RUSSIAN POLITICAL SEASON BEGINS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 009817

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN POLITICAL SEASON BEGINS WITH
KREMLIN-BLESSED OPPOSITION

REF: A. MOSCOW 9627

B. YEKATERINBURG 333

Classified By: PolMinCoun Alice G. Wells: 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Kremlin's involvement, with Deputy
Head of Presidential Administration Surkov's apparent
encouragement and Putin's purported blessing, in engineering
a union of three leftist political parties of marginal to
moderate popularity as an officially sanctioned opposition is
the opening salvo in a political season that starts with
regional elections in October 2006 and culminates in
presidential elections in March 2008. Orchestrating a
leftist flank, beyond leaching support from the Communists,
helps create the facade of a normally functioning multiparty
system, and could provide a patina of legitimacy that
observers believe Putin seeks as he builds his credentials as
future elder statesman and international magnate. Some posit
that, frustrated by Yabloko and SPS bickering, the Kremlin
may be tempted to kickstart a new rightist political bloc as
well. Public apathy, potential regional elite confusion over
whom to direct administrative resources, and the real -- and
really internecine -- focus on the intra-Kremlin division of
lucre could leave this initiative still-born. Despite the
public machinations over political parties, we are told the
real fight is between Putin and those who want him to remain
a third term. Putin's personal interest in orchestrating a
credible transfer of power provides an opening for
coordinated US, EU/G8 messages on what constitutes a credible
democratic process. End Summary.


A Second Party of Power?
--------------


2. (SBU) After the G8-induced lull and a rigorously
observed summer dacha hiatus, the Russian political season
sputtered back to life with the unveiling of the new
"opposition" alliance -- first floated in late July -- of the
Party of Life, headed by Chairman of the Federation Council
Sergey Mironov, and Rodina, led by business tycoon Aleksander
Babakov (following the sacking of popular founder Dmitry
Rogozin),with Igor Zotov's Party of Pensioners added in a
subsequent August 24 announcement. Of the three, only Rodina
has a presence in the Duma (29 members) and realistic
prospects for reelection, with the Party of Life (21
Federation Council members, with branches in 20 republics)
and the Party of Pensioners (1 Federation Council member,
with branches in 44 republics) polling in the one-three
percent range in the 2003 Duma elections.


3. (SBU) Observers immediately called into question both
the union and its opposition status. Appearing jointly
before the press for the first time on August 29, the three
political leaders could not paper over the fact that they had
yet to agree upon a name for the new union or the date of its
legal existence, much less a platform, leadership,
distribution of seats, or electoral strategy. To the
contrary, a less-than-enthused Zotov stressed the alliance's
intention to retain separate party structures, to compete
independently in the October regional elections, and even
took issue with the term merger, emphasizing that this was a
"reorganization" of distinct parties, on an equal basis,
under a new name. As for the group's opposition status,
Mironov reiterated to the press the union's support for the
President's agenda, as well as his personal intention to vote
for whomever Putin indicated should be his successor. (Note:
Mironov ran for president in 2004, finishing last. Observers
saw his candidacy as a Kremlin effort to add legitimacy to
the campaign.)


4. (C) According to official spin, the merger was the
natural consolidation of "leftist" social-democratic forces,
precipitated by the seven percent threshold now required to
achieve representation in the 2007 Duma, with the new left
flank serving as a counterweight to the centrist United
Russia, opponent to the free-market, "rightist" democrats,
and competition to the Communists (and, to a lesser degree,
Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia). Duma
International Relations Chairman Kosachev heralded the
emergence of a unified left opposition in his recent meeting
with the Ambassador (reftel) as the culmination of
democratically grounded political party reforms, which United
Russia welcomed. At a minimum, United Russia chief
ideologist Vladislav Surkov provided a yellow light to the
loyal opposition, telling Party of Life activists in a March
2006 private meeting, which subsequently was fed to the press
on August 18, that the country needed another strong
political alternative, a "second leg" to United Russia's
parliamentary dominance that could capitalize on the
socialist-nationalist mood in the country. Surkov urged

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Mironov's supporters to make a run for national office, to
target those who did not support the government, but were not
themselves antagonists, and to do so without reliance on
administrative resources. Surkov, who in February exhorted
United Russia members to "salt" (i.e. destroy) their
opponents took a softer line: political tolerance of a second
party would add stability to a system overly reliant on
United Russia. Putin's separate meetings with Babakov and
Zotov during his Sochi working vacation gave an implicit
presidential endorsement to the endeavor.

