CIVIL SOCIETY COUNCIL CHAIR PAMFILOVA: "WE'LL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000921

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PINR RS
SUBJECT: CIVIL SOCIETY COUNCIL CHAIR PAMFILOVA: "WE'LL
TRACK IMPLEMENTATION OF NGO LEGISLATION"

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a January 18 meeting with visiting DRL
A/S Barry Lowenkron, the Ambassador and EUR DAS Kramer, Ella
Pamfilova, head of the Presidential body that oversees civil
society issues, said she had strongly opposed the
controversial NGO legislation and had weighed in with
President Putin. She criticized public U.S. reaction,
however as counterproductive in that it left President Putin
no choice but to sign the bill in its current state. She
also argued more generally that the U.S. should be less
critical of Russia in public. Lowenkron countered that the
USG had taken a discreet approach in dealing with the GOR on
the legislation, avoiding public debate. Public
manifestations of U.S. concern were reflected in a
Congressional resolution, yet even that was cast more in the
spirit of registering concerns. The NGO legislation will be
harmful, Pamfilova said, but she will help lead a broad
effort by a strong network of Russian NGOs to monitor its
implementation. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) The meeting took place a day after the public notice
that President Putin had signed the controversial NGO
legislation. Citing a dramatic worldwide increase in the
number of NGOs over the past fifteen years, Lowenkron began
by emphasizing that NGOs had become a reality and played a
positive role throughout the world. NGOs could be supportive
or critical of governments, but they should not be viewed as
enemies.
.
THE EFFORT TO DERAIL THE NGO BILL
--------------


3. (C) Pamfilova stressed that from the moment the first
draft of the legislation had been offered for consideration
by the State Duma, she had viewed it as "the most odious
legislation I had ever seen." She had immediately criticized
the bill, and had voiced her criticism to Putin. While some
of the flaws in the first draft had subsequently been
removed, many others remain in the text signed by Putin on
January 10. The legislation was in itself not terrible, she
continued, but it raised fears about implementation. While
there was reason to hope that, like many other Russian laws,
it would not be implemented at all, there was more reason to
worry that it would be selectively implemented. For that
reason, Pamfilova continued, she would lead an effort to
closely monitor the legislation once it formally goes into
effect.


4. (C) Saying that she wanted to speak frankly because "we
share common interests," Pamfilova argued that U.S. public
reaction had been harmful to the efforts she had helped lead
to significantly change the bill. Pamfilova characterized
U.S. opposition as having come at a pivotal moment when there
was a chance to further amend the bill in light of Western
recommendations. U.S. public criticism put Putin in a
corner, and left him no choice but to approve it in its
current form. Much of the Russian public favored the thrust
of the bill, Pamfilova said, noting that although she had
received some five hundred letters opposing the draft
legislation, she had received many more favoring it.


5. (C) U.S. criticism reflected a broader flaw in the U.S.
approach, Pamfilova argued. The U.S. should not be so harsh
publicly on the Russians, particularly in the current mood
when the public rejects Western influences, associates
democracy with poverty and corruption, still suffers from
loss of its empire, and demonstrates significant
anti-Americanism. That mood, which prevails throughout the
Russian population, places human rights and civil society
activists in a difficult position; democrats are in a small
minority in Russia, Pamfilova said. Russia needs help from
the U.S. to proceed along a democratic path, Pamfilova
continued, but the U.S. should express itself more tactfully.
A measured approach, such as that taken by many Europeans,
would be more effective. According to Pamfilova, harsh
criticism only reinforces a pervasive attitude among Russia's
elite that because the West is being hyper-critical,
listening to Western advice is fruitless.


