SOUTH OSSETIA: RUSSIAN MFA ON HEIGHTENED TENSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005933 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS PBTS OSCE GG RS SUBJECT: SOUTH OSSETIA: RUSSIAN MFA ON HEIGHTENED TENSIONS REF: MOSCOW 5532 AND PREV. Classified By: Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine. Reason 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Russian MFA negotiator on South Ossetia assured us June 2 that Russia supports Georgia's territorial integrity and borders, despite a June 1 public statement implying otherwise. He denied that Russia intends a "creeping annexation" of South Ossetia. In a separate June 2 discussion, MFA Georgia Office director detailed a hardening Russian position on visas for Russian peacekeepers in Georgia. Putin may agree to a telephone conversation with Saakashvili, and the Russians and Ossetians may agree to hold the next South Ossetia JCC in Tbilisi. End Summary. Russians Serving in South Ossetia -------------- ¶2. (C) We noted to Ambassador Yuriy Popov, negotiator on South Ossetia, that Washington was surprised by DFM Karasin's answer (reftel) to U/S Burns' concern that Russians were serving in the South Ossetian government. Some officials seemed to have concurrent positions in the Russian or North Ossetian governments and in the South Ossetian government. Popov suggested that they might be in economic positions or just advisors. When we rejected that, he referred to the former Georgian foreign minister, a serving French diplomat; he suggested that the whole issue was trivial. We noted that each fact in itself -- for example, the announcements of appointments to the "government" of South Ossetia appearing in the official newspaper "Yuzhnyy Federalnyy" -- might be just a small dot. But Washington was concerned with the pattern that emerged when connecting the dots, a pattern that much resembled creeping annexation. Popov strenuously rejected the notion, saying Russia had no desire whatever for the "wasteland" territory of South Ossetia. Territorial Integrity -------------- ¶3. (C) The June 1 MFA Spokesperson's statement calling Georgian territorial integrity a "potential condition" and not a "political-legal reality" was a dangerous precedent, we stressed. The international community recognizes Georgia's de jure territorial integrity. De facto it could not now exercise this legal right on parts of its territory, but it was not in Russia's interests to muddle this distinction. Popov asserted that Russia is "not trying to question Georgia's territorial integrity in principle. We absolutely support it, and are not trying to challenge or disrupt it." When asked about Russia's attitude towards Georgia's 1991 borders, Popov said that Russia is not retreating from its support for Georgia's borders. We said that tone is not reflected in the statement, and he answered that the statement's tone reflects Russian frustration at constant Georgian rhetoric. We suggested that Georgian rhetoric, while brash, could also be a reaction to real Russian actions, for example the bans on wine and mineral water. Visas for PKO -------------- ¶4. (C) Popov said the only agreements with Georgia on visas concerned Russian military personnel at bases in Georgia, not peacekeepers. South Ossetia was a zone of conflict, and this imposed a special regime. We noted that there is no equivalent of a SOFA or UNSCR governing the status of peacekeepers, and as long as Georgia was offering visas, it would reduce tensions to accept them. There was always a danger that when undocumented peacekeepers patrolled the areas of the Zone of Conflict (ZOC) that remained under Georgian control, they risked a confrontation with Georgian security forces. Popov said he did not believe the peacekeepers would patrol outside the South Ossetian part of the ZOC. In any case, he said, Russia feared that Georgia would deny visas to the peacekeepers as a way of harassing or eliminating the PKO. ¶5. (C) In a separate conversation, MFA Georgia Office director Semyon Grigoryev told us the Russian position had hardened on the visa issue. In April, when it first arose, he was scheduled to fly to Tbilisi to discuss it with the Georgians. He had hoped to negotiate some sort of an arrangement short of a visa regime. Just before departure, the Georgians sent a note to the Russians rejecting all possibilities except a visa regime. Grigoryev's superiors had then canceled his trip. By now, he said, the Russians categorically rejected the idea of a visa regime and would not even talk about it -- while understanding that there is no written legal basis for the undocumented status of the peacekeepers. Grigoryev thought no progress could be made on MOSCOW 00005933 002 OF 002 this through bilateral talks, but only through the JCC. Overall Relations and Some Overtures -------------- ¶6. (C) Popov said Russia, for all its clumsiness, genuinely wanted stability on its southern borders. He asked why the U.S. was concentrating on relatively minor visa matters instead of the progress being made through the JCC and the more important issues of an overall peace settlement. We said that irritants such as the visa issue are underbrush that Russia needs to clear away before it can make real progress, and the Georgians seemed to be open to a solution. Asked whether he had talked bilaterally with the Georgians, he replied that he had not yet done so. But he said the Russians were planning some conciliatory moves, including agreeing to Khaindrava's proposal to hold an extraordinary JCC meeting in Tbilisi (though Khaindrava proposed June 2, 3, or 5, dates which may slip). The North Ossetians were on board with that proposal, and though the South Ossetians were still reluctant, Popov believed the Russians could "coax" them to Tbilisi. He hoped the U.S. would "leak" this information to our Georgian friends. ¶7. (C) Grigoryev said he was optimistic that there would be a Putin-Saakashvili telephone conversation, though there was no official word on this yet. Popov noted, however, that frustration with Georgia was still strong. Russia was fed up with the "disrespect" it received from Georgia, he said, and there was a growing school of thought in Russia that Georgia's provocative rhetoric was instigated in Washington as an indirect way of goading Russia. He denied that he adhered to this school, and we noted that those who believed such absurdities would hardly be convinced otherwise by American rebuttals. It was clear, however, that the flashpoints in Russian-Georgian relations were well on their way to becoming irritants in U.S.-Russian relations. The U.S. exerted a strong restraining influence on Georgian rhetoric and actions, but there were real issues that Russia and Georgia needed to resolve, and without Russian acceptance of its share of responsibility to resolve them, the irritants would only grow. Popov summed up by saying the basic problem was one of distrust: it was clear that the U.S. distrusted Russia's intentions, Russia distrusted U.S. intentions, Russia distrusted Georgia and vice versa, and the Georgians and South Ossetians completely distrusted one another. We replied that one needed to start somewhere to unravel this knot, and building Russian-Georgian confidence on South Ossetia would be an important start. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Popov, who is still new, was non-committal on issues, e.g., visas, on which Grigoryev more openly expressed Russia's hard line (Grigoryev is in his last days before leaving Moscow to become DCM at Moscow's embassy in Kabul). Popov's assertions on territorial integrity should not be taken as the MFA's last word on the issue, which will require close attention and engagement. Both Popov and Grigoryev believed the recurrent worsening of relations between Russia and Georgia was unsustainable. While Grigoryev recognized that direct Russian-Georgian talks would be indispensable to reverse this trend, Popov appeared to believe that the U.S. could serve as an intermediary for communicating with Georgia. We agree with Grigoryev: Russia and Georgia must engage directly to resolve their problems. The U.S. can urge restraint on both, but should not be a message carrier -- that would only lead the two sides to believe that they can avoid direct contact, and would diminish their sense of responsibility for promoting a settlement. BURNS