knows IIP provincial leader Dr. Mohammed intimately. Abdullah says the IIP is courting him, trying to win his support to form a strong coalition for provincial elections slated for later this year. Abdullah represents much of the old Iraq, where power brokers reign and deals are made in the interests -- not necessarily values -- of each party, regardless of ethnicity or allegiance. If Iraq continues on a path towards democracy then anomalies such as Abdullah might find themselves out of business. MUNTER