SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY IVANOV ON LARIJANI TALKS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000754 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2014 TAGS: PREL KNNP RS IR SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY IVANOV ON LARIJANI TALKS Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns, for reasons 1.4 (B & D) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. Ambassador met January 25 with Russian Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov, who provided a read-out of his January 24 meeting with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani. Ivanov said "nothing extraordinary" came out of the discussion with Larijani, who had put forward no new positions but probed for signs of evolution in Russia's position. Ivanov was credible in reporting that -- despite Russia's own opposition to a formal referral to the UNSC at this point -- he had made clear to Larijani that Russia cannot prevent such an IAEA referral unless Tehran restores its moratorium and answers the IAEA's questions. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) Ivanov said Larijani's task in Moscow appeared to be to make sure Tehran was clear on what's Russia's position was on the principal nuclear-related issues that will affect decisions at the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) meeting next week. Larijani had put forward no new ideas, and Ivanov said that "frankly, nothing extraordinary was said or happened" in the Russian-Iranian talks. Moratorium on Enrichment Activities -------------- ¶3. (S) Larijani had told Ivanov that Iran's point of departure for discussions of its moratorium was that the 2003 Paris agreements with the EU-3 had extended to production activities, but not to research and development. Their recent cutting of IAEA seals at Natanz, therefore, had not violated their commitments. Moreover, after cutting the seals, they had undertaken no further activity. The move by the EU-3 and others to have the BOG report Iran to the UNSC was not a result of Iran's actions, but rather represented a "political decision." Larijani asked what Russia's position was. ¶4. (S) Ivanov said he had told Larijani that Iran's cutting of seals was not consistent with Russia's understanding of the Paris agreement commitment that, during the time when Iran/EU-3 negotiations were ongoing, there would be no enrichment activities, which Russia understood included research and development activities on enrichment. Since Iran had no enrichment production activities to suspend at the time of the Paris agreement, that could not have been the exclusive subject of the moratorium. Russia believed Iran must reinstate the moratorium as an element of the negotiation process. ¶5. (S) Ivanov said he had made clear that, in Moscow's view, since the IAEA had sealed the centrifuges pursuant to the Paris agreement, breaking the seals broke the moratorium. "For us it's obvious." Larijani had said Ivanov and Russia were tougher on that issue than even UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, who had said (according to Larijani) that the centrifuges did not need to be re-sealed, if Iran simply refrained from introducing gas into them. Ivanov had responded that the EU-3 could define what their position was, but he had stated Russia's position. It was ultimately up to the IAEA -- not Ivanov or Straw or anyone else -- to determine whether the moratorium was in effect or not. If the IAEA concluded that the moratorium had been restored, Russia could take a fresh look at the other issues. The Ambassador noted that he had no confirmation that Foreign Secretary Straw had said that the centrifuges at Natanz did SIPDIS not need to be re-sealed; his public statements, however, had made clear his support for Russia's joint enrichment initiative. Iran's Right to Undertake R&D -------------- ¶6. (S) As a second theme, Larijani had raised its right under the NPT to perform enrichment R&D for peaceful purposes. Ivanov said he had acknowledged that Iran had such a right in principle, but Russia saw no practical need or urgency or economic justification for Iran to act on that right at present. It had an assured supply of nuclear fuel from Russia for its only reactor at Bushehr, so there was no reason why it needed to pursue enrichment immediately. Moreover, Iran had through its own actions undermined international confidence in its nuclear program, and before undertaking sensitive operations it needed first to restore the confidence of the IAEA and the international community in the nature of its program. The way to that, Ivanov had said, was for Iran to restore its moratorium and return to the negotiations with the EU-3, The Russian Initiative MOSCOW 00000754 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶7. (S) Larijani had raised several questions about Russia's proposal for a joint Russian-Iranian enrichment program in Russia. First, he had inquired whether the program could be carried out in Iran, and Ivanov had made clear that the program could be carried out only in Russia. Larijani had asked to what extent the program could be "joint" in the technical aspects of fuel production. Ivanov had responded that management of the overall program would be joint, but only Russian specialists would have access to the technical side of the program. Russian legislation would not allow foreign access to the