THE "FEBRUARY THESES": SURKOV'S PRIMER ON PUTINISM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 003218

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS
SUBJECT: THE "FEBRUARY THESES": SURKOV'S PRIMER ON PUTINISM

REF: A. 04 MOSCOW 13032

B. 05 MOSCOW 7085

C. MOSCOW 2136 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine,
for reasons 1.4 (B & D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. A February speech by Deputy Head of the
Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov to a United
Russia conference sketched out "basic ideological theses" of
the Putin Administration. While not attempting to break new
ground or crystallize a doctrine of "Putinism," the speech
portrayed Putin's policies as consistent and coherent. The
effort may have been stimulated in part by concern about
preserving the main policy thrust of Putin,s rule after
2008, when he is expected to surrender formal power.
Surkov's main points included that:

- Material well-being, freedom and justice are the basic
values Putin is trying to advance in Russia;

- Russia is culturally part of Europe -- and, by
implication, needs no solutions premised on its being
permanently "unique";

- Putin's policies avoid the failures of communism and the
chaos, weakness and injustice of Yeltsin's rule and "return
the real sense of the word democracy, to all democratic
institutions";

- Democracy and "sovereignty" ("a political synonym of
competitiveness") are the two critical requirements for
Russia to be successful over time.

- United Russia,s task is "not simply to be victorious in
2007, but to think and do whatever is necessary to ensure the
party,s domination over at least the next 10-15 years" in
order to prevent hostile forces from "knocking Russia off the
path that has now been marked out for it to go."

The speech may foreshadow a more authoritative exposition of
some of its themes by Putin in his annual address to the
Federal Assembly later this spring. END SUMMARY.

Stepping into the Ideology Gap
--------------


2. (C) The Kremlin has often been criticized, especially
from the "patriotic" end of the political spectrum, for
failing to deploy a mobilizing ideology that would make clear
what goals it is pursuing -- and make it more likely that
those goals would in fact be consistently pursued. Until
recently there has indeed been no effort to systematize
Putin,s domestic and foreign policies or explicitly to
relate the goals to any larger framework. Instead, Putin,s
approach to governance has seemed ad hoc and reactive, and
sometimes strongly influenced by the financial interests of
figures in the inner circle. In our view, the pragmatic
nature of Kremlin decision-making reflects Putin,s
personality and operational (rather than academic or
intellectual) background, but likely also results from a
broader distrust in Russia -- after 70 years of subjection to
an ideology that failed -- of all-encompassing doctrines.


3. (U) Initially delivered February 7 to a United Russia
(UR) audience, Surkov,s speech was posted on the UR website
February 22 and then in March carried by some Russian media.
It was only the third major intervention he has made in
public debate in the past 18 months, following an interview
with "Komsomolskaya Pravda" in September 2004 (ref A) and
remarks to the Delovaya Rossiya business group in May 2005
(ref B). Since being reprinted in the press, the speech has
generated continuing attention as an expression of views by
an authoritative and influential but rarely-heard-in-public
"deep insider." Surkov has since expounded on some of the
same themes with Ambassador (ref C).


4. (C) Surkov is indeed close to Putin and is the Kremlin
operative most directly charged with managing political
developments, but he is not without rivals in the PA. Some
media reports have even asserted that the speech was prompted
by a need on Surkov,s part to resist attempts to weaken his
position in the PA. (Comment. We heard a similar analysis
from Carnegie Center analyst Andrey Ryabov, who said new PA
head Sergey Sobyanin "hates" Surkov, and the latter sought to
reinforce himself politically through the speech. End
Comment) Most commentators, however, have stressed Surkov,s
privileged access to Putin and the degree to which the speech
is assumed to reflect Putin,s own outlook. Vasiliy
Tretyakov, editor-in-chief of "Politicheskiy Zhurnal," called
Surkov "almost the only source of our knowledge of Russia,s
official ideology," and Kremlin consultant Gleb Pavlovskiy

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told us March 23 that the timing of the speech reflected the
fact that "that,s when Putin gave the authorization."

Contemporary History Decoded
--------------


5. (C) Surkov identified the "fundamental values" that Putin
is trying to advance as material well-being, freedom and
justice. He immediately linked those goals to argumentation
that Russia has historically been an inextricable part of
European civilization and has undergone a broadly similar
course of development as other European nations. In Russia
as elsewhere in Europe, people want to participate in the
political life of their society, and over time coercive forms
of government increasingly give way to processes of
persuasion and agreement. Democratic development in Russia
will thus lead to increasing stress on ideas (ideology) and
reasoned discourse, Surkov reasoned, and diminish the role of
"administrative resources" and force.


