RUSSIAN MFA ON HELICOPTER INCIDENT IN SOUTH OSSETIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 009823 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016 TAGS: PREL MOPS GG RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON HELICOPTER INCIDENT IN SOUTH OSSETIA Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Following the September 3 firing on a Georgian military helicopter over South Ossetia, the Ambassador contacted DFM Karasin to highlight the danger posed by the incident and to urge Russia to use its influence with the South Ossetians to prevent its repetition. Karasin acknowledged the incident was a serious matter and urged that all sides avoid an overreaction. German, French and UK envoys told the Ambassador they are also asking Russia to take steps to lower tensions. MFA officials continue to argue to us that the helicopter flight was provocative and violated cease-fire protocols, but recognize that the shooting has created a dangerous situation. They say they are urging South Ossetian authorities to act with restraint. Russia is likely to use the JCC meeting tentatively scheduled for mid-September to repeat Russian claims, but GOR officials might also suggest clarifications to the protocol regulating over-flights of South Ossetia to avoid another such incident. End Summary. . GOR PUBLIC STATEMENTS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) General Marat Kulakhmetov, the Russian commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Force, provided an initial Russian reaction September 4 by claiming that the over-flight and attack on the helicopter were both violations of existing cease-fire agreements. Later that day, the MFA spokesman Mikhail Kamynin provided a more one-sided response. After providing details of the incident, he said that the Georgian actions were a "provocation" aimed at undermining the peace process and were an attempt to seek alternative means to settle the dispute. Ambassador-at-Large for South Ossetia Yuriy Popov directly blamed the Georgians for provoking the incident in September 4 comments to the press. . DFM KARASIN -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador spoke with DFM Karasin three times following the September 3 incident. In his conversations with Karasin, the Ambassador underlined the serious danger posed by this incident and urged the GOR to do all that it could to avoid its repetition. Moscow needed to stress to the South Ossetians that they must exercise restraint. ¶4. (C) Karasin acknowledged that the Russian government understood the incident was a serious matter. He said there was a need by all sides to avoid "political and emotional reactions" until the facts were clear. He appreciated U.S. efforts to urge restraint. In a later conversation, Karasin was mildly apologetic about statements to the Russian press made by Ambassador Popov and reaffirmed that Russia understood that the shooting had created a serious situation. ¶5. (C) The German Ambassador told the Ambassador September 6 that Germany's Ambassador-at-Large for the Caucasus had also urged DFM Karasin in meetings here to use Moscow's influence with the South Ossetians to lower tensions and prevent the shooting incident from spinning out of control. The British and French Ambassadors also said on September 6 that they would soon be approaching the Foreign Ministry with similar messages. (Note: The Germans also warned Karasin against trying to include language about the Kodori Gorge operation in the upcoming rollover of the UNOMIG mandate. In turn, Karasin signaled Russian opposition to the deployment of civilian police in Gali. End Note.) . MFA CIS DIRECTOR KELIN -------------- ¶6. (C) Russian MFA 4th CIS (Caucasus) Department Director Andrey Kelin told us in a September 5 meeting that Russia saw the helicopter "incursion" and the shooting as "gross violations" of the rules governing military activity in the Zone of Conflict (ZOC). Tracing the supposed route of the helicopter's flight on a large wall map, Kelin argued that the helicopter had looped around a large area in the ZOC and had not just incidentally crossed over the ZOC en route to western Georgia. He said the flight was a clear demonstration by Georgia designed to provoke a reaction from South Ossetian forces. As an aside, he claimed it was not even clear whether Georgian MOD Okruashvili was actually onboard the aircraft when the firing occurred. ¶7. (C) We stressed U.S. concerns about the dangers posed by the shooting and reiterated the need for restraint, encouraging the GOR to urge the South Ossetians to take immediate steps to lower tensions. Kelin acknowledged that the South Ossetians should use the JCC to register protests about alleged violations of prior agreements rather than MOSCOW 00009823 002 OF 002 resort to force. He said the Russian government had already told the South Ossetians they must exercise restraint, but he argued that Tskhinvali viewed the helicopter flight in the context of Georgian operations in the Kodori Gorge and Tbilisi's efforts to "sabotage" the Joint Control Commission. ¶8. (C) Kelin said that the JCC was likely to meet in mid-September, but the venue and exact dates had not been finalized and might be pushed off by the South Ossetians. Kelin was headed for Tbilisi on September 6 for a previously scheduled meeting with his Georgian MFA counterparts to discuss Georgia's interest in joining NATO. According to Kelin, Georgia had taken the initiative to invite the Russians to discuss NATO. Kelin was unaware of any plans for First DFM Denisov to meet with his counterpart or for Presidents Putin and Saakashvili to meet in the future. . NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶9. (C) Ambassador Popov told us September 6 that he still expected the JCC to meet soon, perhaps in Tskhinvali on September 13-14. He had been discussing the timing of the next meeting with his Georgian counterpart, DFM Antadze, on September 3, shortly before hearing about the shooting. He noted that he had not been in contact with Georgian officials since learning about the incident. ¶10. (C) Popov said that the GOR obviously would raise the incident at the next JCC meeting, and said that once all sides were able to ventilate, he expected the JCC to focus on the "ambiguous" language in the 2002 protocol governing over-flights. Popov acknowledged that protocolary language about "unauthorized" flights being a danger to peace begged the question since the JCC had never decided which authority would "authorize" flights. He said the GOR was intensively studying this issue, but said Moscow was not inclined to accept Georgian claims that Tbilisi had complete control over the airspace over South Ossetia. He argued that this was inconsistent with previous agreements and, if exercised, might lead to "a disaster." ¶11. (C) In an earlier conversation, Georgian Political Counselor George Karlashvili told us that the JCC meeting was now likely to be held on September 14-16, but in Vladikavkaz, pending South Ossetian assent. He said that First DFM Denisov was supposed to travel to Georgia by the end of September, but the MFA had not yet confirmed dates. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) While initial MFA statements were unhelpful in lowering tensions, Russian officials clearly recognize that the shooting incident created a dangerous situation that could easily veer out of control. We will continue to press Moscow to engage directly with the South Ossetians to lower tensions. BURNS