RUSSIAN NATIONALIST DMITRIY ROGOZIN GOING ...

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003815 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI PINR RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN NATIONALIST DMITRIY ROGOZIN GOING ... GOING ... BUT NOT QUITE GONE REF: MOSCOW 1974 Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine. Reasons 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Rodina Party chairman Dmitriy Rogozin resigned from that position March 25, as observers expected, and also stepped down from his position as Rodina faction chairman in the State Duma April 4. The departure of the mercurial Rogozin has done nothing to mend internal rifts within the party and raises questions about its future direction and status. New Rodina leader Aleksandr Babakov is trying to restore party discipline and is widely expected to hew more closely to the Kremlin line. Some members of the broader Rodina movement hope to bring together its various organizations under a "social democratic" banner without invoking the nationalist plank that characterized the party under Rogozin's leadership. Rogozin, meanwhile, plans to spend the next six months fine-tuning his program, "Securing the Nation," which he hopes to use as the foundation for a new Rodina-like political formation. The result is that Rodina has become further splintered, with the pro-Kremlin United Russia Party (YR) the major beneficiary. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) The anticipated resignation of Rodina Party Chairman Dmitriy Rogozin March 25 set in motion a chain of events that will likely increase party discipline in the short-term but also raise questions about the longer-term direction and viability of the controversial organization. Yuriy Skokov, considered one of Rogozin's mentors and rumored to be a conduit between the party and the Kremlin, told us prior to the March 25 party congress that there had been significant concern among members about Rogozin's tactics and leadership style. He described Rogozin as "energetic and articulate" but also "more populist" than necessary. Skokov acknowledged that controversy surrounding Rogozin had resulted in dissatisfaction within the Kremlin, especially from Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration (PA) Vladislav Surkov, who had been pressing for "tactical changes" within the party. In spite of Rogozin's then-imminent departure, Skokov said he was certain that Rodina would be able to survive his resignation due to its strong "corporate structure" and collective leadership approach. ¶3. (SBU) Aleksandr Babakov inherited the Rodina mantle with almost unanimous support; the vote among congress delegates was 170-3, and Rogozin himself spoke in favor of Babakov's accession. The new Rodina Party Chairman is an economist and businessman who, among other activities, is the owner of one of Russia's premier soccer teams. He is also regarded as a major financial backer of Rodina. Babakov promised that the party would remain in opposition but underscored that it should not be a "hostile opposition." He called for constructive criticism of official policies and dialogue with authorities. Most political observers interpreted Babakov's initial comments as an indication that Rodina would hew more closely to the Kremlin line from which it had strayed on Rogozin's watch, especially over the past year. Some pundits believe that Babakov is only a transitional leader until a more appealing figure emerges. On April 4 Rogozin ceded his position as Rodina faction chairman in the State Duma, which Babakov also assumed. ¶4. (C) Rogozin's departure left Rodina uncertain of its future. Some members of the broader Rodina movement hope to shape its various organizations and associations into a social democratic bloc without emphasizing the nationalist plank that characterized Rodina under Rogozin's leadership. Oleg Denisov, a Rodina Deputy in the State Duma, expressed to us his frustration with Rogozin's leadership style. Denisov mentioned, in particular, that Rogozin's emphasis on nationalism and illegal migrants had distracted supporters and prospective members from Rodina's long-term goal, which was to build a society based on equal opportunity and social protection for all citizens, with the state lending strong guiding support when needed. ¶5. (C) Nikolay Novichkov, another social democrat and current deputy secretary of the Rodina faction in the State Duma, offered much the same message, though he conceded that Rogozin's personality and nationalist themes had broadened Rodina's appeal and attracted numerous supporters. Saying that Rodina would be better served without Rogozin's divisive approach, Novichkov added that he hoped eventually the main Rodina faction would be re-united with the breakaway faction led by Sergey Baburin. However, he was unable to suggest specific goals and objectives for the social democratic wing of the movement or to explain how its platform would differ from other political parties like YR or the communists. ¶6. (C) Mikhail Demurin, a member of the party's political MOSCOW 00003815 002 OF 002 council, told us that Rogozin planned to spend the next six months fine-tuning his program, "Securing the Nation." Demurin, who had previously outlined that program for us (reftel),said it would focus on various proposals aimed at improving the country's socio-economic situation, including explaining the economic rationale for hiring workers from underdeveloped regions of Russia rather than importing illegal migrant labor from Central Asia and elsewhere. The program would also highlight suggestions for turning around Russia's worsening demographics. Rogozin's goal, he added, was to use the program as the foundation for a new Rodina-like political formation. ¶7. (C) Demurin said Rogozin still had considerable personal support throughout the country and even within the PA. He identified Surkov as being most responsible for engineering both internal turmoil within Rodina and Rogozin's resignation from the party. He observed that Surkov had wanted not only to get rid of Rogozin but to humiliate him to the maximum extent so that he would not be able to become a political force in the future. Demurin added, however, that Rogozin still had allies within the PA and elsewhere in the government and speculated that Rogozin would rely on such support, along with his prominent name-recognition among voters throughout the country, to launch a new campaign in time for the 2007 parliamentary election. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: It will be another few months before the full effects of Rogozin's resignation from the Rodina Party become clear. We doubt that either Novichkov's social democrats or the pro-Rogozin nationalists will be able, individually, to generate the mass support and loyalty necessary to pose a credible electoral challenge. A Babakov-led Rodina Party is also unlikely to pose a threat to the ruling authorities. In this sense, the Kremlin's divide-and-conquer tactics have succeeded in undermining and unraveling what had become an increasingly effective and popular, although also in the eyes of many potentially dangerous, political movement that had the capability to win significant numbers of votes throughout the country. The result is that yet another opposition party has been beaten into submission, with the pro-Kremlin YR the most likely beneficiary of Rodina's disintegration. BURNS