6. (C) Noting that Russians hold sharply differing
assessments of the Soviet experience, Surkov sought to build
common ground by asserting that the Soviet Union had a
progressive influence on world development (although Soviet
society itself was not free or just) and established the
industrial base on which Russia,s economy still depends.
Despite such achievements, Soviet decisions were based on
party dogma rather than efficiency. The USSR failed to meet
its citizens' needs, and they -- not the CIA or some
intra-party conspiracy -- brought it down. The loss of the
other Soviet republics that opted for independence was a
price the Russian people "more or less consciously paid" to
chart their own course.


7. (C) Russian society was not ready for democracy in the
1990s, Surkov said, and it fell quickly into oligarchic rule
("manipulation instead of representation") that unfairly
discredited the broader business community. Privatization
was overall a positive phenomenon, but in too many cases was
conducted improperly and unjustly. Chaos reigned in the
relations of state and federal authorities. The outcome of
the first Chechen war led to a de facto violation of Russia's
territorial integrity. Yeltsin,s re-election in 1996
perverted democratic processes to avoid an outcome some were
unwilling to accept. In 2000 the electorate,s support for
Putin was a decision to "normalize the situation in the
country," preserving good features that under Yeltsin had
emerged in distorted forms. Putin has acted to "return the
real sense of the word democracy, to all democratic
institutions," and his policies -- unlike Yeltsin,s in the
1990s -- enjoy the support of the people.

"Sovereignty" and Threats to It
--------------


8. (U) As in his May 2005 speech (ref B),Surkov stressed
the concept of "sovereignty," now defined as "a political
synonym of competitiveness." Internationally, Russia needed
to remain among the states that "make the decisions on the
organization of world order." If it failed to do so, those
decisions inevitably would not take its interests adequately
into account. Moreover, Russia had for centuries been a
power in international relations, unlike many surrounding
states that -- having never in their national lives been
genuinely sovereign -- now had no difficulty, when unhappy
with Moscow, in "running to a new master" and "becoming a
province of some other country." Russia had no one to run to
but itself, and had to remain an independent actor able to
influence world politics in support of its interests. Moscow
supported a "democratization of international relations" and
"fair rules for globalization" to prevent global decisions
being taken by "diktat."


9. (C) Surkov identified democracy and sovereignty as the
two critical requirements for Russia to be successful over
time. "Only a society based on competition and cooperation
among free people can be effective and competitive."
Moreover, "if we are not an open democratic society, if we
are not broadly integrated into the world economy...we will
not have access to the contemporary Western technologies
without which, I believe, Russia,s modernization will be
impossible." Strengthening Russia,s democracy required
strengthening civil society, including political parties,
NGOs and institutions of local self-rule.


10. (U) Surkov identified four present or potential threats
to Russia,s sovereignty:

- International terrorism. Intensive work, including
international cooperation, would need to continue for decades
to meet the threat;


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- An external military threat that now was only hypothetical.
There was no guarantee today's lack of such a threat would
continue, however, so keeping Russia,s army, navy and
nuclear deterrent strong was essential;

- A lack of economic competitiveness. Many problems existed,
including "monstrous" delays in structural reforms that
sooner or later would exact a price. But Russia could not
rely on free-market panaceas and expect all problems to solve
themselves; Putin had identified a realistic path to follow,
drawing on Russia,s competitive advantages (including the
concept of an "energy superpower"); and

- A susceptibility to "orange technologies" supported from
abroad: "If they (Note: Surkov does not say who "they" are.
End Note) were able to do it in four countries, why not in a
fifth?" Russia had in response to develop a
"nationally-oriented" elite, including a nationally-oriented
(rather than "off-shore") business class, and to continue
Putin,s democratization policies. But while a healthy
national orientation was essential, Surkov rejected
isolationist and "Russia for the (ethnic) Russian" tendencies
that call themselves "patriotic." If they came to power, it
would be a catastrophe that might even lead to further loss
of national territory. Neither oligarchic revanchists nor
supporters of a nationalistic dictatorship should be "allowed
to destroy democracy using democratic procedures" (as Hitler
did in coming to power via free elections). Russia must be
not only for the ethnic Russians, but for all the peoples of
Russia.