6. (C) Expressing appreciation for her candor, Lowenkron
emphasized that President Bush, in his conversations with
President Putin, and Secretary Rice in her discussions with
FM Lavrov, had raised the issue quietly. In response to
Russian arguments that its NGO bill was similar to American
procedures, the Secretary had instructed State to provide the
GOR with an analysis of U.S. laws and to offer a comparison
with the Russian draft legislation. Throughout the entire
period of Duma consideration of the NGO bill, the USG had
handled the issue discreetly, Lowenkron underscored. We
pursued quiet discussion rather than public debate. The

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Secretary had also consistently made clear that democracy by

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its very nature cannot be imposed on a country, while at the
same time stressing that creation of democracy cannot be a
top-down process in any country. The U.S. Congress passed a
resolution expressing its concerns, Lowenkron noted, but this
did not "threaten" Russia. Pamfilova replied that the
Russian public does not differentiate between the
Administration and the Congress. Moreover, Russians
interpreted the resolution as a threat.
.
LOOKING AHEAD
--------------


7. (C) Now that Putin had signed the legislation, Lowenkron
asked, what will be its consequences and how will Pamfilova
help monitor its implementation? Pamfilova replied that
Putin had not fostered the legislation to counter a potential
orange revolution in Russia. According to Putin, what
happened in Ukraine could not happen in Russia. Such a
revolution could occur only where the population did not
respect its leadership, as was the case in Ukraine. While
Putin understood this, Pamfilova said, others in the elite
did remain fearful of an "orange revolution." From Putin's
viewpoint, the legislation had been created to fight both
foreign influences on Russian domestic politics and radical
Islamic influences from abroad. The legislation will not
succeed in either goal, Pamfilova continued, adding that she
had made that point to Putin. Its biggest flaws were that it
failed to define "political activity," thus leaving room for
its arbitrary use by bureaucrats against organizations they
disliked, and that it opened the door to massive corruption.
Indeed, bureaucrats and Duma deputies had lobbied heavily for
the bill because, having lost opportunities to receive bribes
as businesses found their registration process more
transparent, they now saw NGO registration as a new
opportunity to collect bribes.


8. (C) The legislation was a step backward, but Putin had
nonetheless helped strengthen civil society in other ways,
Pamfilova argued, adding that foreign critics did not seem to
notice that. Changes to tax laws had created more
possibilities for foundations to support NGOs, for example,
and Putin was meeting regularly with civil society
organizations. He met once a year with Pamfilova's Council,
she reported. In the most recent such meeting, in July 2005,
Putin had asked the Council to prepare a plan to encourage
funding to NGOs, studying Western models as a basis for its
suggestions. Pamfilova added that her Council did not
reflect a top-down approach; while some Russian "political
technologists" took such an approach, it had been
discredited. In addition to the steps she had listed,
Pamfilova said that Putin had also taken other positive steps
on civil society, although the new NGO legislation might
threaten some of those.


9. (C) With respect to monitoring of the new legislation,
Pamfilova said that Russia's vast civil society community --
containing some 120,000 NGOs -- had a strong network of
experts. Her own NGO (which works on child welfare issues)
includes over 750 groups throughout the country, and many
other Council members had similar networks. This would allow
for effective monitoring implementation of the legislation,
which would also include issuing reports on the Internet and
elsewhere about how things were proceeding, Pamfilova
continued. She planned to report to the State Duma and to
Putin. Although civil society may be in the minority in
Russia, Pamfilova said, it is well organized, thanks partly
to Western help, and was well prepared to monitor the
legislation's implementation. Pamfilova added that Putin had
asked her to work with international NGOs in the run-up to
the G-8 summit.


10. (C) Lowenkron welcomed the fact that Pamfilova would
report to Putin and that she was helping address
misconceptions about the orange revolution. He echoed her
concern that the legislation could be used against any NGO.
Adding that he also welcomed the Council's role in using
Western models to generate ideas on funding sources for NGOs,
Lowenkron stressed that in the U.S., organizations need
register only if they are to represent a foreign government
or if they seek tax free status; otherwise, they are free to
function as long as they are not terrorist or extremist.
Acknowledging Lowenkron's point, Pamfilova reiterated that
Putin had told her that he wanted Russian law to be based on
Western experience. She said that Russian legislation would
get to that point eventually, and expressed appreciation to
the Ambassador for having provided her with information about
U.S. laws on NGOs.


11. (SBU) A/S Lowenkron cleared this cable.
BURNS