Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW9311
2006-08-25 12:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
DPRK: RUSSIAN VIEWS ON IMPLEMENTING UNSCR 1695
VZCZCXYZ0019 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHMO #9311 2371232 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 251232Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1129 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4093 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0648 RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 0150 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1834 RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 0387 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1999 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1658 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2615 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4031 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0153 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0263
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 009311
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP MNUC KN RS
SUBJECT: DPRK: RUSSIAN VIEWS ON IMPLEMENTING UNSCR 1695
REF: STATE 136495
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Alice Wells. R
easons: 1.4(B/D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 009311
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP MNUC KN RS
SUBJECT: DPRK: RUSSIAN VIEWS ON IMPLEMENTING UNSCR 1695
REF: STATE 136495
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Alice Wells. R
easons: 1.4(B/D).
1. (C) Russia will comply with the requirements of UNSCR
Resolution 1695 but is unlikely to adopt additional legal
requirements directed against the DPRK's missile or WMD
programs. MFA Korea Section Chief Aleksandr Vostrikov told
us August 23 that responsibility for implementing the
resolution's requirements would be shared among Foreign
Ministry departments and other law enforcement and financial
agencies. Russia was committed to implementing the
resolution, but was unwilling to consider UN Security Council
sanctions against the DPRK because they would destroy any
hope of achieving a negotiated solution through Six Party
talks.
2. (C) Vostrikov noted that Russia had a strong record of
bilateral cooperation with the U.S. in countering terrorism
finance and financial crimes and was involved in multilateral
fora aimed at stemming criminal financial activity. He said
that Moscow would be responsive to allegations that Russian
entities were being used to transfer financial resources to
the DPRK's missile or WMD programs, noting that following
U.S. warnings last year, Russian banks had been cautioned
about entering into new relationships with North Korea. He
observed that Russia had also taken steps over the last
several years to tighten its export controls. He said he was
unaware of any special action or new legislation or
regulations that would be needed to implement UNSCR 1695
requirements.
3. (C) Peter Ilyechev of the MFA International
Organizations Department's UN Political Affairs Office told
us on August 24 that the reftel proposals for stopping land,
air and maritime proliferation can be addressed through
existing nonproliferation regimes, such as the Proliferation
Security Initiative and the Missile Technology Control
Regime. Ilyechev also said that DPRK entities which could
face financial measures should be listed by the UNSC.
4. (C) We provided reftel points August 25 to the MFA
Department for Disarmament and Security Affairs (DVBR) Export
Control Policy Section. The Section promised to review the
information.
BURNS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP MNUC KN RS
SUBJECT: DPRK: RUSSIAN VIEWS ON IMPLEMENTING UNSCR 1695
REF: STATE 136495
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Alice Wells. R
easons: 1.4(B/D).
1. (C) Russia will comply with the requirements of UNSCR
Resolution 1695 but is unlikely to adopt additional legal
requirements directed against the DPRK's missile or WMD
programs. MFA Korea Section Chief Aleksandr Vostrikov told
us August 23 that responsibility for implementing the
resolution's requirements would be shared among Foreign
Ministry departments and other law enforcement and financial
agencies. Russia was committed to implementing the
resolution, but was unwilling to consider UN Security Council
sanctions against the DPRK because they would destroy any
hope of achieving a negotiated solution through Six Party
talks.
2. (C) Vostrikov noted that Russia had a strong record of
bilateral cooperation with the U.S. in countering terrorism
finance and financial crimes and was involved in multilateral
fora aimed at stemming criminal financial activity. He said
that Moscow would be responsive to allegations that Russian
entities were being used to transfer financial resources to
the DPRK's missile or WMD programs, noting that following
U.S. warnings last year, Russian banks had been cautioned
about entering into new relationships with North Korea. He
observed that Russia had also taken steps over the last
several years to tighten its export controls. He said he was
unaware of any special action or new legislation or
regulations that would be needed to implement UNSCR 1695
requirements.
3. (C) Peter Ilyechev of the MFA International
Organizations Department's UN Political Affairs Office told
us on August 24 that the reftel proposals for stopping land,
air and maritime proliferation can be addressed through
existing nonproliferation regimes, such as the Proliferation
Security Initiative and the Missile Technology Control
Regime. Ilyechev also said that DPRK entities which could
face financial measures should be listed by the UNSC.
4. (C) We provided reftel points August 25 to the MFA
Department for Disarmament and Security Affairs (DVBR) Export
Control Policy Section. The Section promised to review the
information.
BURNS