SEARCH FOR NEW RUSSIAN PROCURATOR GENERAL OVERLAID

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 006268 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INL/PRAHAR DOJ FOR OPDAT (LEHMANN) AND OIA (BURKE) E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR KCRM RS SUBJECT: SEARCH FOR NEW RUSSIAN PROCURATOR GENERAL OVERLAID BY KREMLIN POLITICS REF: MOSCOW 5934 Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine. Reasons 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Over the past week analysts have tried to read the tea leaves swirling around Vladimir Ustinov's abrupt June 2 dismissal as Procurator General. Speculation has largely shifted from the reasons behind his departure to educated guessing about the effects the choice of his replacement may have on presidential succession and the balance of power between competing Kremlin factions. The dominant view at present is that Ustinov's departure has weakened the position of Presidential Administration Deputy head Igor Sechin, who is regarded as the leader of the so-called "siloviki" faction. Whether the appointment of the new Procurator General will be intended to establish a "new balance" in the President's entourage, or will be accompanied by other substantial firings and appointments, is being hotly debated in the absence of reliable information. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) Observers continue to assess the motivations behind last week's sudden dismissal of former Procurator General (PG) Vladimir Ustinov. Among the frequently discussed theories now being given currency is that Ustinov's departure was the opening salvo in what could be a broader shake-up of the GOR cabinet reflecting fault lines within the Kremlin. That scenario posits that Putin had been unhappy with Presidential Administration (PA) Deputy Chief Igor Sechin and the "siloviki" faction, comprised of current and former security service officials and nominally headed by Sechin. Most analysts have thought that the siloviki were in the ascendancy within the Kremlin, gaining greater influence relative to economic liberalizers. Putin in this view chose to dismiss Ustinov, a close Sechin ally, to demonstrate displeasure with silovik overreaching and check the Sechin-Ustinov tandem before it gained more momentum. Media reports also speculate that at least four ministers -- Yuriy Chayka (Justice),German Gref (Economic Development and Trade),Andrey Fursenko (Education and Science),and Yuriy Trutnev (Natural Resources) -- could lose their jobs by the end of the summer as part of an effort to re-balance the alignment of power between the Kremlin's "liberal" wing, loosely associated with First Deputy Prime Minister (and former PA Chief) Dmitriy Medvedev, and Sechin's "siloviki." ¶3. (C) Some contacts have told us that Ustinov's removal represents a setback for Sechin and the "siloviki," at least in the near-term. In this view Medvedev and, perhaps to a lesser extent, fellow unofficial presidential contender and Deputy Prime Minister/Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov were principal beneficiaries of the development, in part because a clipping of Sechin's wings would limit his ability to undermine their presidential chances. (Some analysts believe Sechin has been working against both Sergey Ivanov and Medvedev as presidential succession candidates in order to convince Putin that he has "no choice" but to remain in power beyond 2008. Any weakening of Sechin's influence, in this analysis, reinforces the notion that Putin genuinely intends to step down in 2008.) Our contacts explained that Putin had become concerned with the growing influence of the "siloviki," citing their role, e.g., in last month's transfer of the Federal Customs Service from Gref's ministry to the office of Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, a member of the "siloviki" wing. Our contacts were not sure to whether Ustinov's removal was also tied to the government's recently announced anti-corruption campaign. ¶4. (C) The selection of Ustinov's successor will also have direct implications for Kremlin politics. Dmitriy Kozak and Aleksandr Konovalov, PolPreds for the Southern and Volga Districts respectively, are still considered front-runners, but "Kommersant" has quoted unidentified sources as indicating that those two are not in fact on Putin's shortlist. However that may be, Kozak's appointment as Procurator General (PG) would bring him back to Moscow and undoubtedly lead many to conclude that he had joined Medvedev and Sergey Ivanov as succession front-runners. Meanwhile, Duma Deputy Aleksandr Lebedev speculated to the Ambassador that Viktor Cherkesov, Director of the Federal Counter-Narcotics Service, is another possible contender. According to Lebedev, Cherkesov has close ties to Putin, is not associated with Sechin or the "siloviki," and is "due for a change" in position, Lebedev said. ¶5. (C) Other names being floated as possible successors include Chayka, who previously held the job in an acting MOSCOW 00006268 002 OF 002 capacity, Acting PG Yuriy Biryukov, and two Deputy PG's -- Yuriy Zolotov in the Urals Federal District and Valentin Simuchenkov in the Siberian Federal District. The latter two are considered politically neutral. Some predict that Putin will announce the new PG personally a few days before the next session of the Federation Council on June 23, when the chosen candidate can be confirmed by that body. ¶6. (C) COMMENT. The choice of Ustinov's successor will be seen first and foremost through the prism of succession politics. If Kozak -- or Cherkesov -- were selected as the new PG, observers would regard either as having been jumped into the running for the presidency, with reform of the procuracy a test he must handle successfully, just as Medvedev is seen as being tested by his handling of the national priority projects and Ivanov by his management of the military and military-industrial complex. Konovalov is identified by many as "Medvedev's man," and his appointment would be read as a sign Medvedev is in the ascendancy. Appointment of a technocratic figure not known to be linked to any of the perceived succession "heavyweights" would spur speculation about whether the Procuracy was being taken out of politics or simply made more responsive to direct management by Putin. With the President's proclivity to make unexpected personnel decisions (e.g., the appointment of Fradkov as Prime Minister in 2004),no one is confident which way Putin will choose to tilt the gameboard. BURNS