NINEWA: TAWAFOQ IRAQI FRONT PARLIAMENTARIAN VIEWS ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSUL 000041 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/7/2016 TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR SUBJECT: NINEWA: TAWAFOQ IRAQI FRONT PARLIAMENTARIAN VIEWS ON IRAN AND NEW GOVERNMENT FORMATION MOSUL 00000041 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State. REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Tawafoq Iraqi Front coalition national assemblymembers, who are predominantly from the Iraqi Islamic Party, told us that U.S. pressure on Iran over nuclear issues is causing Iraq's Shia politicians to resist any formation for the new government. They said the end of U.S. pressure on Iran might also help improve security in Iraq as well, and that the USG should communicate directly with the Iranian government to resolve tensions. They said any power sharing agreement in the new federal government must include Sunni Arab and minority voices. They suggested creating additional layers of bureaucracy in the form of committees that would oversee any decisions by the prime minister and ministers. The Tawafoq coalition is planning on establishing satellite offices throughout Ninewa province to improve communications with constituents. They claimed the remote offices could play a role with the provincial council and Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces with claims for damages sustained during raids and arrests. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) PRT Leader and PolOff met with Tawafoq Iraqi Front national assembly delegates and Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) members at IIP headquarters in Mosul on April 5. In attendance were: national assemblymembers Dr. Nawal Majeed Hameed and Noredin Hamdoon Abdullah, Ninewa IIP Director Dr. Mohammed Shaker Al Ghanam, and Leadership Officer Faris Younis. -------------- USG MUST END "PRESSURE" ON IRAN -------------- ¶3. (C) According to national assemblymember Abdullah, Iraqis were searching for some light after 25 years of war, violence, and sectarian strife. Unfortunately, he claimed, the fall of the regime was met with security problems and a lack of basic services. Abdullah said he and his Tawafoq coalition colleagues in the national assembly were trying to do their best to move Iraq forward and to restore its image on the world stage. Abdullah claimed that tensions between Iran and the USG were contributing to problems with central government formation in Baghdad. He claimed if Iran perceived it was being pushed too hard by the USG on nuclear issues then it would continue, or even increase, its terrorist activities in Iraq. This would ultimately stall Shia participation in the new government formation, since Iraqi Shia were "taking orders from Iran" and would resist moving forward. Younis said he had heard rumors that Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ) leader Al Zarqawi -- whom he claimed was an "Iran follower" -- would resign if the U.S. ceased pressuring Iran. Once U.S. pressure was lifted, claimed Abdullah, it would only take 10 days for the new government to be formed. ¶4. (C) Abdullah said he supported the idea of U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad speaking to the Iranian government. However, he thought even higher levels in the U.S. Administration should join in as well. Abdullah compared Iran to an "octopus" that had its arms positioned throughout the Middle East. He recommended communicating directly could "cut" the arms. Any work on this issue would need to be done sooner rather than later, he claimed, since Iran's power in Iraq continued to grow on a daily basis. -------------- POWER SHARING OPTIONS FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) Abdullah believed that the democratic process thus far had intentionally "left out" certain groups -- namely Sunni Arabs and minorities -- and that the country needed balance if it was to advance. The writing of the constitution last year was a glaring example since it lacked sufficient input from Sunni Arabs, he claimed. To remedy the issue of power sharing at the national level, Tawafoq was proposing a "national council" that would share decision-making power with the prime minister. Abdullah claimed such an arrangement would keep important decisions out of the hand of one person (most likely the Shia majority) who would favor one ethnic group over another. Another step towards true power sharing would also be MOSUL 00000041 002.2 OF 002 the building of a cabinet for the prime minister position, as well as smaller committees that would oversee the decisions of each minister. Before this could occur two primary organizations would need to be established: the first would be the establishment of a committee to interpret the articles of the constitution to ensure they were applied transparently to all peoples of Iraq. The second would be the creation of a true civil service modeled after the U.S. A civil service would ensure that government positions were based on merit and not on cronyism, said Abdullah. He said he believed that more layers of bureaucracy would help ensure that the voices of Sunni Arabs and minorities would be heard. -------------- CONSTITUENT OFFICES THROUGHOUT NINEWA -------------- ¶6. (C) In an effort to better address the needs of the people outside of Mosul, Tawafoq members said they were planning to install satellite offices throughout the province. Abdullah said they would collect information from the field and coordinate with the provincial council to compare data and then submit the results to Baghdad. He said results would help shape programs and policies from the central government to the province. Hameed appealed for USG assistance. She said the idea for satellite offices was to improve communication with constituents and to assist with security issues, such as Coalition (CF) and Iraqi Security Force raids on homes, and arresting and detaining of suspects. Hameed believed actual and psychological damage was done during each raid. She said the process of filing a claim for damages was "degrading" and asked if more work could be done to improve the process and make it more humane. She suggested that Tawafoq satellite offices could receive claims information from constituents, and then coordinate with the provincial council which could vet the claims before passing them to CF for processing and payment. She believed this arrangement could expedite the claims process and improve relations with the Iraqi people. Dignity, not money, was the impetus for this suggestion, claimed Hameed. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) During our third meeting with members of the Tawafoq coalition, the mood was less hostile and more cooperative. They say they look forward to continuing dialogue with the PRT and CF. Abdullah claims the Tawafoq coalition will move forward with or without USG help, by providing information on the democratic process and seeking to improve security. The Tawafoq leaders seem to prefer warm relations with us, but see the U.S. mainly as an occupying power whose impact (mostly negative) needs to be blunted. MUNTER