NEW COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES CREATE "VERTICAL OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003115 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER RS SUBJECT: NEW COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES CREATE "VERTICAL OF SECURITY" REF: 05 MOSCOW 15657 Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine. Reasons 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On March 6 President Putin signed a bill "On Counteracting Terrorism" that had hastily moved through the Duma and Federation Council in the preceding days. Passed on its first reading in December 2004 (reftel) after the Beslan tragedy, the bill was then shelved because of several controversial provisions. It again gained urgency early this year because it was essential to implement Putin's February 16 decree establishing the National Counterterrorism Committee (NCC),to be headed by Federal Security Service (FSB) Chief Patrushev, which will coordinate all federal counterterrorism policies and operations. Many observers view the NCC decree and the law primarily through the prism of internal Kremlin politics, with Patrushev and the FSB seen as having gained a vote of confidence from Putin and having bested Internal Affairs (MVD) Minister Nurgaliyev for control of counterterrorism efforts. Human rights activists worry that the Kremlin -- and especially the FSB -- has gained instruments that could potentially be abused for political ends. END SUMMARY. . New National Counterterrorism Committee -------------- ¶2. (C) After the Beslan tragedy in 2004, President Putin vowed to develop an effective counterterrorism strategy and mechanisms to implement it. However, the issue quickly stalled because of government infighting about who would take ultimate responsibility for counterterrorism activities. The main competition was between the FSB, led by Nikolay Patrushev, and the Interior Ministry, led by Rashid Nurgaliyev. Moscow Carnegie Center regional expert Nikolay Petrov told us the February 16 Presidential Decree "On Measures to Counteract Terrorism," which granted the FSB full control over the fight against terrorism, was significant primarily as a victory for Patrushev against Nurgaliyev. Given that rumors have long swirled that the FSB chief might soon be removed, Petrov continued, the latest decision also marks Putin's vote of confidence in Patrushev. On the other hand, Federation Council member Vladimir Slutsker, who has long been sharply critical of Patrushev to us in private, told us March 15 that the latest developments marked an institutional victory for the FSB, rather than a personal victory for its current chief. ¶3. (SBU) Putin's decree created a "vertical of security" running from Regional Counterterrorism Commissions (RCCs) headed by governors to the NCC at the national level. The decree also established operational headquarters for both the NCC and RCCs: the former will be overseen by the deputy chief of the FSB and the latter will be led by regional FSB heads. Three hundred specialists assigned to the NCC will be based at the FSB. The NCC will include the ministers of Interior, Emergency Situations, Health, Communications, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Transportation, the chair of the foreign intelligence service, and the deputy speakers of the State Duma and Federation Council. The Armed Forces Chief of Staff will represent the Defense Ministry on the NCC. Also included on the list of committee members will be a deputy head of the Presidential Administration (PA),and speculation is that Igor Sechin, rather than Vladislav Surkov, will serve in that role, given Sechin's prominence in the Kremlin's "power group." In the event of a terrorist incident, all governmental agencies represented on the committee would be required to implement NCC decisions. The FSB Director is empowered to develop further details, including the regulations and procedures under which the committees will work. In addition, he is to appoint the person responsible for informing the public of the committee's operations. ¶4. (SBU) Creation of the vertical of security has generated some serious concerns among civil society activists. Head of the All-Russia Movement for Human Rights Lev Ponomarev argues that the decree is dangerous as it creates "a new organ headed by the FSB that operates like a parallel government to the cabinet of ministers and whose decrees will be obeyed by all the structures that form the committee." Viktor Ilyukhin, a Duma deputy from the Communist Party and the former head of the State Duma Security Committee, shared that view, telling "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" that the "NCC will have the opportunity to intervene in the work of any authority, whether federal, regional, or municipal, and one should not rule out that it will do so not only in the interests of fighting terrorism." . Parliament Approves Law "On Counteracting Terrorism" -------------- -------------- MOSCOW 00003115 002 OF 003 ¶5. (SBU) The law "On Counteracting Terrorism" was introduced by Duma members and quickly passed its first reading in December 2004 in the wake of the Beslan tragedy. It was then shelved for more than a year because of concerns over several provisions, including strict limits on the right of the media to cover a terrorist attack and an unclear understanding of the term "terrorism danger regime." Both the PA's legal office and civil society groups reportedly strongly opposed the bill. However, Putin's February 16, 2006, decree creating the NCC made the law essential, and it was revived and rushed through the Duma and Federation Council. On February 26, the bill was adopted almost unanimously by the Duma -- 423 votes in favor, one against, and eight abstentions ) and it passed unanimously in the Federation Council four days later. ¶6. (SBU) According to "Gazeta.Ru," Duma Security Committee member Gennadiy Gudkov said that almost ninety percent of the bill had been rewritten in response to the president's decree. In the first draft, authority to fight terrorism had been given to a Federal Counterterrorism Commission under the prime minister. Now, the law replicates almost in its entirety the text of the presidential decree creating the NCC. The new legislation establishes a single chain of command in counterterrorism operations, specifies all actions for security structures, and holds the people in charge personally accountable. In addition, the law significantly expands the concept of terrorism. It emphasizes that terrorist