U.S.-RUSSIAN COUNTERTERRORISM WORKING GROUP

S E C R E T MOSCOW 009978 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR UNDER SECRETARY BURNS FROM AMBASSADOR BURNS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016 TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV RS SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIAN COUNTERTERRORISM WORKING GROUP MEETING, SEPTEMBER 14 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Since the last U.S.-Russian Counterterrorism Working Group (CTWG) convened in Moscow in December 2005, bilateral CT cooperation has continued to move forward even as the pace has remained uneven. Russia has focused on strengthening its capacity to respond to counterterrorism challenges by enacting legislation in March that established an FSB-headed National Counterterrorism Committee (NCC). Despite a stalemate in the UN 1267 Committee regarding financial holds on U.S. and Russian designations, we are encouraging the Russians to expand information-sharing on Gulf-based "charitable organizations" that are funneling money to terrorists throughout the world, including in Chechnya. DFM Kislyak will likely raise standing Russian concerns about threats posed by developments in Afghanistan. Cooperation between U.S. and Russian law enforcement agencies continues apace, with consistent working-level exchanges and information-sharing. After years of Russian unwillingness to engage on bioterrorism issues, progress was made on April 12 when an interagency USG bioterrorism experts team sat down with a sizable Russian bio-experts team in Moscow. On MANPADS, we are ready to move beyond initial information exchanges. The Russians are increasingly confident regarding the success of their counterterrorism strategy in Chechnya. END SUMMARY. . NEW COUNTERTERRORISM LAW -------------- ¶2. (C) President Putin signed a bill in March that is designed to implement an earlier presidential decree establishing a National Counterterrorism Committee (NCC), headed by the FSB. The placement of FSB chief Patrushev as chairman of the committee was a bureaucratic victory of sorts for the security service, as it gave the FSB the lead role over the Interior Ministry. The decree established a "vertical of security," running from Regional Counterterrorism Commissions headed by governors to the NCC at the national level. In the event of a terrorist incident, all government agencies represented on the committee would be required to implement NCC decisions. While the measure is designed to increase the GOR's capacity to address terrorism incidents, it has not yet been put to the test, so it is too early to judge its effectiveness. . TERRORISM FINANCE -------------- ¶3. (C) Despite a stalemate in the UN 1267 Committee regarding financial holds on U.S. and Russian designations, the U.S. has proposed to expand joint work and information sharing on Gulf-based "charitable organizations" that are funneling money to terrorists throughout the world, including Chechnya. Anatoly Safanov, Russia's Presidential Representative for Counterterrorism, has noted that Russia has seen a drop on the flow of money from the Gulf region to trouble spots in the Caucasus, thanks largely to USG efforts in the Gulf. . AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶4. (C) Moscow's agreement with Kabul in July to reconcile outstanding debt and its reiteration of a commitment to forgive 100 percent of debt in the Paris Club goes a long way to meeting a U.S. request in the CTWG dating back to 2003. According to DFM Alekseyev in late June, Moscow continues to look for investment opportunities in Afghanistan, with resolution of the debt issue as removing a significant obstacle to further economic cooperation. On the political front, Russia is concerned about the upsurge in Taliban/al-Qaida activity that began this spring. DFM Kislyak will likely seize on the news that opium production in Afghanistan has jumped to question the effectiveness of current counternarcotics efforts and urge U.S. cooperation in the Russian-led Operation Canal in Central Asia. . INTELLIGENCE/LAW ENFORCEMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) Counterterrorism cooperation between U.S. and Russian law enforcement agencies continues to be good. In April, a delegation from the FSB and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) visited the FBI Academy for a joint exchange on best practices regarding WMD. The FSB's elite Alpha Team, tasked with hostage rescue missions, is scheduled to visit the same Academy in October for joint training with their U.S. counterpart. In September, an FBI bomb disposal team will visit Moscow for a technical exchange with the Russians. We are also working with the Russians on a number of terrorism finance cases, the majority involving financing for Chechen insurgents. Unfortunately, the Russians have not responded to our proposal to establish an FBI/Russian Interior Ministry shared fingerprint database of known and suspected terrorists. The Interior Ministry is ready to sign an MOU with the U.S. Secret Service that should pave the way to reestablishing a permanent presence for the Service in Moscow and further cooperation in combating counterfeiting