NINEWA: TAWAFOQ IRAQI FRONT PARLIAMENTARIAN VIEWS ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSUL 000041

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/7/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR
SUBJECT: NINEWA: TAWAFOQ IRAQI FRONT PARLIAMENTARIAN VIEWS ON IRAN
AND NEW GOVERNMENT FORMATION

MOSUL 00000041 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)



--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Tawafoq Iraqi Front coalition national assemblymembers,
who are predominantly from the Iraqi Islamic Party, told us that
U.S. pressure on Iran over nuclear issues is causing Iraq's Shia
politicians to resist any formation for the new government.
They said the end of U.S. pressure on Iran might also help
improve security in Iraq as well, and that the USG should
communicate directly with the Iranian government to resolve
tensions. They said any power sharing agreement in the new
federal government must include Sunni Arab and minority voices.
They suggested creating additional layers of bureaucracy in the
form of committees that would oversee any decisions by the prime
minister and ministers. The Tawafoq coalition is planning on
establishing satellite offices throughout Ninewa province to
improve communications with constituents. They claimed the
remote offices could play a role with the provincial council and
Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces with claims for damages
sustained during raids and arrests. End Summary.


2. (SBU) PRT Leader and PolOff met with Tawafoq Iraqi Front
national assembly delegates and Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP)
members at IIP headquarters in Mosul on April 5. In attendance
were: national assemblymembers Dr. Nawal Majeed Hameed and
Noredin Hamdoon Abdullah, Ninewa IIP Director Dr. Mohammed
Shaker Al Ghanam, and Leadership Officer Faris Younis.

--------------
USG MUST END "PRESSURE" ON IRAN
--------------


3. (C) According to national assemblymember Abdullah, Iraqis
were searching for some light after 25 years of war, violence,
and sectarian strife. Unfortunately, he claimed, the fall of
the regime was met with security problems and a lack of basic
services. Abdullah said he and his Tawafoq coalition colleagues
in the national assembly were trying to do their best to move
Iraq forward and to restore its image on the world stage.
Abdullah claimed that tensions between Iran and the USG were
contributing to problems with central government formation in
Baghdad. He claimed if Iran perceived it was being pushed too
hard by the USG on nuclear issues then it would continue, or
even increase, its terrorist activities in Iraq. This would
ultimately stall Shia participation in the new government
formation, since Iraqi Shia were "taking orders from Iran" and
would resist moving forward. Younis said he had heard rumors
that Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ) leader Al Zarqawi -- whom he
claimed was an "Iran follower" -- would resign if the U.S.
ceased pressuring Iran. Once U.S. pressure was lifted, claimed
Abdullah, it would only take 10 days for the new government to
be formed.


4. (C) Abdullah said he supported the idea of U.S. Ambassador
Khalilzad speaking to the Iranian government. However, he
thought even higher levels in the U.S. Administration should
join in as well. Abdullah compared Iran to an "octopus" that
had its arms positioned throughout the Middle East. He
recommended communicating directly could "cut" the arms. Any
work on this issue would need to be done sooner rather than
later, he claimed, since Iran's power in Iraq continued to grow
on a daily basis.

--------------
POWER SHARING OPTIONS FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT
--------------


5. (C) Abdullah believed that the democratic process thus far
had intentionally "left out" certain groups -- namely Sunni
Arabs and minorities -- and that the country needed balance if
it was to advance. The writing of the constitution last year
was a glaring example since it lacked sufficient input from
Sunni Arabs, he claimed. To remedy the issue of power sharing
at the national level, Tawafoq was proposing a "national
council" that would share decision-making power with the prime
minister. Abdullah claimed such an arrangement would keep
important decisions out of the hand of one person (most likely
the Shia majority) who would favor one ethnic group over
another. Another step towards true power sharing would also be

MOSUL 00000041 002.2 OF 002


the building of a cabinet for the prime minister position, as
well as smaller committees that would oversee the decisions of
each minister. Before this could occur two primary
organizations would need to be established: the first would be
the establishment of a committee to interpret the articles of
the constitution to ensure they were applied transparently to
all peoples of Iraq. The second would be the creation of a true
civil service modeled after the U.S. A civil service would
ensure that government positions were based on merit and not on
cronyism, said Abdullah. He said he believed that more layers
of bureaucracy would help ensure that the voices of Sunni Arabs
and minorities would be heard.

--------------
CONSTITUENT OFFICES THROUGHOUT NINEWA
--------------


6. (C) In an effort to better address the needs of the people
outside of Mosul, Tawafoq members said they were planning to
install satellite offices throughout the province. Abdullah
said they would collect information from the field and
coordinate with the provincial council to compare data and then
submit the results to Baghdad. He said results would help shape
programs and policies from the central government to the
province. Hameed appealed for USG assistance. She said the
idea for satellite offices was to improve communication with
constituents and to assist with security issues, such as
Coalition (CF) and Iraqi Security Force raids on homes, and
arresting and detaining of suspects. Hameed believed actual and
psychological damage was done during each raid. She said the
process of filing a claim for damages was "degrading" and asked
if more work could be done to improve the process and make it
more humane. She suggested that Tawafoq satellite offices could
receive claims information from constituents, and then
coordinate with the provincial council which could vet the
claims before passing them to CF for processing and payment.
She believed this arrangement could expedite the claims process
and improve relations with the Iraqi people. Dignity, not
money, was the impetus for this suggestion, claimed Hameed.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) During our third meeting with members of the Tawafoq
coalition, the mood was less hostile and more cooperative. They
say they look forward to continuing dialogue with the PRT and
CF. Abdullah claims the Tawafoq coalition will move forward
with or without USG help, by providing information on the
democratic process and seeking to improve security. The Tawafoq
leaders seem to prefer warm relations with us, but see the U.S.
mainly as an occupying power whose impact (mostly negative)
needs to be blunted.
MUNTER