RUSSIA'S DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION TO CONTINUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005378

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION TO CONTINUE
COOPERATION, BUT GENUINE UNITY UNLIKELY


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador met separately May 16 with
democratic opposition leaders Nikita Belykh of the Union of
Right Forces (SPS) and Irina Khakamada of Our Choice. Belykh
insisted that the democratic opposition must do more to
rejuvenate the movement and demonstrate that it is capable of
initiating creative ideas. The SPS might change its name as
part of this broader effort. Belykh said that he favored
continued coordination among democratic parties, but
prospects for genuine unity, especially between Yabloko and
SPS, were increasingly dim. He called President Putin's May
10 address to the nation disappointing since it failed to
offer solutions to major problems. Belykh bemoaned the
inability of the Belarus opposition to generate greater
enthusiasm among voters, but predicted that President
Lukashenko would come in for increased domestic criticism as
Russia tightened the economic screws. Khakamada shared
Belykh's assessment that Russia's democratic opposition would
continue to coordinate its activities, but the principal
parties likely would remain independent. On Russian
perceptions of the U.S., both Belykh and Khakamada favored
continued engagement with the Russian leadership, with
Khakamada urging less public criticism and continued economic
cooperation in order to keep open bilateral communications.
END SUMMARY.
.
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NIKITA BELYKH
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2. (C) In a May 16 meeting with the Ambassador, the leader
of the SPS, Nikita Belykh, suggested that he might have to
rename the party to attract broader public support. Belykh
explained that the democratic opposition needed an infusion
of new goals and younger, energetic leaders to demonstrate to
Russia's electorate that it was capable of generating new
ideas. Renaming the party would be part of this effort. The
SPS leader professed continued support for cooperation among
democratic opposition parties but said prospects for unity
between his party and its main rival, Yabloko, were
increasingly dim. Strategically, the two parties had
different approaches to policy issues, especially at the
federal level. Yabloko, for example, thought the 1990s were
a disaster for the country, whereas SPS was less negative
about developments under Yeltsin. Belykh said the parties
were moving in different directions, with Yabloko forming
alliances with environmentalists and human rights activists,
while SPS would likely take in Vladimir Ryzhkov's Republican
Party. In the meantime, SPS and Yabloko continued to
cooperate and had agreed not to compete against each other in
local and regional elections.


3. (C) Asked about the role former Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov might play in this equation, Belykh was uncertain.
On the one hand, Kasyanov might be waiting to see if the
democrats would be able to unite in anticipation of joining a
consolidated movement. On the other hand, the former PM
could be waiting for the opposition's unity efforts to fail
so that he could offer a "third option" to voters. Belykh
thought the latter approach would harm democrats in general,
including Kasyanov, who would likely be perceived by voters
as simply counting on his previous government experience to
attract support without offering a specific program. It
would be better, Belykh suggested, if Kasyanov joined forces
now with other democrats.


4. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question about
President Putin's May 10 address to the nation, Belykh
thought it had been disappointing. While praising Putin for
raising difficult issues like the country's demographic
problems, his proposed solutions did not go far enough. For
example, offering money to women who had more babies would
simply result in the further "Islamization" of Russia since
most of the government's subsidies would likely go to women
who were already predisposed to having large families.
Corruption also had to be addressed. Belykh said
corruption's effects could be mitigated by increased
political competition, such as that found in democratic
societies. In authoritarian systems the problem becomes
entrenched, especially when corrupt government officials act
in concert with businessmen seeking official favors.
Nonetheless, Belykh believed that Putin's address had been
popular among many Russians because of its emphasis on
building up the military, challenging the U.S., and
protecting the nation. That was "scary," Belykh concluded
without further comment.


5. (C) Turning to issues beyond Russia, Belykh observed that
the opposition in Belarus had shaken up society there, but
had not been fully prepared for the government's strong

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interference during the March electoral campaign or for its
subsequent onslaught against opposition members. While it
was true that Aleksandr Lukashenko had cheated during the
elections, Belykh emphasized, a majority of voters still
probably supported him. Much of that support could
dissipate, however, if Moscow continued to step up pressure
on Belarus, particularly with respect to energy prices and
other economically-related subsidies. Belykh subscribed to
the view that personal relations between Putin and Lukashenko
were poor. Nonetheless, union talks would continue despite
the current state of relations between the two countries'
leaders.


6. (C) On Russian attitudes toward the U.S., Belykh
suggested that Washington should offer a more consistent
message regarding its Russia policy. In the past, it had
been relatively simple to distinguish between the Republicans
and Democrats in Washington, but NOW he perceived schisms
even among Republicans, citing Senator John McCain's call for
cancellation of the G-8 Summit as an example. Pointing to
Vice President Cheney's speech in Vilnius, Belykh said he
thought it had been crafted for U.S. domestic consumption,
mainly to stem criticism from the Democratic Party. Belykh
thought that Washington had to decide whether energy or
democracy was more important in this part of the world.
.
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IRINA KHAKAMADA
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7. (C) The Ambassador also met with Irina Khakamada of Our
Choice on May 16. Responding to the Ambassador's questions
about her association with Kasyanov and prospects for
democratic unity, Khakamada asserted that Kasyanov was not a
politician in the traditional sense, but he knew how to
mobilize resources to achieve goals. He would be able to
rely upon his previous government experience, including his
ties to supporters and other contacts, to move the country in
a positive direction. Khakamada acknowledged that Kasyanov
had little public support at the moment (roughly one
percent),but she attributed that to several factors,
including constraints on media access that limited his public
exposure, an increasingly disinterested electorate that was
more concerned about materialism than politics, and the
continuing machinations of Presidential Administration Deputy
Head Vladislav Surkov.


8. (C) More broadly, Khakamada noted that the democratic
opposition would continue to coordinate its activities,
especially at the local and regional levels, but implied that
genuine unity among the parties was unlikely. She pointed to
the relative success of the opposition in the Moscow city
elections last December as an example of tactical
cooperation, but noted as well that the Kremlin, along with
its supporters in United Russia, had made it difficult for
the opposition to compete. She cited specifically the
imposition of a 10 percent threshold for entering the Moscow
city legislature. The opposition had encountered similar
obstacles during local and regional elections in March.


9. (C) On Putin's address to the nation, Khakamada concluded
that the President's remarks reflected the views of the
"political-ideological class" and characterized Putin's
leadership style as "instrumental democracy." Although
Russia's economy was doing reasonably well, she did not think
momentum could be sustained without corresponding progress on
building democracy. In the absence of stronger democratic
institutions, the situation in Russia would only worsen. In
any case, Khakamada said, she was not convinced that the
majority of Russians would understand all the nuances of
Putin's address and would hear only what they wished to hear.


10. (C) Asked about the U.S. role in Russia, Khakamada said
that the situation was complicated. The Russian media had
virtually reverted to the Soviet period when anti-American
sentiment abounded. The conflict in Iraq, U.S. support for
the "color" revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, and overall
U.S. activism on issues affecting Moscow's interests rubbed
Russians the wrong way. More consistency would also be
helpful. Khakamada said public criticism of Russian policies
was not helpful, pointing out that the current power
structure was less pliable and more self-confident than
during the Yeltsin era. In spite of the cooler bilateral
relations, she encouraged continued economic cooperation, as
well as coordination on other practical issues. Maintaining
mutual trust in these areas could eventually improve the
atmosphere for discussion of more sensitive political issues.
BURNS