technical side. Larijani had complained that such an arrangement would deprive Iran of its NPT right to nuclear technology transfer for peaceful purposes. Ivanov had explained that Russia's conception was not intended to be eternal, but rather of temporary, although undefined, duration -- for the period until Iran had been able to reestablish its credibility with the IAEA and the international community. How long that might take was not clear, but for its duration Iran would have a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel. That should satisfy its needs. ¶8. (S) Larijani asked whether the joint enterprise could operate for several years in Russia while simultaneously Iran pursued enrichment work in Iran. Ivanov had said that was not consistent with Russia's proposal, which had as a necessary element a moratorium on enrichment work in Iran. Larijani said Iran would continue to study the Russian proposal, and an Iranian team would come in mid-February for further talks. Ivanov said he understood that the Iranian team would not include Larijani, but would include some of his deputies and other Iranian specialists. He added that Larijani had been accompanied on this visit by two of assistants and at least one representative of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization. ¶9. (S) Ivanov said he had explained to Larijani Russia's unhappiness with how Iran had dealt with the joint enrichment initiative, telling the EU-3 at one point that Russia had made no proposal. Moscow had then made public statements making clearing that it was not playing games with Iran or the EU-3. ¶10. (S) Asked by the Ambassador whether there had been any discussion of possible Chinese participation in a joint Russian-Iranian joint enrichment venture, Ivanov said that issue had not been raised by either side. From Russia's standpoint, he said, that was a technical problem that it would make no sense to discuss when the issues of principle concerning the program had not been resolved. He noted that members of the Iranian delegation had met later with Rosatom Director Kiriyenko, but Larijani had not participated in that meeting. Referral to the UNSC -------------- ¶11. (S) Ivanov said Iran was intensively consulting now with a number of countries to determine their positions. He thought Tehran was beginning to understand that a report by the BOG to the Security Council was a real possibility, and it was eager to avoid such an action. Larijani had asked how Russia would vote in the IAEA on a report to the UNSC. Ivanov had told him that Russia had no veto at the IAEA and could not prevent a referral even by voting against it. There were enough votes at the BOG in favor of a report for a resolution to that effect to be passed. Iran should have no illusions about the situation it was in, and should expect no "tricks" from Russia or China to prevent a referral. If it wanted to avoid that outcome, it would need to reinstate its moratorium and resume negotiations with the EU-3. Larijani had "just listened" to that advice and made no comment. 12, (S) Larijani had laid out Iran's position, however, that if the nuclear issue were referred to the UNSC, it would be bound by Iranian legislation to curtail its cooperation with the IAEA and to pursue enrichment on an industrial scale. Ivanov said he had responded that if Iran took such steps, neither Russia nor other countries would be able to continue cooperating with it. Iran would in effect be harming its own interests. The Ambassador asked whether Larijani had understood that point. Ivanov shrugged his shoulders and responded, "I said it clearly." ¶13. (S) Ivanov made clear to the Ambassador that Russia itself continued to believe that a referral to the UNSC at this point would convert the issue from a "technical" into a "political" one. The IAEA would in essence be cut out of further action, and the Security Council would be tied up MOSCOW 00000754 003 OF 003 trying to decide whether to impose sanctions. He reiterated, however, that he had made clear to Larijani that Russia was not in a position to prevent a referral. Russia's Conclusions -------------- ¶14. (S) Ivanov said he had stressed to Larijani that Iran's own interests would be served by fully restoring the moratorium on enrichment and satisfying the IAEA that it has full answers to all its questions. He and Larijani had agreed that Russia and Iran would remain in contact, including at the level of specialists. If Iran created the right conditions by taking the necessary steps, Russia would be ready to try for a solution short of UNSC referral. Press Event -------------- ¶15. (U) Ivanov noted that he had not briefed the press on his meeting with Larijani, who did hold a press conference after their meeting. The Russian Security Council had put out, however, a statement on the talks in which it was indicated that both sides had expressed the desire to have the Iranian nuclear issue resolved by diplomatic means "within the framework of the IAEA." Comment -------------- ¶16. (S) It indeed appears that Larijani was on a reconnaissance mission, sounding out the Russians for any evolution in their position. Ivanov was credible in reporting that -- despite Russia's own opposition to a formal referral to the UNSC at this point -- he made clear to Larijani that Russia cannot prevent such a IAEA referral unless Tehran restores its moratorium and answers all the IAEA's questions. BURNS