Kremlin-driven, with Putin in the driver's seat?
-------------- ---


5. (C) Observers across the political spectrum agree that
there was nothing spontaneous about the impending unification
of the three parties. Former Rodina party leader Dmitriy
Rogozin told us that it was Putin personally who pitched the
merger to Babakov, and not Surkov (with Rodina's
international relations chairman Mikhail Dimurin repeating to
us "this is not a Kremlin project -- at least, not a Surkov
project"). The director of United Russia's Information
Bureau and longstanding aide to Duma Chair Boris Gryzlov,
Leonid Vladimirovich Goryainov candidly described the role of
the Kremlin in encouraging the formation of "stable and
enduring" political parties. This would be a key feature of
Putin's political legacy, he maintained, and reflected the
importance Putin placed on legitimacy, on institutions
running according to acceptable norms; in other words, he
said, "the anti-Yelstin." Echo Moskvy chief editor Aleksey
Vennediktov also stressed the importance that Putin attached
to orchestrating presidential elections acceptable to the
international community. These elections must provide
legitimization for Putin in his after-life as an
internationally prominent statesman and businessman. By
creating the look and feel of a competitive multi-party
system, Vennediktov told us, Putin reduced the odds of being
held hostage to United Russia (as Gorbachev ultimately was to
the Communist Party),drained some support from the Communist
Party, and maintained appearances in the West. Putin, he
reiterated, had no desire to slink into retirement.


6. (C) Designating an officially sanctioned opposition
party also minimized intra-elite tensions, other observers
posited, without risking a significant erosion in United
Russia's support or Putin's popularity. Noting
dissatisfaction with Surkov among senior United Russia
members, Carnegie Center's Lilia Shevtsova argued that the
new grouping could provide disgruntled elite an alternate
perch to oppose the Surkov-driven "sovereign democracy" and
its unpleasant parallels to the Communist Party, as well as
represent a release valve for those who were uncomfortable
with United Russia's centrist economic policies. In
principle, she noted, United Russia members and Yeltsin
before them had long flirted with the idea of "two wings,"
liberal and conservative, within one party, but had never
succeeded. Mironov, both Shevtsova and United Russia
spin-doctor Gleb Pavlovsky told us, was the perfect champion
for this new party union: jealous of Gryzlov's preeminence in
the Duma, unsuccessful in building his own party, and
suffering a charisma-deficit, he was unthreatening. Rodina's
Rogozin agreed, noting that his own failure as a Kremlin
political project was directly tied to his success in
attracting "too many" voters, and served as an object lesson
for Putin and his advisers.

Will a unified right please stand up, or be stood up?
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Vennediktov is among those observers who predict
that a Kremlin-engineered rightist party, "Free Russia," will
be unveiled in September, which would occupy the political
ground that infighting and disunity have prevented Yabloko
and SPS from seizing. In a recent meeting, SPS party
chairman Nikita Belikh acknowledged these rumors and
reiterated his public statements that on-going negotiations
with Yabloko were a matter of "life and death" for the
democratic remnants in Putin's Russia. The problem was not a
question of leadership of the democratic movement, Belikh
insisted, since he was prepared to cede to Yavlinsky -- 20
years his senior. However, substantial disagreements
remained over party programs and Yabloko's continued
criticism of the 1990's reforms and tepid support for reform
in general. Belikh questioned whether a political union
would resurrect the democrats in time for the 2007 Duma
elections. Positing that SPS and Yabloko each enjoyed five
percent and the Republican Party two percent in public
support, Belikh conceded that the sum of the parts was less
than the whole, since the leadership could not paper over
differences among its supporters. Moreover, any union of
existing democratic forces would have to undertake a serious

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"anti-branding" effort to overcome the legacy of distrust
associated with Yeltsin-era policies and politics.


8. (C) Pavlovsky, reflecting ruling party frustration over
the state of Yabloko and SPS, told us without elaboration
that it would be easier to build a new rightist party from
scratch than piece together the outsized personalities and
historic grudges between existing "democrats" and concluded
that time was running out for a rightist coalition to emerge.

