Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW504
2006-01-20 11:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
A/S LOWENKRON'S MEETING WITH NGO REPRESENTATIVES
VZCZCXRO7103 PP RUEHDBU DE RUEHMO #0504/01 0201159 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 201159Z JAN 06 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9461 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000504
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EAID KDEM RS
SUBJECT: A/S LOWENKRON'S MEETING WITH NGO REPRESENTATIVES
REF: A. MOSCOW 00306
B. MOSCOW 03447
C. MOSCOW 10863
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (B/D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000504
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EAID KDEM RS
SUBJECT: A/S LOWENKRON'S MEETING WITH NGO REPRESENTATIVES
REF: A. MOSCOW 00306
B. MOSCOW 03447
C. MOSCOW 10863
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (B/D).
1. (C) SUMMARY. On January 17, the same day as the
announcement that President Putin had signed the
controversial NGO legislation, NGO leaders told A/S Lowenkron
and the Ambassador that the legislation was flawed and
ambiguous. Although the new legislation will come into force
around mid-April, they expressed doubt that the government
would apply it forcefully before the G-8 summit so as not to
undermine President Putin's goal of presenting himself as
chairman of the G-8 on a world stage. Rather, they saw the
period between the summit and the 2008 elections as critical
for civil society in Russia. Most of the participants
believed that in the short-term NGOs needed to focus on
limiting the damage from the legislation, while positioning
themselves to take advantage of long-term democratic trends
in Russia. Some of the NGO representatives also expressed
concern about government control or co-optation of civil
society through the Public Chamber, government-oriented NGOs,
and increased state funding of NGOs. A/S Lowenkron and the
Ambassador emphasized continued U.S. support for Russian NGOs
and on-going U.S. engagement with the GOR on the
implementation of NGO legislation. END SUMMARY.
2. (U) A/S Lowenkron and the Ambassador met with nine
prominent Russian NGO leaders January 17 to discuss the new
Russian legislation on NGOs and to express continued U.S.
support for their work. Participants included:
U.S.
---
A/S Lowenkron
AMB Burns
EUR DAS Kramer
AID Country Director Myers
Notetaker
Russian NGOs
--------------
Lyudmila Alekseyeva, Moscow Helsinki Group
Andrey Kortunov, New Eurasia Foundation
Yuriy Dzhibladze, Center for the Development of Democracy and
Human Rights
Tatyana Lokshina, Demos Center
Grigoriy Shvedov, Memorial
Yelena Topleva-Soldunova, Agency for Social Information
Marina Liborakina, Institute for Urban Economics
Sergey Litovchenko, Russian Managers Association
Yelena Gerasimova, Center for Social and Labor Rights
.
REACTION TO THE NEW NGO LAW
--------------
3. (C) A/S Lowenkron and the Ambassador thanked the
participants for meeting at such an important time for the
NGO community, given the announcement that President Putin
had signed the controversial NGO law on January 10 (ref A).
The NGO participants agreed the new legislation was flawed
but said they were not surprised that it had been signed.
Alekseyeva believed Putin had not publicized the signing
since he knew the bill was flawed and feared that it would
embarrass his G-8 colleagues. She noted that her
organization planned to file a legal case to have it declared
unconstitutional. Dzhibladze said the legislation was vague
and ambiguous and gave the authorities a huge amount of
leeway to implement it as they saw fit, potentially including
denying registration and blocking foreign funding for NGOs.
Many discussion participants agreed that even though the
legislation would come into force around mid-April, the GOR
was unlikely to apply it against organizations until after
the G-8 summit to avoid undermining President Putin's goal of
presenting himself as chairman of the G-8 on a world stage.
Dzhibladze and Kortunov said the period between the summit
and the elections in 2007 and 2008 would be critical for NGOs.
4. (C) Lokshina noted that the new legislation would
immediately affect some NGOs. For example, since it forbade
individuals convicted of extremism from founding or
participating in NGOs, Sakharov Center Director Yuriy
Samodurov would likely have to resign from his position by
virtue of having been convicted of inciting religious hatred
(ref B). NGOs such as the Russian Chechen Friendship Society
(RCFS) in Nizhniy Novgorod were already experiencing problems
(ref C),Lokshina continued, arguing that the authorities may
have picked that organization as a trial case on how to
destroy an NGO. The RCFS was particularly vulnerable since
it was a small regional organization and lacked local
support, at least in part because of its pro-separatist views
MOSCOW 00000504 002 OF 003
on the conflict in Chechnya. Shvedov said that under the new
legislation regional organizations, especially those focused
on human rights, were vulnerable. Gerasimova and Litovchenko
believed the legislation would have little impact on labor
and business NGOs such as theirs, which received little money
from abroad. Liborakina argued that though many observers
had initially believed that nothing could be done about the
legislation, successful lobbying and public support had
resulted in adoption of more than half of the amendments
recommended by the NGO community. Others were less positive
about their success in softening the legislation.