11. (C) UR,s task, in Surkov's view, was "not simply to be
victorious in 2007, but to think and do whatever is necessary
to ensure the party,s domination over at least the next
10-15 years" to prevent hostile forces from "knocking Russia
off the path that has now been marked out for it to go." To
become a dominating force, UR members would have to
internalize and propagate the "ideology" set out in
presidential and party documents.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) The point of Surkov,s speech was not to break new
ground, and a number of commentators with whom we spoke
(e.g., Pavlovskiy, Sergey Karaganov, Dmitriy Danilov, Valeriy
Fedorov, Vladislav Nikonov) tended to dismiss it as "nothing
new." Some of them, however, at the same time voiced support
for the idea of clarifying the Kremlin,s goals and
strategies, and allowed that Surkov,s speech was a step in
the right direction in that regard. Andrey Ryabov told us he
found the speech "static" in its assumptions and "lacking
vision," and thus likely to appeal more to the bureaucracy
than to intellectuals or the middle class.


14. (C) "Sovereignty" remains Surkov,s key concept for
addressing both internal ("sovereign democracy") and foreign
policies. His linking of "sovereignty" to "competitiveness"
is on the whole positive, both because it encourages Russians
to focus on what actually works in the empirical world,
rather than on romantic assertions of ethnic or neo-imperial
identity, and because it emphasizes the need to sustain an
achievement, rather than to be recognized as possessing a
status. He seems, moreover, to have real insight into, if
not conviction about, Russia,s need to be a genuinely open
society if it is to sustain its claim to being a Great Power.
At the same time, he is forced by his position -- and
probably a sincere perception of Russian vulnerability -- to
subordinate the demands of openness to a need for social
unity, which is implicitly understood to require central
control. The overall tone of his speech is nonetheless far
from the "enemy at the gates" shrillness of his post-Beslan
interview in September 2004, with its evocation of "fifth
columns" and "dividing lines" in every community and
neighborhood.


15. (C) Acknowledging that assessments of 20th century
history remain highly controversial in Russia, Surkov feels
for a balance that pays enough tribute to all viewpoints so
that critics of the USSR and those nostalgic for it can join
hands to support Putin's policies. His view of the 1990s
mixes harsh criticism with a refusal to reject everything
initiated under Yeltsin, but the overall picture he draws of
the 1990s is nonetheless more negative than his summary of
the Soviet period, reflecting the continuing desire by
Putin,s team to be seen above all as a corrective to the
disorder, weakness, and broadly perceived injustice of the
Yeltsin years.


16. (C) Surkov's stress on Russia,s being fully a part of
European culture seems intended to rebut arguments that it is
a "unique" civilizational entity requiring political

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solutions qualitatively distinct from those that have proved
successful elsewhere in Europe. In that, in his unequivocal
declaration that the Soviet Union fell because of its own
inadequacies, and in his rejection of isolationism and ethnic
chauvinism, Surkov -- who recently was named by Putin to head
the organizing committee for Russia's upcoming chairmanship
of the Council of Europe -- casts himself as a relative
"Westernizer" or "Europeanist" among Putin's advisors. He
shows that he belongs comfortably within the Kremlin
spectrum, however, by saying that Putin,s "policy of
democratization" has returned "the real meaning of the word
democracy, to all democratic institutions."


17. (C) Surkov's thesis that persuasion will increasingly
drive Russian politics implies a need for UR to be an
effective promoter of Putinist policies, rather than just a
beneficiary of Putin,s popularity, as it has been to date.
But he would entrust it only with the downstream task of
selling whatever the Kremlin has already decided. His speech
may, as he hoped, help make UR members "forget about whether
you,re right-wingers or left-wingers" and recognize that the
party must be a synthesis of various interests, but it will
take more than a speech to convert UR into the effective
political force that Surkov,s thesis of
politics-by-persuasion would require. UR,s raison d,etre
is, by Kremlin design, to support whatever Putin,s team
tells it to support, and it shows little sign of overcoming
its congenital passivity and growing beyond Putin,s
coattails. In our view, it is unlikely to have more than
inertial weight in promoting continuity in the succession
process, unless Putin takes a leadership role in the party
himself and uses it as an instrument for exerting influence
on his successor as President.


18. (C) Ultimately, only Putin -- through his actions and
words -- can define Putinism. As some commentators have
speculated, Surkov's speech may well foreshadow a more
authoritative exposition of some of the same themes by Putin
in his annual address later this spring to the Federal
Assembly.
BURNS