and cybercrime. ¶6. (C) In a case of particular import for the Russians, the GOR has requested we arrange for the extradition to Russia of suspected terrorist Mohamed Kamal El-Zahabi, a Lebanese national, who is currently in U.S. custody pending trial on immigration charges of fraud and false statements. El-Zahabi has been charged with terrorism-related offenses in Russia. The Russian procuracy's request has been pending since December 2005; in September, we informed the GOR that we were interested in the possibility of removing him to Russia under U.S. immigration law. . COUNTER NARCOTICS -------------- ¶7. (U) The GOR has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement on counter narcotics, and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has a record of cooperation with the GOR drug law enforcement agencies, although DEA still struggles to obtain pro-active intelligence from their counterparts on high-value targets. The Embassy's Law Enforcement Section continues its efforts to expand Russia's ability to combat narcotics trafficking. In the past 12 months, the USG has allocated USD 1 million worth of equipment to enhance the Russian Federal Counter Narcotics Service and Customs' ability to combat narcotics trafficking. . BIOTERRORISM -------------- ¶8. (S) After years of unwillingness to engage on bioterrorism issues, progress was made on April 12 when an interagency USG bioterrorism experts team met with a sizable and diverse Russian bio-experts team in Moscow. The meeting took place under the auspices of the WMD Subgroup of the U.S.-Russia Counterterrorism Working Group. The meeting focused on three areas: intelligence sharing; law enforcement cooperation; and joint efforts on terrorism. The Russian side was cooperative and both sides agreed to identify and move forward with concrete, practical next steps for joint efforts. In response to GOR questions posed at the April meeting, the USG in mid-July shared with the GOR a bioterrorism intelligence package. However, the scope of future cooperation is not clear. According to MFA contacts, there is disagreement between the security services and other agencies on the usefulness of further steps. MANPADS -------------- ¶9. (C) The U.S.-Russia MANPADS Arrangement was finalized on February 24, 2005. A series of expert level meetings and information exchanges have taken place; the next information exchange is due September 30 and experts are to meet in Moscow January 24-26, 2007. The expert-level meetings have been a useful forum to discuss best practices regarding physical security and stockpile management, end-use monitoring, destruction methods and assistance programs. We have exchanged regional threat assessments and discussed black markets. The U.S. delegation believes implementation will soon move toward more concrete activities. Outstanding issues are: U.S. decision on whether or not to provide information on U.S. systems destroyed annually; Russia sharing information on systems transferred by the Soviet Union to specific countries. . CHECHNYA -------------- ¶10. (C) The Russians have consistently portrayed the conflict in Chechnya as international terrorism, not a nationalist/separatist insurgency. Ironically, they have defeated the Chechen insurgency but have spurred wider Islamist movements in the North Caucasus. Chechen Prime Minister (and strongman) Ramzan Kadyrov, like his father, has successfully improved security within Chechnya by attracting rebel fighters away from the insurgency and into his militias. Remaining Chechen separatist fighters -- and Islamists from the rest of the North Caucasus -- have formed a Jihadist movement with ties to international networks that seeks to establish an Islamic state throughout the region. The deaths of Chechen separatist leaders Abdul Khalim Saidullayev and Shamil Basayev -- orchestrator of Beslan, among other terrorist attacks -- were critical setbacks for the insurgency, which now lacks a charismatic leader. ¶11. (C) The Russians have not addressed the issue of recruitment into the Jihadist movements, which is fueled by economic hardship and the repressive policies (especially against religion) of local authorities in the North Caucasus. The British engaged the Russians on Muslim outreach as part of their CT dialogue. The Russians appeared interested, but there has been no follow-up yet. One factor constraining further U.S.-GOR cooperation is residual skepticism within the security services over U.S. intentions in the North Caucasus, and suspicion that the U.S. welcomes the weakening of Russian state authority in this region. . COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) While cooperation remains uneven across the CTWG issue areas, there are areas where progress has been made. We continue to believe that an emphasis on accomplishing specific tasks -- in the first place through the Action Plan -- is the right approach. The CTWG is most valuable when it spurs the sort of working-level contacts that we have on a regular basis with our closest partners. We are not there yet with the Russians, but the CTWG is the most promising means we have to encourage practical cooperation in the fight against global terrorism. BURNS