.
DAMAGE CONTROL AND LOOKING TO THE LONG-TERM
--------------
5. (C) Kortunov said the NGO community needed to do immediate
damage control, but to also take advantage of long-term
positive trends. The short-term damage control consisted of
trying to avoid allowing the GOR to use the legislation to
set bad precedents. Many noted that the NGO legislation has
increased cooperation and mobilization within the NGO
community. This experience combined with continued openings
for grassroots movements - particularly in some regions - may
help strengthen the cohesiveness and capacity of civil
society. Over the long term, Kortunov believed that an
emergent middle class in Russia would demand more liberal
reforms and that the Kremlin could not reverse this trend.
NGOs needed to develop the capacity to make the most of a
second round of reforms that would take place sometime after
the 2008 election. To position themselves for this "second
coming of liberalism," NGOs should work on the regional and
municipal level. Shvedov believed that in the short-term,
NGOs should try to protect themselves by participating in
more intergovernmental dialogues like the EU dialogue on
human rights and welcomed opportunities for increased
engagement with U.S. NGOs. Some of the long-term areas to
work on might include using social marketing to build support
for human rights and expanded use of the Internet to make
information available to the public and to conduct regional
campaigns focused on youth, Shvedov said. Lokshina agreed
that part of the long-term effort should focus on exposing
Russia's younger generation to liberal values through
non-controversial mechanisms like exchanges with the West and
courses taught by foreign professors. The Ambassador noted
that it was important to invest in the next generation and
that the U.S. would continue pursuing this effort.
6. (C) The participants agreed with the Ambassador that it
was important for the U.S. to work with other Western
countries in response to the legislation. Some participants
urged the U.S. to speak out even more loudly against the
legislation. Dzhibladze, by contrast, expressed uncertainty
about such a strategy given both the Kremlin's preference to
discuss such issues privately and a growing tendency in
Russian politics to exploit anti-Americanism. As an example
of anti-Americanism, Dzhibladze said the Kremlin-controlled
media had devoted extensive coverage to the U.S.
Congressional resolutions on the NGO legislation while
virtually ignoring a similarly critical resolution passed by
the European Parliament. He added that many Russians were
cynical about USG efforts to promote democracy and viewed
them as a cover for other U.S. foreign policy goals.
.
GOR INFLUENCE ON CIVIL SOCIETY
--------------
7. (C) Looking beyond the NGO legislation, some of the
participants expressed concern about other GOR efforts to
influence civil society. They portrayed the Public Chamber
as a manifestation of this trend, with Topleva-Soldunova
saying that the GOR could use the Chamber to control civil
society and arguing that only about ten percent of its
members were "real" representatives of civil society. Some
nonetheless said the Chamber's statements on the NGO law were
helpful and they would continue to try to cooperate with its
members.
8. (C) Lokshina said that Government-Oriented
Non-Governmental Organizations (the so-called "GONGOs") posed
a threat, particularly to NGOs working in politically
sensitive areas such as elections and human rights. By
controlling the distribution of government funds, such as the
money that the GOR had said it would dedicate to developing
democracy in the CIS, the government could ensure that only
pro-Kremlin organizations or those working in fields lacking
political sensitivity would receive funding. Authorities
could use the GONGOs to support Kremlin positions in the
international arena. Litovchenko argued, however, that
giving government funding to independent NGOs would be
helpful since most of the business community feared
contributing to them and lacked the tax incentives for doing
so. Liborakina believed increased GOR funding for social
MOSCOW 00000504 003 OF 003
services created new opportunities for cooperation between
independent NGOs and the government.
9. (C) A/S Lowenkron noted that civil society could not be
built from the top down in any country. NGOs had a lot of
important work to do, and while governments could view them
as advocates or opponents, NGOs should not be viewed as
enemies. A/S Lowenkron said the USG had concerns about the
NGO legislation, particularly its vagueness and possible
implementation. He stressed that we will continue to follow
its implementation closely in the coming months. He noted
that the issue would receive attention before, during, and
after the G-8 summit. A/S Lowenkron added that the G-8
summit is not only a place and an agenda, it is an
opportunity for countries to support common values. In this
spirit the USG would continue to talk with government
officials so that the implementation of the NGO law reflects
a common view of the importance of civil society to the
fabric of democracy.
