MOSCOW REACTS TO HAMAS VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002212

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: MOSCOW REACTS TO HAMAS VISIT

REF: MOSCOW 2134

Classified By: A/POL Mike Klecheski. Reasons: 1.4(B/D).


1. Summary: While the MFA was able to point to few concrete
results from Foreign Minister Lavrov's March 3 meeting with a
Hamas delegation, we were told March 6 by the MFA Middle East
Peace Process desk that the Moscow-Hamas channel was likely
to remain open. In Moscow's estimation, Hamas Politburo
Chief Khaled Mish'al was a pragmatic figure who recognized
the need for accommodation with the Quartet if he wanted a
Hamas government to be successful. Moscow's think tank
community was divided -- while most observers saw the meeting
as a coup for Russia's diplomacy, several we spoke to were
skeptical that contacts with Hamas would produce results,
given limits on Russia's capacity to influence the situation.
Press reaction was almost uniformly positive, but at least
one informal poll suggests that the informed Russian public
has concerns about the role Moscow aspires to in the Middle
East. End Summary.

MFA Readout
--------------


2. (C) On March 6, Sergey Kozlov, who heads the MFA Middle
East Department's Peace Process Office, provided us with
further details of the talks to supplement the March 3
readout DFM Saltanov and Ambassador Kalugin provided to the
Ambassador (reftel). Kozlov emphasized that Moscow had
pushed hard on Quartet principles -- recognition of Israel,
renunciation of violence and acceptance of prior agreements,
but Hamas was not yet ready to make "hard decisions."

Recognition: According to Kozlov, Hamas Politburo Chief
Mish'al was clear that Hamas would not recognize Israel soon.
As an interim step, Russia had suggested that Hamas weigh
accepting explicitly the 2002 Beirut Declaration of the Arab
League, in which all Arab states agreed to recognize Israel
if it withdrew to 1967 borders.

Renouncing Violence: Kozlov said Hamas had agreed to
continue the ceasefire for an indeterminate period, but also
noted that the group conditioned observance on Israeli
actions. The MFA suggested to Hamas that if it wanted an
Israeli partner it could eventually work with, it needed to
exercise restraint and avoid provocations in the run-up to
the Israeli elections. If Israel elected a Likud government,
Lavrov suggested, that would make it that much harder for any
Hamas government to succeed.

Prior Agreements: Mish'al noted to FM Lavrov, Kozlov
reported, that prior agreements between the PLO and Israel
had been ultimately unsuccessful. Hamas was reviewing the
agreements to determine what had been useful and served the
interest of the Palestinians.


3. (C) Despite the lack of progress on Quartet principles,
Kozlov said that Hamas had indicated to FM Lavrov that it
wanted the channel with Russia to remain open, without
setting a date for any future meeting. Kozlov said that
Mish'al, who spoke throughout the meeting for the Palestinian
delegation, struck the Russians as a pragmatic politician who
understood accurately the "correlation of forces" that the
Palestinians faced and was ready to adapt to the political
environment. This made Moscow's engagement "on behalf of the
Quartet" worth pursuing.

Mixed Reactions in Moscow
--------------


4. (C) Reaction to the visit from Moscow's Middle East
experts was mixed. Middle Eastern Studies Institute
President and former Russian Jewish Congress President
Yevgeniy Satanovskiy cast the visit as a public relations
"success" for Russia: the GOR positioned itself as a friend
to Arab states and as a counterweight to the U.S. He told us
that Moscow had also won a concession from Hamas by delinking
Chechnya from the larger jihadi cause. (Mish'al had said the
situation in Chechnya is an internal Russian matter.) But on
the peace process itself Satanovskiy sarcastically expressed
optimism in the "30-50 year" time frame. He called Russian
financial investment in the Palestinian Authority
"impossible" and was equally critical of potentially training
Hamas police on Russian territory, observing that
U.S.-trained Afghan fighters later supported al-Qaeda's
terrorists. In his view, "Russia didn't need that!"


5. (C) Oriental Studies Institute Professor Vladimir
Isayev, who has ties to former PM and FM Yevgeniy Primakov,
said "nothing positive" had come from Hamas' visit to Moscow
and noted that Hamas continues touting the same old slogans.

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The visit lent "no additional stimulus" to the peace process
and he predicted only further stagnation in negotiations on
implementing the Road Map. He also said much now depends on
whether Russia is willing to finance the Palestinian
Authority (PA),a prospect he found unlikely. Carnegie's
Scholar-in-Residence Aleksey Malashenko was somewhat more
upbeat, suggesting that inviting Hamas to Moscow had been a
"good idea." But he went on to criticize GOR implementation,
characterizing the visit as poorly organized. Malashenko
thought it would have made sense to conduct preliminary
negotiations before the Palestinians arrived. He also called
the delegation's call on Moscow mufti Ravil Gaynutdin
"stupid." Malashenko said Gaynutdin, whom he knows
personally, is a liberal Muslim and an opponent of Hamas,
therefore that official call sent the wrong message. Mish'al
also met with Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Aleksey II.


6. (SBU) Press coverage of the visit was positive for the
most part. Echoing Satanovskiy, the reformist daily Gazeta
presented Hamas' visit as a diplomatic coup for the Kremlin,
making the familiar argument that the meeting was the message
and that, in Russia, process is often more important than
results. Business-oriented Kommersant also looked favorably
on Russia's role as mediator, but noted that the Hamas
invitation had ignited speculation in the West about the
GOR's motives; the article also questioned the
appropriateness of Hamas' meeting with Patriarch Aleksey II
(who has refused to receive the Pope). Articles in the
moderate dailies Izvestiya and Vedomosti drew attention to
some moderation in Hamas' anti-Israeli rhetoric during the
course of the visit. That said, Izvestiya went on to note
that the visit brought almost no results. The reformist
newspaper Vremya Novostey sounded the theme of Quartet unity,
describing close coordination between President Putin and the
other Quartet leaders as well as German Chancellor Merkel and
Israeli A/PM Olmert.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) The Russian public itself -- or at least the small
segment that pays attention to Russia's foreign policy --
does not appear completely reconciled to efforts by Moscow to
play a greater role in the Middle East as a counterweight to
the U.S. For example, at the outset of an Ekho Moskvy radio
interview with Ambassador Burns on March 2, moderator Aleksey
Venediktov invited the audience to phone in their opinion on
whether Russia should be a partner or competitor with the
U.S. in the Middle East. By the end of the interview 4065
listeners had called in: 65 percent thought Russia should
partner with the U.S. while 35 percent favored competing with
us. While in no way a scientific poll, the results do
reflect concerns also shared by many in the academic
community and some in the media that Russia lacks the
capacity and resources to play a significant role in the
Middle East and that in doing so, it risks causing greater
damage to more significant relationships, especially with the
United States.
RUSSELL