RUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION LEADER BORIS NEMTSOV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003388 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION LEADER BORIS NEMTSOV GETS PERSONAL REF: MOSCOW 1083 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Russell. Reasons 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) In a March 27 meeting with the Ambassador, democratic opposition leader Boris Nemtsov: -- Strongly condemned the falsified election results in Belarus, where the people faced a "catastrophic situation"; -- Suggested that negotiations to form a new government in Ukraine would be prolonged and contentious; -- Noted that talks to unite Russia's democratic opposition continued, but that liberals needed new leadership to attract popular support and enhance their overall position; and -- Interspersed his comments with a range of personal views concerning various local and regional leaders. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) Ambassador met with Boris Nemtsov on March 27. Nemtsov, a former Governor of Nizhniy Novgorod and Deputy Prime Minister during the Yeltsin era, has long been associated with liberal economic policies and democratic politics. Most recently, he was appointed by the Union of Right Forces (SPS) to serve as that party's representative on a committee charged with uniting the country's democratic opposition forces. He has also served as an advisor to Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko following the 2004 Orange Revolution and has been an outspoken supporter of Belarus opposition leader Aleksandr Milinkevich. . -------------- - BELARUS ELECTIONS A CATASTROPHE FOR THE PEOPLE -------------- - ¶3. (C) Nemtsov roundly condemned the current situation in Belarus. The March 19 elections had been falsified and, subsequently, protesters had been beaten and arrested. He welcomed official statements by the U.S. and EU condemning these events but, overall, Nemtsov concluded that a popular revolution along the lines of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine was unlikely. The opposition was neither as well organized nor as effective as the forces that brought Viktor Yushchenko to power in Kiev. As a result, the people of Belarus faced a "catastrophic situation." ¶4. (C) Referring to possible implications for the relationship between Belarus and Russia, Nemtsov did not believe there would be any significant change in direction, including in the continuing negotiations to establish a Union State. Moscow had congratulated Aleksandr Lukashenko almost �A;immediately after the polls closed and would continue to defend the embattled regime against criticism from the West. Nemtsov claimed that President Putin did not personally like Lukashenko (he likened the relationship to the World War II-era ties between Hitler and Mussolini),but the two leaders needed each other. In any case, Nemtsov thought Putin's recent tilt toward support for "dictators" and populist politicians of various types in Belarus and Central Asia was not worthy of a G-8 leader. At the same time, Nemtsov warned that Lukashenko, who was "worse than Milosevic," maintained considerable popular support in both Belarus and Russia which, along with his political connections, could conceivably propel him to the presidency of a future Russia-Belarus Union State. . -------------- ARDUOUS POWER NEGOTIATIONS IN UKRAINE -------------- ¶5. (C) Turning to the situation in Ukraine following the March 26 parliamentary elections, Nemtsov characterized the majority of Ukrainian politicians, including Viktor Yanukovych and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, as either "criminal or corrupt." The major difference among them was one of degree rather than quality. Nemtsov said that while Yushchenko was well-intentioned, he was never able to overcome the entrenched business interests, deep-seated corruption, or continuing GOR opposition that ultimately rendered U.S. and Western praise for the "Orange Revolution" premature. Nemtsov said Putin, in particular, had never gotten over Yanukovych's defeat in 2004. ¶6. (C) Nemtsov predicted that the negotiations to establish a new government would be prolonged and arduous. He thought Tymoshenko had been a "catastrophe" when she had been PM last year but conceded that her second-place finish strengthened her hand and might allow her to regain her former position. A repeat of the Tymoshenko Government would be another "catastrophe." In the meantime, Nemtsov speculated that MOSCOW 00003388 002 OF 002 Yanukovych might have the strongest hand. In addition to his party's first-place finish in the elections, Yanukovych might be able to exploit differences between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, including Yushchenko's evident unwillingness to see Tymoshenko become PM again. ¶7. (C) Regardless of who took over the government helm in Kiev, Nemtsov said the new PM would have to pay more attention to Moscow. In this respect, he said Yanukovych was harder to predict. Clearly supported by Moscow, Yanukovych nevertheless had promised during the campaign to keep the country on its pro-Western course. Nemtsov was unsure of the extent to which policy would change -- or not -- as a result, although he mentioned that relations with Poland could become more complicated. He was certain, however, that the country's plans to join NATO would slow since most Ukrainians (not only those in the eastern part of the country) were not enthusiastic about joining the Alliance. . -------------- DEMOCRATS NEED NEW LEADERSHIP -------------- ¶8. (C) Asked about prospects for uniting Russia's democratic opposition forces, Nemtsov said discussions were continuing with the main political players, but a genuine coalition was still out of reach. He singled out Yabloko's Grigoriy Yavlinskiy as one of the main obstacles. Although Yavlinskiy agreed in principle that unity, or at least closer cooperation on joint lists, would be desirable, the Yabloko leader was still reluctant to make meaningful concessions for the sake of a broader coalition. Nemtsov surmised that Yavlinskiy had not abandoned his personal goal of becoming president. A lack of financial support was also an obstacle, especially for smaller parties like Vladimir Ryzhkov's Republican Party. ¶9. (C) In the meantime, Nemtsov said the democrats needed an infusion of new leadership, along with a new message, that would spark public interest. Former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov was the only option for the time being, but Nemtsov said he was relatively weak and had not yet been able to cast aside a "very negative image" as a corrupt politician. Nemtsov alleged that Kasyanov had been involved in numerous cases of bribe-taking and official corruption; the widely reported case of his dacha was just the tip of the iceberg. . -------------- A LITTLE BIT OF COLOR FOR EVERYBODY -------------- ¶10. (C) Over the course of our conversation, Nemtsov commented on various personalities. Among other things, Nemtsov: -- Claimed there were only four honest politicians in the country -- Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov, Our Choice leader Irina Khakamada, Yabloko's Yavlinskiy, and himself. With the exception of Zyuganov, the other three have been close associates of Nemtsov over the years. Among the most corrupt are recently deposed Rodina Party President Dmitriy Rogozin, Rodina faction leader Sergey Glazyev, and Kasyanov. -- Said Putin feared being overthrown or assassinated, especially on the orders of Chechen separatists or exiled business leader Boris Berezovskiy, whom Putin had personally tried to convince British PM Tony Blair last October to extradite to Russia. -- Maintained close ties with Vladislav Surkov, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, including during the money laundering raids against Neftyanoy Bank, Nemtsov's former bank, last December. He claimed that Surkov had warned him in advance that the raid was "political," which was one of the factors that had prompted Nemtsov to resign from the bank's board. RUSSELL