LOOKING AHEAD TO PUTIN'S ADDRESS TO THE FEDERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004839 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR RS SUBJECT: LOOKING AHEAD TO PUTIN'S ADDRESS TO THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY REF: MOSCOW 3218 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ending lengthy speculation, the Kremlin announced on May 2 that President Putin will present his annual Address to the Federal Assembly on May 10. Delays in its delivery, which some had expected to take place in early April, fueled rumors that Putin had been dissatisfied with early drafts and that disagreements flared within the Kremlin about what the address should contain. Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Spasskiy told the Ambassador on April 27 that the address would include a substantial focus on Russia's role in the world. With Spasskiy and other senior GOR officials, the Ambassador underscored the opportunity the address offered to present a more positive image of Russia abroad, outline long-term plans for economic and political modernization, and send a strong signal against ethnic violence and extremism to the domestic audience. The upcoming address is likely to restate recent pronouncements by Kremlin and other GOR officials about a more confident Russia committed to cooperation with the West but on what it would view as more equal terms. END SUMMARY. . FINALLY, A DATE... -------------- ¶2. (U) Kremlin press spokesman Aleksey Gromov's May 2 announcement that Putin would make his Address to the Federal Assembly on May 10 ended weeks of speculation. Expectations that the address might take place in early April did not pan out, and rumors circulated about several dates later that month. Most recently, some observers had predicted Putin would make his address in St. Petersburg on April 28 during celebrations of the Duma's centennial. The press noted, however, that the current address was within the normal timeframe for such speeches; among the six Putin has presented, the earliest was on April 3 and the latest on July ¶8. . ...FOLLOWING MANY RUMORS -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Rumors also swirled about the cause of the delays. Those rumors centered on Putin's reported dissatisfaction with early drafts of the text. Vedemosti reported that in an April 12 meeting with State Duma leaders, Putin expressed unhappiness with an initial draft. Kommersant reported that Putin rejected an initial draft written by a team headed by G-8 Sherpa Igor Shuvalov and Kremlin chief speech writer Dzhakhan Pollyyeva. By one unconfirmed report, Pollyyeva was even forced to take a vacation to remove her from the drafting process. Kremlin economic advisor Arkadiy Dvorkovich (the principle drafter of last year's address) reportedly was involved in at least one draft text. According to Kommersant, the Kremlin called in Higher School of Economics head Yaroslav Kuzminov and others from that university to help with the drafting. Other reports attributed much of the delay to dissatisfaction by new Presidential Administration (PA) head Sergey Sobyanin with the influence that "liberal economists" had had on the draft. ¶4. (C) Observers hypothesized various reasons for Putin's dissatisfaction with the early drafts. Moscow Carnegie Center scholar Andrey Ryabov speculated to us that the delays resulted from Putin's failure to define a central message in the address due to his lack of a clear vision for the future. A Center for Political Technologies (CPT) analysis said that the address was delayed because Putin was frustrated that, while Russia had the resources to wield its influence, it did not know how to use them or for what goals. That view was shared by independent radio station Ekho Moskvy chief editor Aleksey Venediktov, who told us that Putin felt that the early drafts were wishy-washy, reflecting a lack of dynamism that he also perceived in his Cabinet lately. Putin wanted the address to present a vigorous and well-defined vision of Russia's future, Venediktov said, and pressed his team to do extensive redrafting, which produced the delays. . FOCUSING ON RUSSIA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD -------------- ¶5. (C) In an April 27 conversation with the Ambassador, Security Council Deputy Secretary Nikolay Spasskiy said the address had been delayed by disagreements about what it should contain. Holidays in the first two weeks of May created further delays, with Putin wanting to present his address only after the Victory Day celebrations. Spasskiy confirmed that Pollyyeva had a lead role in drafting, with Presidential Administration (PA) Head Sergey Sobyanin and MOSCOW 00004839 002 OF 002 Deputy Head Vladislav Surkov also contributing. Sobyanin's role was proving greater than expected, Spasskiy commented. PA Aide Sergey Prikhodko and Security Council head Igor Ivanov had been involved in the drafting process as well. ¶6. (C) Spasskiy confirmed reports that the address would focus to a significant extent on Russia's proper place in the world. Having laid out the challenges on the international scene, Putin would highlight the need to strengthen Russia's ability to compete in the global economy, including the improvements to be effected by the national priority projects. The address would include discussion of energy issues, military doctrine, and the war on terrorism. Prikhodko and State Duma International Relations Committee Chair Konstantin Kosachev separately confirmed to the Ambassador the thrust of Spasskiy's prediction that a central theme of the speech would be Russia's place in the world. ¶7. (C) In all three meetings and in a meeting with PA Aide Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, the Ambassador highlighted that the address offered Putin an opportunity to underscore Russia's interest in playing an active and responsible role on the international scene. It was also an opportunity to lay out a clear vision for how Russia intends to modernize economically and politically to compete effectively in a changing world. Given signs of growing xenophobia in Russia, the Ambassador stressed, the address also allowed Putin to send a clear message that such behavior was unacceptable. Such high-level signals could have a major impact in countering xenophobic trends in Russia, the Ambassador noted to his interlocutors. . COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) In recent months, those inside or closely associated with the Kremlin have sought to define Russia's current ideological direction. Most significantly, in his "February theses" (reftel),Surkov elaborated on his idea of strengthening Russia's "sovereignty." On the foreign policy side, that meant ensuring that Russia would be competitive and among the major decisionmakers on the international scene. Surkov stressed that Russia sought to cooperate with the international community, but on more equal terms than in the 1990s. Domestically, it meant that Russia would make its own decisions, without undue influence from outside. Surkov argued that achieving such sovereignty required that Russia make changes to confront the challenges posed by the realities of the 21st century. ¶9. (C) Putin's previous six addresses to the Federal Assembly centered on specific priorities, with a particular focus on the economy and domestic scene. The upcoming address, by contrast, is expected to raise issues involved in a broader clarification of Russia's ideological direction that many see as especially important in the context of the expected presidential succession in 2008. The address will also be scanned avidly for any possible hints as to whether Putin is "leaning" toward Dmitriy Medvedev, Sergey Ivanov, or any other candidate for that succession. ¶10. (C) Putin may also use the address to send messages about the issues of the day, including Iran, and perhaps to lay the groundwork for the upcoming G-8 Summit. It would be odd, as well, if Putin did not use the address to reprise some of his recent remarks on Gazprom and its international expansion plans. It bears mention that while Putin's addresses to the Federal Assembly have been important occasions at which he has set out key directions of action for the government, they have also frequently been left with inadequate follow-up and done little to change realities on the ground. BURNS