RUSSIAN POLITICAL SEASON BEGINS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 009817 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN POLITICAL SEASON BEGINS WITH KREMLIN-BLESSED OPPOSITION REF: A. MOSCOW 9627 ¶B. YEKATERINBURG 333 Classified By: PolMinCoun Alice G. Wells: 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Kremlin's involvement, with Deputy Head of Presidential Administration Surkov's apparent encouragement and Putin's purported blessing, in engineering a union of three leftist political parties of marginal to moderate popularity as an officially sanctioned opposition is the opening salvo in a political season that starts with regional elections in October 2006 and culminates in presidential elections in March 2008. Orchestrating a leftist flank, beyond leaching support from the Communists, helps create the facade of a normally functioning multiparty system, and could provide a patina of legitimacy that observers believe Putin seeks as he builds his credentials as future elder statesman and international magnate. Some posit that, frustrated by Yabloko and SPS bickering, the Kremlin may be tempted to kickstart a new rightist political bloc as well. Public apathy, potential regional elite confusion over whom to direct administrative resources, and the real -- and really internecine -- focus on the intra-Kremlin division of lucre could leave this initiative still-born. Despite the public machinations over political parties, we are told the real fight is between Putin and those who want him to remain a third term. Putin's personal interest in orchestrating a credible transfer of power provides an opening for coordinated US, EU/G8 messages on what constitutes a credible democratic process. End Summary. A Second Party of Power? -------------- ¶2. (SBU) After the G8-induced lull and a rigorously observed summer dacha hiatus, the Russian political season sputtered back to life with the unveiling of the new "opposition" alliance -- first floated in late July -- of the Party of Life, headed by Chairman of the Federation Council Sergey Mironov, and Rodina, led by business tycoon Aleksander Babakov (following the sacking of popular founder Dmitry Rogozin),with Igor Zotov's Party of Pensioners added in a subsequent August 24 announcement. Of the three, only Rodina has a presence in the Duma (29 members) and realistic prospects for reelection, with the Party of Life (21 Federation Council members, with branches in 20 republics) and the Party of Pensioners (1 Federation Council member, with branches in 44 republics) polling in the one-three percent range in the 2003 Duma elections. ¶3. (SBU) Observers immediately called into question both the union and its opposition status. Appearing jointly before the press for the first time on August 29, the three political leaders could not paper over the fact that they had yet to agree upon a name for the new union or the date of its legal existence, much less a platform, leadership, distribution of seats, or electoral strategy. To the contrary, a less-than-enthused Zotov stressed the alliance's intention to retain separate party structures, to compete independently in the October regional elections, and even took issue with the term merger, emphasizing that this was a "reorganization" of distinct parties, on an equal basis, under a new name. As for the group's opposition status, Mironov reiterated to the press the union's support for the President's agenda, as well as his personal intention to vote for whomever Putin indicated should be his successor. (Note: Mironov ran for president in 2004, finishing last. Observers saw his candidacy as a Kremlin effort to add legitimacy to the campaign.) ¶4. (C) According to official spin, the merger was the natural consolidation of "leftist" social-democratic forces, precipitated by the seven percent threshold now required to achieve representation in the 2007 Duma, with the new left flank serving as a counterweight to the centrist United Russia, opponent to the free-market, "rightist" democrats, and competition to the Communists (and, to a lesser degree, Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia). Duma International Relations Chairman Kosachev heralded the emergence of a unified left opposition in his recent meeting with the Ambassador (reftel) as the culmination of democratically grounded political party reforms, which United Russia welcomed. At a minimum, United Russia chief ideologist Vladislav Surkov provided a yellow light to the loyal opposition, telling Party of Life activists in a March 2006 private meeting, which subsequently was fed to the press on August 18, that the country needed another strong political alternative, a "second leg" to United Russia's parliamentary dominance that could capitalize on the socialist-nationalist mood in the country. Surkov urged MOSCOW 00009817 002 OF 004 Mironov's supporters to make a run for national office, to target those who did not support the government, but were not themselves antagonists, and to do so without reliance on administrative resources. Surkov, who in February exhorted United Russia members to "salt" (i.e. destroy) their opponents took a softer