RUSSIA-GEORGIA: LOOKING AHEAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002974 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR ETRD PBTS NATO GG RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA: LOOKING AHEAD Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns; reason 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Emotions seem to be cooling (at least temporarily) between Russia and Georgia, and we are seeing a return to low-level business. Statements that would have caused an uproar just a few weeks ago are being dismissed with good humor. But that is a long way from making real progress, especially on Georgia's immediate goal of a peace settlement on South Ossetia. Rather, both sides appear to be girding for what they see as the major struggle -- Georgia's prospects for NATO membership and the irreversibility of its external orientation. The U.S. should continue to try to keep emotions dampened on both sides and push hard for advancing economic aspects of the South Ossetia settlement on which the U.S., Russia, and Europe can cooperate. End summary. -------------- The Atmosphere Improves... -------------- ¶2. (C) At separate meetings with MFA Georgia Office Director Semyon Grigoryev and visiting Georgian Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mikheil Machavariani, we tried to piece together the state of Russian-Georgian relations and their likely course over the next few months. Grigoryev told us March 13 that relations were in a "pause" that would go on until emotions on both sides cooled. ¶3. (C) Emotions in fact seem to be cooling sooner than expected. Machavariani was cautiously upbeat about his March 20-22 visit ("We expected much worse" is the way Georgian DCM Shugarov put it),saying atmospherics were relatively good with all interlocutors, even when there was disagreement over substance. To be sure, provocative rhetoric has not disappeared. Georgian President Saakashvili unveiled plans for a "Museum of Occupation," provoking Grigoryev to muse on exactly whom Stalin, Beria and Ordzhonikidze were "occupying." South Ossetian "President" Kokoity has declared that on the basis of a 1774 document, South Ossetia has never ceased being a part of Russia -- under the unique legal reasoning that while the laws of the defunct Soviet Union are null and void, the laws of the even more defunct Russian Empire remain in full force. The Georgians did not rise to the bait this time: the press reported March 23 that Georgian Minister for Conflict Resolution Khaindrava doubted anyone would take Kokoity's words seriously. Injudicious rhetoric has characterized the relationship all along; only the emotional reactions vary in pitch. ¶4. (C) In a March 23 discussion, the Ambassador raised Kokoity's latest intended provocation with DFM Karasin, urging that Russia not let the considerable efforts expended to organize a Joint Control Commission meeting be undermined by such unproductive rhetoric. Karasin noted that the Georgians were also not innocent of injudicious remarks, but he agreed that all concerned should try to arrange a successful JCC. Although neither Russia's nor South Ossetia's positions had changed, he said, Russia would try to moderate Kokoity's statements. -------------- ...But Will Results Follow? -------------- ¶5. (C) Meanwhile, business is resuming, although with ups and downs. President Putin signed the decree on withdrawing Russian troops and bases from Georgia. The Russian Embassy in Tbilisi is now issuing visas to Georgians, while Russia's military personnel in Georgia have started receiving one-year multiple-entry visas. A JCC meeting on South Ossetia looks likely to take place next week in Vladikavkaz, and Grigoryev assured us that Russia would not even mind discussing a replacement for the Peace Keeping Force -- provided discussion took place in an appropriate context such as the JCC, and not in the press. On the other hand, Russia widened its ban on the import of plants from Georgia, and is discussing a ban on wine (which would probably not affect availability, thus helping wine lovers confirm what they suspected all along: that many of the "Georgian" wines they drink here are counterfeit). ¶6. (C) Machavariani (joined at our March 22 meeting by his predecessor Gigi Tsereteli, Ambassador Chubinishvili and DCM Shugarov) said that his main aim in Moscow was to persuade Russia to move ahead on the South Ossetia peace process. He feared that if the momentum were to fade, it would appear that the peace plan endorsed in Ljubljana was "stale." Tsereteli noted that the Georgian electoral cycle -- local SIPDIS elections this September and parliamentary elections in 2008 -- would have a hardening effect on Georgian rhetoric. MOSCOW 00002974 002 OF 003 ¶7. (C) Machavariani claimed that all his interlocutors -- both in Parliament and the MFA -- supported Georgian territorial integrity, and all now recognized that there was, indeed, a peace plan (the Russian MFA previously denied its existence). However, he admitted, no Russian interlocutor was in a rush to implement it. "We're not in a hurry," he said the Russians repeatedly told him. "You