NINEWA'S KURDS AND THEIR NEIGHBORS: ENCROACHMENT ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSUL 000025 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/4/2016 TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR SUBJECT: NINEWA'S KURDS AND THEIR NEIGHBORS: ENCROACHMENT ISSUES MOSUL 00000025 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State. REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Anxieties are building between the Kurds and their neighbors in Ninewa. Since taking control of the provincial government in January 2005, Kurdish political parties have spread their influence through many symbolic gestures in several strategic areas of the province. From Sinjar in the west to Makhmour in the southeast, the proliferation of Kurdish political party offices, Asayesh (Kurdistan Regional Government "KRG" Intelligence) offices, Kurdish learning institutions, and KRG flags has gone on virtually unobstructed and to the consternation of many of their non-Kurdish neighbors. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) PRT Poloff met with Ninewa Education Director General (DG) Saeed Hamid Al-Haj Saeed in Mosul on February 25; with Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM) Ninewa Director Edmon Yohanna in Mosul on February 20; with Shabek Democratic Assembly (SDA) Spokesman Yousef Muharam on February 20; with Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) Public Affairs Director Younis Hashim on February 19; with Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) Ninewa Director Sabbah Baberi on February 2; and with Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Deputy Director Abdelbari Al-Zebari on January 29. -------------- KURDISH FLAGS BELOW THE GREEN LINE -------------- ¶3. (C) The site of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) flags in Ninewa has caused a considerable amount of consternation among minorities and Arabs. Over the past year, the PRT has received numerous reports from political parties, NGOs, and individuals about encroachment issues. Complaints ranged from KRG flags being flown on police and military checkpoints, public schools and local government offices, to the increase in Asayesh (KRG Intelligence) offices popping up in villages. KRG flags can be seen almost everywhere in eastern and northern Ninewa, well below the "Green Line" that separates Iraqi Kurdistan from the rest of the country. [COMMENT: The PRT has confirmed many of these reports first hand on visits to outlying villages, and via photographic evidence from contacts. In Telkaif, a predominantly Assyrian village just north of Mosul, for example, a large public water tank has the KRG flag prominently displaced on its face]. Many non-Kurds and Kurds alike consider this an issue of grave importance. Calling it "Kurd aggression," Hashim of IIP said it was the "greatest problem" facing Ninewa today. Deputy PUK director Al-Zebari fingered the KDP as the main culprit, and accused the KDP of employing "unnecessary heavy-handed tactics to exert influence" over the province. Ninewa KIU director Baberi called the visibility of KRG flags and the public display of (KRG President and KDP leader Masoud) Barzani's photos as part of the "Barzani cult of personality." Hashim said the presence of Barzani photos demonstrated that "the KDP" had "replaced Saddam Hussein with Masoud Barzani." ¶4. (C) Several non-Kurdish contacts have repeatedly complained to the PRT about the legality of issue, since the KRG does not have administrative authority over Ninewa. However, many have said they refused to raise this with the provincial government or the KDP. Hashim said that IIP feared broaching the topic with the Kurds, especially the KDP, because he claimed they had "finally made progress" in relations between their respective parties. Hashim in turn blamed the USG and Coalition Forces (CF) for "allowing Kurds" to fly the flags. He suggested therefore that CF Stryker brigades physically "tear down" the flags instead, so as not to put the IIP or other groups in an awkward position. [COMMENT: The PRT has been working with political parties and NGOs to have them address complaints directly with the local government. On February 28, the PRT received calls from SDA members that the KDP had raised a KRG flag over the men's wing of the Bazwaya Clinic in Bazwaya village in eastern Ninewa. The KDP allegedly refurbished the building to serve as a local headquarters. After connecting SDA with officials in the Iraqi Police (IP) and Provincial Joint Communication Center (PJCC),the flag was taken down later that evening. Afterwards, SDA reps said that based on the IP's response to the issue they were now more comfortable contacting the IP for assistance in the future, rather than just the PRT]. -------------- -------------- INCREASED PRESENCE OF KDP OFFICES IN MINORITY VILLAGES MOSUL 00000025 002.2 OF 003 -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) SDA Muharam said the Kurds, specifically the KDP, were behind a concerted effort to "control minorities," especially Shabek, whom he claimed, the KDP considered "Kurds." Muharam said, for example, that the KDP has been building numerous recruiting offices in minority villages in Ninewa. He claimed the impetus behind the increased number of offices was for KDP to "have a presence" in villages where they did not perform well during the national election. The problem, according