line: political tolerance of a second party would add stability to a system overly reliant on United Russia. Putin's separate meetings with Babakov and Zotov during his Sochi working vacation gave an implicit presidential endorsement to the endeavor. Kremlin-driven, with Putin in the driver's seat? -------------- --- ¶5. (C) Observers across the political spectrum agree that there was nothing spontaneous about the impending unification of the three parties. Former Rodina party leader Dmitriy Rogozin told us that it was Putin personally who pitched the merger to Babakov, and not Surkov (with Rodina's international relations chairman Mikhail Dimurin repeating to us "this is not a Kremlin project -- at least, not a Surkov project"). The director of United Russia's Information Bureau and longstanding aide to Duma Chair Boris Gryzlov, Leonid Vladimirovich Goryainov candidly described the role of the Kremlin in encouraging the formation of "stable and enduring" political parties. This would be a key feature of Putin's political legacy, he maintained, and reflected the importance Putin placed on legitimacy, on institutions running according to acceptable norms; in other words, he said, "the anti-Yelstin." Echo Moskvy chief editor Aleksey Vennediktov also stressed the importance that Putin attached to orchestrating presidential elections acceptable to the international community. These elections must provide legitimization for Putin in his after-life as an internationally prominent statesman and businessman. By creating the look and feel of a competitive multi-party system, Vennediktov told us, Putin reduced the odds of being held hostage to United Russia (as Gorbachev ultimately was to the Communist Party),drained some support from the Communist Party, and maintained appearances in the West. Putin, he reiterated, had no desire to slink into retirement. ¶6. (C) Designating an officially sanctioned opposition party also minimized intra-elite tensions, other observers posited, without risking a significant erosion in United Russia's support or Putin's popularity. Noting dissatisfaction with Surkov among senior United Russia members, Carnegie Center's Lilia Shevtsova argued that the new grouping could provide disgruntled elite an alternate perch to oppose the Surkov-driven "sovereign democracy" and its unpleasant parallels to the Communist Party, as well as represent a release valve for those who were uncomfortable with United Russia's centrist economic policies. In principle, she noted, United Russia members and Yeltsin before them had long flirted with the idea of "two wings," liberal and conservative, within one party, but had never succeeded. Mironov, both Shevtsova and United Russia spin-doctor Gleb Pavlovsky told us, was the perfect champion for this new party union: jealous of Gryzlov's preeminence in the Duma, unsuccessful in building his own party, and suffering a charisma-deficit, he was unthreatening. Rodina's Rogozin agreed, noting that his own failure as a Kremlin political project was directly tied to his success in attracting "too many" voters, and served as an object lesson for Putin and his advisers. Will a unified right please stand up, or be stood up? -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Vennediktov is among those observers who predict that a Kremlin-engineered rightist party, "Free Russia," will be unveiled in September, which would occupy the political ground that infighting and disunity have prevented Yabloko and SPS from seizing. In a recent meeting, SPS party chairman Nikita Belikh acknowledged these rumors and reiterated his public statements that on-going negotiations with Yabloko were a matter of "life and death" for the democratic remnants in Putin's Russia. The problem was not a question of leadership of the democratic movement, Belikh insisted, since he was prepared to cede to Yavlinsky -- 20 years his senior. However, substantial disagreements remained over party programs and Yabloko's continued criticism of the 1990's reforms and tepid support for reform in general. Belikh questioned whether a political union would resurrect the democrats in time for the 2007 Duma elections. Positing that SPS and Yabloko each enjoyed five percent and the Republican Party two percent in public support, Belikh conceded that the sum of the parts was less than the whole, since the leadership could not paper over differences among its supporters. Moreover, any union of existing democratic forces would have to undertake a serious MOSCOW 00009817 003 OF 004 "anti-branding" effort to overcome the legacy of distrust associated with Yeltsin-era policies and politics. ¶8. (C) Pavlovsky, reflecting ruling party frustration over the state of Yabloko and SPS, told us without elaboration that it would be easier to build a new rightist party from scratch than piece together the outsized personalities and historic grudges between existing "democrats" and concluded that time was running out for a rightist coalition to emerge. If you build it, will they vote? -------------- ¶9. (C) The Moscow jury is out on whether this latest Kremlin political project will endure, much less succeed in crossing the seven percent