Georgians are the ones in a hurry. But the idea of resolving this conflict in the next two or three years is unrealistic." Machavariani noted that the prospects for Kosovo independence were a brake on progress on South Ossetia and Abkhazia -- all the separatists were waiting to see what the Kosovars got rather than settling now for what could turn out to be less. All the Russians with whom he spoke played up support for Russian citizens in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but reacted impassively when he described the unilateral confidence-building measures Georgia was taking, such as adopting a law on restitution. -------------- The Looming Precipice: NATO -------------- ¶8. (C) The big anxiety for Russia is the prospect of Georgia joining NATO. Grigoryev said that while Russia's official line is that joining an alliance is "a country's own business," in reality Georgia's NATO aspirations are the single greatest spoiler -- present and potential -- in the relationship. Russia's concern is all the more, he said, because Georgia's new National Security Strategy identifies Russia as the main source of threats to Georgia's security. ¶9. (C) Machavariani confirmed that he heard both the official and the unofficial line in his various conversations, and that there was sometimes an implicit linkage to the frozen conflicts. Machavariani said his interlocutors' arguments boiled down to this: "Of course, it's your choice. But the choice is this: are you with us, or are you with the Americans? The Americans are not our enemy, but they are our competitor. If you are joining the competition, we will be in no hurry to help you with your conflicts." ¶10. (C) Grigoryev feared that the NATO factor would come to a head this year. Georgia appeared to be on the NATO "escalator." Its Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) review had earned high marks, and it might get a Membership Action Plan (MAP) this year -- which to Grigoryev meant "automatic" membership in about two years. A MAP would cause an immediate escalation of tensions between Russia and Georgia. Asked what could be done to improve relations in the long run, Grigoryev called for a unilateral Georgian renunciation of foreign bases or NATO membership. -------------- Tackling the Dilemma -------------- ¶11. (C) Machavariani stressed the importance of creating conditions in which Russia would be willing to move forward on South Ossetia. Given Russian fears, we asked how we could foster such an atmosphere. How could Russia be induced to see it as worth its while to move forward? That stumped Machavariani, but Chubinishvili listed three factors: -- Toned-down rhetoric, eliminating all ad hominem attacks ("We can't stop our rhetoric entirely," Machavariani noted, "or the Russians will believe Georgia accepts whatever they do"); -- Working quietly, without fanfare, towards the MAP; and -- Enlisting international pressure, revolving around the G8 summit. ¶12. (C) With regard to the summit and the economic issues to be discussed, Machavariani made clear that Georgia would stick to its preconditions, all of them economic, for supporting Russian accession to WTO. The conditions involved imports, customs, borders and the elimination of smuggling. Only one condition, a demand for a single Russian visa policy for all parts of Georgia, could be considered political. That condition was moot in any case, Tsereteli noted, because their Russian interlocutors claimed that 95 percent of the residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia already have Russian citizenship. Machavariani said that if Russia met those preconditions, Georgia would support its WTO accession -- he made no linkage to South Ossetia. -------------- Comment: The U.S. Role -------------- MOSCOW 00002974 003 OF 003 ¶12. (C) Events of the past two weeks have shown that when emotions are calmed, Georgia and Russia are capable of negotiations that get business done. But the calm is unlikely to last. Georgia has a concrete short-term goal: recovery of South Ossetia, the key to which is in Moscow. Georgia also has a concrete medium-term goal: recovery of Abkhazia, the key to which is also in Moscow. And Georgia has a long-term goal: joining NATO, a prospect that makes Russia want to throw away both keys. ¶13. (C) One area in which the U.S. can help is in keeping the sides from provoking each other, and in urging calm when irritants appear. Another area in which we can push for progress -- an area that is also less likely to provoke one side or the other -- is economics. Most recent peace plans for South Ossetia -- Georgian and Ossetian alike -- call for a "Special Economic Zone" linking parts of North Ossetia, all of South Ossetia and parts of Georgia. In the long run, that may be the best hope for re-uniting the Ossetian and Georgian peoples through common interests. We should make a strong push -- including at the April Donors' Conference in Brussels -- to set that up independent of all other progress in the peace process, and maximize our cooperation with Russia and the EU both to make it come about and provide it with adequate support. BURNS