to Muharam, was that the offices were built in residential and not commercial neighborhoods. He claimed this was causing many Shabek to become angry and uncomfortable, especially women, who believed they were being watched in their homes by the KDP. ADM director Yohanna said society in Ninewa was becoming increasingly polarized between the Kurds and Arabs. He claimed Peshmerga forces had contributed to tensions, and accused them of trying to "claim eastern and northern Ninewa for the KRG." He said that as a result Arabs have begun to consider minorities "Kurds" and have retaliated against them. -------------- PROLIFERATION OF KURDISH SCHOOLS -------------- ¶6. (C) Since the fall of the regime there has been a concerted effort by the Kurds to build Kurdish schools in Ninewa. The issue has served as another point of contention in the provincial council amongst the majority Kurds and the GOI's Education DG, Saeed, a Sunni Arab. Saeed credited himself for successfully presiding over 1,700 schools, 30,000 staff and 600,000 students in the province. However, Saeed was recently removed by the provincial council at the end of February. He said he believed his sacking was done to open the way for the unimpeded construction of more schools under the auspices of the KRG. Saeed said he fought against the provincial council over the issue for the past year. He accused the provincial government of overstepping its authority by allowing the KRG Ministry of Education to build Kurdish schools outside of their jurisdiction and without his approval. "The Green Line does not run through Ninewa," said Saeed, and therefore the KRG had "no authority to operate schools in the province." ¶7. (C) Vice Governor Goran on the other hand, said he believed that Kurds had a right to open the schools. He said that the KRG had in fact built about 250 schools, mostly in Sinjar, Telkaif, and Ain Sifne. He said the schools were created to allow Kurdish youth the opportunity to learn about their culture and language. He said the schools, opened to both Kurds and Arabs, had complied with GOI requirements and that the curriculum included training in Arabic and Kurdish (a claim disputed by Saeed). Goran said no one was forced to attend the schools, and that the provincial government had received positive feedback from Arab students and parents. He said resistance to the schools came from "racists" and "nationalist Arabs." During a provincial council meeting on March 1, Goran suggested that Ninewa have two Education DGs (one from the GOI and the other from the KRG). Saeed said he spoke directly to the GOI Minister of Education, Abdel Falah Hassan, about the issue. He said the Minister, with the support of labor and teachers unions in Baghdad, was planning to give Saeed a six-month extension. Saeed said he believed the extension was granted in the hope that he might be retained after provincial elections were held later this year, and the Kurds "lose control of the provincial government." -------------- -------------- PROVINCIAL ELECTION STRATEGY AGAINST KURDISH DOMINANCE -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Muharam said SDA has been working with major Shia and Sunni parties in Ninewa to build a coalition to "take control" of the provincial government. He said the move was necessary to "protect the voices" of non-Kurds, whom he believed were unable to speak out for fear from reprisal. He claimed, for example, that SDA leader and national assemblyman Dr. Haneen Al Qaddo received numerous threats from Peshmerga and Asayesh for speaking his mind when he was a member of the provincial council. Muharam said the poor performance of the provincial government was another reason for outside groups to band together. He also said security issues and the lack of basic services could be attributed to Kurdish inaction and inability to lead. -------------- COMMENT -------------- MOSUL 00000025 003.2 OF 003 ¶9. (C) While tensions are high between Sunnis and Shias in central and southern Iraq, a less visible but significant anxiety has been rising among the Kurds and their non-Kurdish neighbors in Ninewa. There are numerous theories to explain Kurdish actions in Ninewa. Many speculate that the presence of Kurdish military units, schools, flags, and Asayesh offices have all been part of a concerted effort by the KRG to control many strategic areas of the province for a future "Kurdistani state." Others claim that KRG control of parts of Ninewa could be used down the road as bargaining chips once Article 58 and the "Kirkuk" issue was finally settled, where the Kurds could "exchange" pieces of Ninewa for more of Kirkuk. What seems undeniable, however, is how such actions highlight the very powerful symbolic nature of Kurdish presence in the area, which has done nothing more than increase concern among some groups. On the other hand, the PRT has met with non-Kurdish mayors and district governments that have praised the KRG for its assistance, given the low-level of support many have received from the Ninewa provincial government. It is uncertain, however, how willingly the Kurds would retreat and remove Kurdish articles of symbolism if they were to lose control of the provincial government. What is clear is this: The current Kurdish-led leadership of Ninewa has no stake in early provincial elections, where this pent-up concern of non-Kurds could sweep them from office. MUNTER