10. (U) A/S Lowenkron cleared this cable.
BURNS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EAID KDEM RS
SUBJECT: A/S LOWENKRON'S MEETING WITH NGO REPRESENTATIVES
REF: A. MOSCOW 00306
B. MOSCOW 03447
C. MOSCOW 10863
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (B/D).
1. (C) SUMMARY. On January 17, the same day as the
announcement that President Putin had signed the
controversial NGO legislation, NGO leaders told A/S Lowenkron
and the Ambassador that the legislation was flawed and
ambiguous. Although the new legislation will come into force
around mid-April, they expressed doubt that the government
would apply it forcefully before the G-8 summit so as not to
undermine President Putin's goal of presenting himself as
chairman of the G-8 on a world stage. Rather, they saw the
period between the summit and the 2008 elections as critical
for civil society in Russia. Most of the participants
believed that in the short-term NGOs needed to focus on
limiting the damage from the legislation, while positioning
themselves to take advantage of long-term democratic trends
in Russia. Some of the NGO representatives also expressed
concern about government control or co-optation of civil
society through the Public Chamber, government-oriented NGOs,
and increased state funding of NGOs. A/S Lowenkron and the
Ambassador emphasized continued U.S. support for Russian NGOs
and on-going U.S. engagement with the GOR on the
implementation of NGO legislation. END SUMMARY.
2. (U) A/S Lowenkron and the Ambassador met with nine
prominent Russian NGO leaders January 17 to discuss the new
Russian legislation on NGOs and to express continued U.S.
support for their work. Participants included:
U.S.
---
A/S Lowenkron
AMB Burns
EUR DAS Kramer
AID Country Director Myers
Notetaker
Russian NGOs
--------------
Lyudmila Alekseyeva, Moscow Helsinki Group
Andrey Kortunov, New Eurasia Foundation
Yuriy Dzhibladze, Center for the Development of Democracy and
Human Rights
Tatyana Lokshina, Demos Center
Grigoriy Shvedov, Memorial
Yelena Topleva-Soldunova, Agency for Social Information
Marina Liborakina, Institute for Urban Economics
Sergey Litovchenko, Russian Managers Association
Yelena Gerasimova, Center for Social and Labor Rights
.
REACTION TO THE NEW NGO LAW
--------------
3. (C) A/S Lowenkron and the Ambassador thanked the
participants for meeting at such an important time for the
NGO community, given the announcement that President Putin
had signed the controversial NGO law on January 10 (ref A).
The NGO participants agreed the new legislation was flawed
but said they were not surprised that it had been signed.
Alekseyeva believed Putin had not publicized the signing
since he knew the bill was flawed and feared that it would
embarrass his G-8 colleagues. She noted that her
organization planned to file a legal case to have it declared
unconstitutional. Dzhibladze said the legislation was vague
and ambiguous and gave the authorities a huge amount of
leeway to implement it as they saw fit, potentially including
denying registration and blocking foreign funding for NGOs.
Many discussion participants agreed that even though the
legislation would come into force around mid-April, the GOR
was unlikely to apply it against organizations until after
the G-8 summit to avoid undermining President Putin's goal of
presenting himself as chairman of the G-8 on a world stage.
Dzhibladze and Kortunov said the period between the summit
and the elections in 2007 and 2008 would be critical for NGOs.
4. (C) Lokshina noted that the new legislation would
immediately affect some NGOs. For example, since it forbade
individuals convicted of extremism from founding or
participating in NGOs, Sakharov Center Director Yuriy
Samodurov would likely have to resign from his position by
virtue of having been convicted of inciting religious hatred
(ref B). NGOs such as the Russian Chechen Friendship Society
(RCFS) in Nizhniy Novgorod were already experiencing problems
(ref C),Lokshina continued, arguing that the authorities may
have picked that organization as a trial case on how to
destroy an NGO. The RCFS was particularly vulnerable since
it was a small regional organization and lacked local
support, at least in part because of its pro-separatist views
MOSCOW 00000504 002 OF 003
on the conflict in Chechnya. Shvedov said that under the new
legislation regional organizations, especially those focused
on human rights, were vulnerable. Gerasimova and Litovchenko
believed the legislation would have little impact on labor
and business NGOs such as theirs, which received little money
from abroad. Liborakina argued that though many observers
had initially believed that nothing could be done about the
legislation, successful lobbying and public support had
resulted in adoption of more than half of the amendments
recommended by the NGO community. Others were less positive
about their success in softening the legislation.