activity goes beyond "organizing, planning, preparing, financing, or perpetrating an act of terrorism," and also covers promoting "terrorist ideas" and distributing materials or information that encourage terrorist activity or incite individuals to commit an act of terrorism. ¶7. (SBU) Other counterterrorist measures provided in the law in the event of a terrorist attack include: --removing persons from specified locations or buildings; --conducting ID checks and body-searches; --monitoring telephone conversations and other information transmitted through telecommunication channels; --limiting the movement of vehicular traffic and pedestrians; --introducing a "legal regime for counterterrorist operations" with restrictions on residents of the region or city where it is in force; --relocating residents temporarily from the region where a legal regime for counterterrorist operations is in force; --negotiating with terrorists for the purpose of saving lives or preventing injuries, but without giving in to political demands; and --authorizing the Armed Forces to shoot down planes or sink ships, even with civilian hostages on board, as well as to fight terrorism outside of Russia's borders. ¶8. (SBU) Other provisions establish procedures for paying compensation for damages sustained in a terrorist attack and for social rehabilitation for victims. The law specifies that "killing an individual committing an act of terrorism, injuring him, or damaging his property is considered lawful." There is also a list of benefits for military personnel and executive branch personnel who participate in counterterrorist operations. ¶9. (SBU) Finally, the law bans "establishing or operating any organization whose goals or actions aim to promote, justify, or support terrorism or crime." It notes that "an organization will be recognized as a terrorist organization and subject to closure following a court decision based on a statement from the Prosecutor General's office." The property of such an organization will be subject to confiscation and acquisition by the state. (NOTE: The concept of "confiscation" is not yet covered in the Criminal Code; it is one of many legislative acts -- others include laws on transport security, the media, the Tax Code, the Federal Security Service, the status of servicemen, and prevention of political, ethnic, and religious extremism -- that will need to be changed or amended to correspond to the new law. END NOTE.) Additionally, the Duma decided to include a special provision that "this article applies to foreign or international organizations, along with their departments, branches, and representative offices in the Russian Federation." ¶10. (C) Many experts agree that the law as passed marks an improvement over the 2004 version, which was widely considered as too draconian. Aleksander Petrov of Human Rights Watch told us that "it could have been worse" and that, in the post-Beslan environment, the authorities could have passed anything they wanted. One of the law's main drafters, Chairman of the State Duma Subcommittee on MOSCOW 00003115 003 OF 003 International Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime Igor Barinov, told us the law had been purposely "watered down to take into account possible international and domestic criticism," and he said many in the Duma and the government believe that "the law doesn't give nearly enough powers to the FSB." In contrast, according to Georgiy Dzhibladze of the Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights, the law gives huge powers to the security forces without providing any public control of them. Dzhibladze said it was similar to what the government could do under a state of emergency, with no check on the GOR's authority. He maintained that the law might be "tested" in various regions to see how suspension of the rule of law would work. . FSB Chief Patrushev Defends New Law -------------- ¶11. (SBU) On March 21 FSB Chief Patrushev gave a lengthy and detailed front-page interview to "Rossiiskaya Gazeta" in which he vigorously defended the new law. Admitting that serious improvement was needed in the way counterterrorism operations were conducted in Russia, he said the new law would help prevent, fight, and minimize the consequences of terrorist acts by involving not only the security services, but federal executive branch bodies, regional government bodies, and local government bodies. The two main issues that he said demanded immediate attention were detecting and eliminating financial sources of terrorism and creating socioeconomic conditions that would prevent recruitment of new terrorists. He said those issues were particularly relevant for the Caucasus -- normalization of the situation there would come about faster by pooling the efforts of all levels of government. Finally, he emphasized that the law met international standards, saying that there was a difference between "abuses" and restrictions on civil liberties. He maintained that restrictions were permitted by the Russian Constitution and that "even the European Convention on Human Rights states that rights are inviolate save for when restrictions are necessitated by considerations of state or public security, prevention of crime, etc." ¶12. (C) COMMENT. In the fight against terrorism, a strong, centralized institution to prevent, counter, and mitigate the consequences of terrorist attacks and take responsibility for counterterrorist operations makes sense. The string of deadly terrorist incidents, beginning with the Moscow apartment bombings in 1999 and including the now-household names of Dubrovka, Beslan, and Nalchik, required that Russia retool its government to respond. Its new mechanisms may prove a more effective tool for coordinating the GOR's response to terrorism, and the marked increase in the willingness of GOR agencies to cooperate with the U.S. bilaterally to improve their capabilities is but one example of a real recognition that Russia must improve its capabilities and performance. As with the recently enacted NGO law, however, the danger is in how the GOR may use its powerful new counterterrorism tools. In a country without effective checks on central power -- from the courts, legislature, or media or any tradition of limited powers within the executive branch -- the temptation to abuse those tools at the expense of civil liberties will be powerful. The only effective oversight of the activities of the NCC will come from the President, and in practice the FSB is likely to have nearly unlimited power in a declared terrorist situation. BURNS