If you build it, will they vote?
--------------


9. (C) The Moscow jury is out on whether this latest
Kremlin political project will endure, much less succeed in
crossing the seven percent threshold in the 2007 Duma
elections. What Mironov did not understand, a disgruntled
Rogozin charged, was that "the President can say yes, the
American Ambassador can say yes, but that does not mean the
Russian voters say yes." Claiming that 95 percent of
Rodina's 150,000 supporters were in his camp, despite his
Kremlin-ordained ouster from the party's leadership, Rogozin
said he would remain on the sidelines of the political
alliance and redirect his own energies -- perhaps into a
"social movement" focused on the potent cocktail of Russian
nationalism and great power status, as relates to relations
with Ukraine and Belarus. A key factor in the new alliance's
success will be its reception in the regions. Presented with
two parties of power and burdened by their own oligarchic
concerns, Rogozin said, the regional leadership will wait for
a clearer signal of what is expected or, in Pavlovsky's
version, try not to offend either side. It was an untenable
position for the regional elite, Shevtsova told us, who "want
one czar and one party." The Party of Life's inability to
register in Sverdlovsk and Tuva is evidence of the difficulty
the union will face in United Russia-dominated regions (ref
B). To date, there has been no clear direction from Putin,
which Shevtsova interpreted as the President giving his "good
friend" Mironov a new shot at political prominence, without
investing his own prestige in the venture.


10. (C) All the manipulations from above, Shevtsova
underscored, are indicative of the Russian leadership's lack
of confidence in the Russian people and central preoccupation
with redistributing wealth within the Kremlin inner circle.
The jockeying of minor political parties was a side-show, she
charged when "time is literally money" during the countdown
to Duma elections and a new Prime Minister in May 2007.
Without any tacit understanding among administration insiders
on who leaves power when Putin does, all energies are focused
on ensuring their own positions and lucrative board
memberships. The priorities of the political heavyweights
were to redistribute assets to themselves, assuage the
regional elite, placate the public with national projects,
and secure a consensus on succession. Political parties, she
concluded, were not the Kremlin's goal, just an instrument.

What does this mean for succession?
--------------


11. (C) Machinations over political parties have indirect
bearing on the succession debate, since it is unclear whether
any credible successor plans to contest the 2008 elections as
head of a party or prefers, in the tradition of Yeltsin and
Putin, to remain above the party fray. Minister of Defense
Sergey Ivanov dismissed as nonsense public speculation that
he would head the Mironov political configuration into the
presidential elections (with First Deputy PM Medvedev
putatively his rival as head of a United Russia list). Those
who view the new political alliance as a vehicle for
Mironov's vanity see little mileage in the Federation Council
Chairman ceding leadership to Ivanov.


12. (C) Instead, well-connected political bystanders argue
that the real contest remains between Putin and those who do
not want to see him leave office. It is not a question that
Putin is indispensable or that others cannot balance the
power between rival Kremlin factions, Vennediktov told us,
but rather that the transaction costs of changing Presidents
were too high. Pavlovksy flogged this view to us, noting
darkly that elections were dangerous and that all revolutions
in Russia have come from above. There are divisions within
the presidential administration, as well as within the
broader bureaucratic strata, and these splits, he intimated,
would become more fraught as individuals maneuvered for
personal riches. "Putin staying on would be easier in that
respect," he stated, reiterating that change brings
insecurity, which results in risk and even danger to the
Russian political system.


13. (C) To his open regret, Pavlovsky said that Putin

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appeared set on leaving office for "complex motives,"
including protecting the constitution, as well as his own
image, and avoiding alienating the one-third of the
electorate that did not support a third term. Mainstream
political analysts share the view that any figure ruling the
Kremlin after 2008, even Putin, will be weaker. According to
Pavlovsky, Putin was "unsustainably popular," occupying the
historical zenith of the post-Yeltsin restoration.


Comment
--------------


14. (C) The election season has started, and whether or not
the proposed merger of the three leftist parties takes root,
the intent of the Kremlin and of Putin to direct political
events is clear. While public polling indicates that a
majority of the Russian electorate will take their cue from
Putin as to whom to support in the Presidential elections and
political parties appear as open as ever to Kremlin
blandishments, Putin's personal stake in overseeing a
credible transfer of power provides an opening for the US,
acting in concert with the G8 and EU, to lay down consistent
markers on what constitutes a credible democratic process.
BURNS