.
DAMAGE CONTROL AND LOOKING TO THE LONG-TERM
--------------
5. (C) Kortunov said the NGO community needed to do immediate
damage control, but to also take advantage of long-term
positive trends. The short-term damage control consisted of
trying to avoid allowing the GOR to use the legislation to
set bad precedents. Many noted that the NGO legislation has
increased cooperation and mobilization within the NGO
community. This experience combined with continued openings
for grassroots movements - particularly in some regions - may
help strengthen the cohesiveness and capacity of civil
society. Over the long term, Kortunov believed that an
emergent middle class in Russia would demand more liberal
reforms and that the Kremlin could not reverse this trend.
NGOs needed to develop the capacity to make the most of a
second round of reforms that would take place sometime after
the 2008 election. To position themselves for this "second
coming of liberalism," NGOs should work on the regional and
municipal level. Shvedov believed that in the short-term,
NGOs should try to protect themselves by participating in
more intergovernmental dialogues like the EU dialogue on
human rights and welcomed opportunities for increased
engagement with U.S. NGOs. Some of the long-term areas to
work on might include using social marketing to build support
for human rights and expanded use of the Internet to make
information available to the public and to conduct regional
campaigns focused on youth, Shvedov said. Lokshina agreed
that part of the long-term effort should focus on exposing
Russia's younger generation to liberal values through
non-controversial mechanisms like exchanges with the West and
courses taught by foreign professors. The Ambassador noted
that it was important to invest in the next generation and
that the U.S. would continue pursuing this effort.
6. (C) The participants agreed with the Ambassador that it
was important for the U.S. to work with other Western
countries in response to the legislation. Some participants
urged the U.S. to speak out even more loudly against the
legislation. Dzhibladze, by contrast, expressed uncertainty
about such a strategy given both the Kremlin's preference to
discuss such issues privately and a growing tendency in
Russian politics to exploit anti-Americanism. As an example
of anti-Americanism, Dzhibladze said the Kremlin-controlled
media had devoted extensive coverage to the U.S.
Congressional resolutions on the NGO legislation while
virtually ignoring a similarly critical resolution passed by
the European Parliament. He added that many Russians were
cynical about USG efforts to promote democracy and viewed
them as a cover for other U.S. foreign policy goals.
.
GOR INFLUENCE ON CIVIL SOCIETY
--------------
7. (C) Looking beyond the NGO legislation, some of the
participants expressed concern about other GOR efforts to
influence civil society. They portrayed the Public Chamber
as a manifestation of this trend, with Topleva-Soldunova
saying that the GOR could use the Chamber to control civil
society and arguing that only about ten percent of its
members were "real" representatives of civil society. Some
nonetheless said the Chamber's statements on the NGO law were
helpful and they would continue to try to cooperate with its
members.
8. (C) Lokshina said that Government-Oriented
Non-Governmental Organizations (the so-called "GONGOs") posed
a threat, particularly to NGOs working in politically
sensitive areas such as elections and human rights. By
controlling the distribution of government funds, such as the
money that the GOR had said it would dedicate to developing
democracy in the CIS, the government could ensure that only
pro-Kremlin organizations or those working in fields lacking
political sensitivity would receive funding. Authorities
could use the GONGOs to support Kremlin positions in the
international arena. Litovchenko argued, however, that
giving government funding to independent NGOs would be
helpful since most of the business community feared
contributing to them and lacked the tax incentives for doing
so. Liborakina believed increased GOR funding for social
MOSCOW 00000504 003 OF 003
services created new opportunities for cooperation between
independent NGOs and the government.
9. (C) A/S Lowenkron noted that civil society could not be
built from the top down in any country. NGOs had a lot of
important work to do, and while governments could view them
as advocates or opponents, NGOs should not be viewed as
enemies. A/S Lowenkron said the USG had concerns about the
NGO legislation, particularly its vagueness and possible
implementation. He stressed that we will continue to follow
its implementation closely in the coming months. He noted
that the issue would receive attention before, during, and
after the G-8 summit. A/S Lowenkron added that the G-8
summit is not only a place and an agenda, it is an
opportunity for countries to support common values. In this
spirit the USG would continue to talk with government
officials so that the implementation of the NGO law reflects
a common view of the importance of civil society to the
fabric of democracy.
10. (U) A/S Lowenkron cleared this cable.
BURNS