RUSSIAN SCO REPRESENTATIVE ON JUNE 15 SUMMIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 006563 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER RS IR AF CN KZ SUBJECT: RUSSIAN SCO REPRESENTATIVE ON JUNE 15 SUMMIT REF: A. MOSCOW 5413 ¶B. MOSCOW 5483 Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Russian Ambassador-at-Large for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Vitaliy Vorobiyov gave us a readout June 20 of the June 15 SCO Summit. He encouraged the United States to have more dialogue with the SCO to avoid misunderstandings, perhaps as a formal "dialogue partner" to the organization. He said Russia and the SCO have their own misgivings about U.S. intentions in the region, and acknowledged that more dialogue would be warranted on that subject as well. Vorobiyov recounted dissatisfaction expressed by all SCO members, except for Russia and China, with the performance of the Afghan government and admitted that no efforts to combat drug flows from Afghanistan had been particularly successful. Vorobiyov characterized the summit tasking to develop guidelines for the admission of new members as a way to appease the current observers; he thought the guidelines would take years to work out. He also offered views on Ahmadi-Nejad's performance at the summit as well as on SCO component organizations. End summary. The U.S. Presence -------------- ¶2. (C) Russian Ambassador-at-Large for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Vitaliy Vorobiyov discussed the June 15 Shanghai Summit and SCO developments with us on June 20. The USG's repeated demarches in the lead-up and the Secretary's phone call to Chinese FM Li hours before the SIPDIS summit gave Vorobiyov the impression throughout the event that the United States was a silent "eleventh participant," he told us only half in jest. He said the U.S. ought to find ways to talk with the SCO directly as an organization. He understood that the USG would not be seeking observer status in the organization at this time, but thought that the concept of a "dialogue partner" might be developed and might be appropriate for the U.S. He said that SCO members were eager for more dialogue with the U.S., and a report that SCO SYG Zhang distributed on his recent meeting with Ambassador Randt in Beijing had been very well received. Vorobiyov was pleased that Zhang and Amb. Randt had agreed to continue talking. Strengthening the Secretariat -------------- ;¶3. (C) Vorobiyov thought that the decision taken at the summit to strengthen the authority of the Secretariat would make interlocutors take it more seriously. He showed us the resume of incoming SYG Bolat Nurgaliyev, the current Kazakh Ambassador to Japan, whose election to the post had been approved at the summit. Vorobiyov said he did not know Nurgaliyev, but his past posts as ambassador to both the United States and to various East and South Asian countries made him a well-qualified choice. Misunderstandings -------------- ¶4. (C) Vorobiyov was concerned that there was still much misunderstanding in the U.S. about the SCO's intentions, and cited reports he had seen in the Western press of U.S. lawmakers giving voice to those misunderstandings (he was not specific about which lawmakers or which comments). He emphasized that the SCO is and will remain a transparent organization, eager for dialogue. ¶5. (C) We pointed out the emphasis of Russian press reports about the summit on its alleged anti-American character, including Putin's comments that Russia opposed "the duplication of organizations, unnecessary competition, and establishment of closed clubs" in the region. Vorobiyov said the idea had taken hold in circles within the Russian and other SCO member governments that the U.S. remained intent on establishing new regional organizations that were intended to exclude Russia and China. He said Putin had raised these concerns with both the President and Secretary. The concerns had been around for several years, but only now did some believe that the alleged U.S. plans had become official USG policy and had begun to be operationalized. He cited the "Greater Central Asia Initiative" as an attempt to "mix the problems of Central Asia with those of Afghanistan and South Asia." Vorobiyov said the concerns were shared by the SCO as an organization, so it had to react by opposing them in the summit declaration. He stressed that the declaration reference had been indirect, in order that it not be viewed as confrontational ¶6. (C) We told Vorobiyov that the U.S. had no plans to establish duplicative or exclusionary structures in Central Asia. Our efforts, for instance, to combat narcotics trafficking through the region were inclusive and focused on a widely shared goal. Vorobiyov agreed that fighting drugs traffic was a "tremendously difficult" endeavor, and that no one may even sufficiently understand how to go about it, much less be able to reduce the flow. We told him that the "Paris 2 Moscow 1" conference, to be convened later this month in Moscow under G-8 auspices, would be useful for coordinating efforts and deconflicting. Vorobiyov did not argue with U.S. plans for economic development ideas in Central Asia, saying each country could make up its own mind about its interests. Afghanistan -------------- ¶7. (C) Vorobiyov was not specific about when the SCO's long-planned Afghanistan Contact Group would be on the ground. He said its mandate would be to involve itself with "all forces" in the country. Vorobiyov noted that President Karzai had drawn open criticism at the summit from all SCO members -- except for Russia and China -- for the failures of Afghan authorities to maintain control. Karzai had "said words in defense, maybe defensively" about his government's efforts. Vorobiyov thought the criticism would persist. New Members -------------- ¶8. (C) Commenting on the leaders' tasking to ministers during the summit to develop guidelines and procedures for the admittance of new members to the organization, Vorobiyov said that it was simply a bureaucratic exercise to show that it was taking requests for new members seriously. Among the current observers, only Pakistan had formally requested admission, but Vorobiyov doubted the Pakistanis had a clear idea of what membership meant. He related that President Musharraf had cited only three of the SCO Charter's numerous paragraphs before pronouncing that the organizations terms were acceptable. While the other observers had not filed formal membership applications, Vorobiyov reported that Iran was "actively sounding out" the possibility, and there had been "heavy hints" from India. Despite the new tasking, he said the membership admission guidelines would take years to develop. In the meantime, the SCO was looking for ways to involve the observers more deeply in the organization. Iran -------------- ¶9. (C) Vorobiyov provided his impressions of Ahmadi-Nejad's summit appearance. He was not surprised that the Iranian chose not to use strong or inflammatory rhetoric at either the summit plenary of in his press appearance. What did surprise Vorobiyov, he related, was that Ahmadi-Nejad spoke so "smoothly," as though he were signaling that he could be "constructive," and not always "narrow-minded." An unidentified Central Asian friend pointed out to Vorobiyov that Ahmadi-Nejad was using "strange literary language" and that the "Shiite influence on his mentality" was obvious. He did not discount that the Iranian's choice of language may have been intended to show that he was not speaking for domestic consumption. SCO-Affiliated Bodies -------------- ¶10. (C) Vorobiyov touched briefly on the SCO Business Council and Interbank Union -- both formally inaugurated at the Shanghai summit -- and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). The Business Council and Interbank Union were both intended to be nongovernmental bodies that followed only general official guidelines. The "Scientific-Expert Forum" launched in Moscow in May (ref B) was meant to operate the same way. The SCO hoped that the Council and Union would consult with and make recommendations to member governments and the Secretariat to fulfill the SCO's 2020 goal of free movement of capital and technology within the SCO space. Vorobiyov added that bringing together businessmen and bankers in an informal but structured format would spur concrete cooperative projects. He said the Council was modeled on a similar forum within APEC. ¶11. (C) Vorobiyov said the summit-approved changes to the SCO Charter on the role of the Secretariat would affect the operations of the RATS. Whereas before, the RATS was an autonomous body, now its overall budget would be approved by the Secretariat. The RATS Executive will retain authority for now on how its funds get spent, but the SCO is also considering making the Executive formally subordinate to the SYG. Vorobiyov said RATS members have not all agreed on a common list of terrorists. BURNS