threshold in the 2007 Duma elections. What Mironov did not understand, a disgruntled Rogozin charged, was that "the President can say yes, the American Ambassador can say yes, but that does not mean the Russian voters say yes." Claiming that 95 percent of Rodina's 150,000 supporters were in his camp, despite his Kremlin-ordained ouster from the party's leadership, Rogozin said he would remain on the sidelines of the political alliance and redirect his own energies -- perhaps into a "social movement" focused on the potent cocktail of Russian nationalism and great power status, as relates to relations with Ukraine and Belarus. A key factor in the new alliance's success will be its reception in the regions. Presented with two parties of power and burdened by their own oligarchic concerns, Rogozin said, the regional leadership will wait for a clearer signal of what is expected or, in Pavlovsky's version, try not to offend either side. It was an untenable position for the regional elite, Shevtsova told us, who "want one czar and one party." The Party of Life's inability to register in Sverdlovsk and Tuva is evidence of the difficulty the union will face in United Russia-dominated regions (ref B). To date, there has been no clear direction from Putin, which Shevtsova interpreted as the President giving his "good friend" Mironov a new shot at political prominence, without investing his own prestige in the venture. ¶10. (C) All the manipulations from above, Shevtsova underscored, are indicative of the Russian leadership's lack of confidence in the Russian people and central preoccupation with redistributing wealth within the Kremlin inner circle. The jockeying of minor political parties was a side-show, she charged when "time is literally money" during the countdown to Duma elections and a new Prime Minister in May 2007. Without any tacit understanding among administration insiders on who leaves power when Putin does, all energies are focused on ensuring their own positions and lucrative board memberships. The priorities of the political heavyweights were to redistribute assets to themselves, assuage the regional elite, placate the public with national projects, and secure a consensus on succession. Political parties, she concluded, were not the Kremlin's goal, just an instrument. What does this mean for succession? -------------- ¶11. (C) Machinations over political parties have indirect bearing on the succession debate, since it is unclear whether any credible successor plans to contest the 2008 elections as head of a party or prefers, in the tradition of Yeltsin and Putin, to remain above the party fray. Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov dismissed as nonsense public speculation that he would head the Mironov political configuration into the presidential elections (with First Deputy PM Medvedev putatively his rival as head of a United Russia list). Those who view the new political alliance as a vehicle for Mironov's vanity see little mileage in the Federation Council Chairman ceding leadership to Ivanov. ¶12. (C) Instead, well-connected political bystanders argue that the real contest remains between Putin and those who do not want to see him leave office. It is not a question that Putin is indispensable or that others cannot balance the power between rival Kremlin factions, Vennediktov told us, but rather that the transaction costs of changing Presidents were too high. Pavlovksy flogged this view to us, noting darkly that elections were dangerous and that all revolutions in Russia have come from above. There are divisions within the presidential administration, as well as within the broader bureaucratic strata, and these splits, he intimated, would become more fraught as individuals maneuvered for personal riches. "Putin staying on would be easier in that respect," he stated, reiterating that change brings insecurity, which results in risk and even danger to the Russian political system. ¶13. (C) To his open regret, Pavlovsky said that Putin MOSCOW 00009817 004 OF 004 appeared set on leaving office for "complex motives," including protecting the constitution, as well as his own image, and avoiding alienating the one-third of the electorate that did not support a third term. Mainstream political analysts share the view that any figure ruling the Kremlin after 2008, even Putin, will be weaker. According to Pavlovsky, Putin was "unsustainably popular," occupying the historical zenith of the post-Yeltsin restoration. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) The election season has started, and whether or not the proposed merger of the three leftist parties takes root, the intent of the Kremlin and of Putin to direct political events is clear. While public polling indicates that a majority of the Russian electorate will take their cue from Putin as to whom to support in the Presidential elections and political parties appear as open as ever to Kremlin blandishments, Putin's personal stake in overseeing a credible transfer of power provides an opening for the US, acting in concert with the G8 and EU, to lay down consistent markers on what constitutes a credible democratic process. BURNS