GEORGIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ON CIS WITHDRAWAL,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005492

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2016
TAGS: PREL ETRD GG RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ON CIS WITHDRAWAL,
NATO ENTRY

REF: TEFFT-REMLER E-MAIL 5/19/06

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: Georgian Deputy PM Baramidze told the
Ambassador May 23 that he expected Georgia to leave the CIS
in a matter of months. Negotiating bilateral agreements with
the non-Russian members of the organization would be a
priority; it would be important to protect the interests of
Georgian citizens living and trading in the CIS. He
predicted that as Georgia moved towards NATO membership,
Russia would increasingly portray it as irresponsible.
Ambassador urged Georgia to pursue tactics that would make
such a portrayal difficult. End Summary.

CIS
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2. (C) Georgian Deputy PM and State Minister for European
Integration Giorgi (Gia) Baramidze called on the Ambassador
May 23. He was in Moscow en route to a CIS Heads of
Government (HOG) meeting in Dushanbe. He said his
instructions were to inform other CIS HOGs that Georgia
wished to maintain excellent bilateral relations. However,
in view of the CIS' failure to secure for Georgia the freedom
of travel and economic access that it secured for other
member countries, President Saakashvili had asked the
government to "start consideration" of whether Georgia should
remain a member of the organization. Baramidze would stress
that no decisions had been taken.


3. (C) Baramidze said that in his opinion it was a "matter of
months" before Georgia quit the organization. The GOG needed
first to ensure that the economic interests of its people
would be secure (especially by replacing the CIS visa regime
with bilateral ones) and that other necessary bilateral
agreements could be reached. Timing would be important:
before or after the NATO Summit in Riga?


4. (C) Ambassador asked what the practical consequences of
withdrawal would be. Baramidze listed several:

-- The Abkhazia PKO was a CIS PKO whose status would have to
change; Georgia was already considering demanding that it
leave. Baramidze did not address the likely Russian reaction.

-- Georgia's main exports to Russia -- fruit, wine and
mineral water -- were already banned, and Georgia was the
only CIS country whose citizens needed visas to enter Russia.
In the long run, Georgia would benefit from finding a
replacement for Russian markets, as the Baltics had done.
(Note: Baramidze was concerned about the fate of Georgian
citizens living and working in Russia, but did not raise the
prospect that Russia might allow them to stay but interfere
with remittances they send back to relatives in Georgia. End
Note.)

-- Georgian Ambassador Chubinishvili, who was sitting in,
added that if Georgia quit the CIS, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia would demand CIS membership and might be allowed in
as "observers." He believed Georgian citizens of
non-Georgian ethnicity (Armenians and Azeris) might be
expelled from Russia back to Georgia to stir up trouble in
ethnically sensitive regions.


5. (C) Ambassador asked about the attitudes of other CIS
members. Baramidze guessed that Kazakh President Nazarbayev,
now CIS Chair, would be "slightly on the Russian side" in the
dispute. Ukraine would be Georgia's main ally, though it
would not leave the CIS. Moldova would be another ally. If
Azerbaijan supported Georgia, Armenia would oppose, and vice
versa. The attitude of Belarus was a foregone conclusion.

NATO
--------------


6. (C) Baramidze talked of progress in convincing Allies to
grant Georgia Intensified Dialogue (ID) for NATO membership.
Three days earlier, German Chancellor Merkel's Foreign
Affairs advisor had told Baramidze he was convinced, but
needed to conduct internal consultations. Baramidze expected
a long process for NATO membership, but warned that if
Georgia's expectations were allowed to fail, Georgia might
develop "different priorities," especially on peaceful
conflict resolution.


7. (C) Baramidze said that the reluctance of some Allies on
ID was due to an intensive Russian campaign. He said Russia
will engage in military provocations, as it already has with
"visas, gas, electricity and embargoes on Georgian products."
That was all done to cause internal discontent and

MOSCOW 00005492 002 OF 002


demonstrations. The GOG's popularity had gone down, but as
the result of normal internal processes, not the Russian
campaign. Externally, the Russians would try to convince the
international community that the Georgia was run by a "bunch
of kids" who make provocative statements and take crazy,
unpredictable actions. Russia could then turn to the G8 and
NATO and say, "Let us handle these crazy people."


8. (C) Ambassador asked whether recent public statements by
Georgian officials did not play into the Russian strategy
Baramidze had described. Baramidze said that the statements
themselves were just excuses; Russian actions were not driven
by them. He reiterated that Russia's main aim was to portray
Georgia as irresponsible. Ambassador reiterated that
provocative Georgian statements made it easier for Russia to
do just that. Baramidze sighed and acknowledged that
sometimes DefMin Okruashvili "lets emotion get the better of
him."


9. (C) Ambassador said there was little advice he could give
Baramidze about Russia that Baramidze did not already know,
or that Ambassador Tefft had not already conveyed. Russia
made no secret of its concerns over Georgian moves towards
NATO. It had used some levers, and had many more. Politics
would get more intense as we headed towards 2008, and
Georgia-bashing would be popular. Continued high energy
prices would keep the Russians self-confident. The U.S. had
a strong interest in cooperating with Russia where possible,
but would not hesitate to criticize where necessary. Georgia
should work with the Europeans as well, and despite all
temptations not fall into the trap of making it easier for
Russia to portray Georgia as irresponsible.
BURNS