MOSCOW REACTS TO HAMAS VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002212 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV RS SUBJECT: MOSCOW REACTS TO HAMAS VISIT REF: MOSCOW 2134 Classified By: A/POL Mike Klecheski. Reasons: 1.4(B/D). ¶1. Summary: While the MFA was able to point to few concrete results from Foreign Minister Lavrov's March 3 meeting with a Hamas delegation, we were told March 6 by the MFA Middle East Peace Process desk that the Moscow-Hamas channel was likely to remain open. In Moscow's estimation, Hamas Politburo Chief Khaled Mish'al was a pragmatic figure who recognized the need for accommodation with the Quartet if he wanted a Hamas government to be successful. Moscow's think tank community was divided -- while most observers saw the meeting as a coup for Russia's diplomacy, several we spoke to were skeptical that contacts with Hamas would produce results, given limits on Russia's capacity to influence the situation. Press reaction was almost uniformly positive, but at least one informal poll suggests that the informed Russian public has concerns about the role Moscow aspires to in the Middle East. End Summary. MFA Readout -------------- ¶2. (C) On March 6, Sergey Kozlov, who heads the MFA Middle East Department's Peace Process Office, provided us with further details of the talks to supplement the March 3 readout DFM Saltanov and Ambassador Kalugin provided to the Ambassador (reftel). Kozlov emphasized that Moscow had pushed hard on Quartet principles -- recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence and acceptance of prior agreements, but Hamas was not yet ready to make "hard decisions." Recognition: According to Kozlov, Hamas Politburo Chief Mish'al was clear that Hamas would not recognize Israel soon. As an interim step, Russia had suggested that Hamas weigh accepting explicitly the 2002 Beirut Declaration of the Arab League, in which all Arab states agreed to recognize Israel if it withdrew to 1967 borders. Renouncing Violence: Kozlov said Hamas had agreed to continue the ceasefire for an indeterminate period, but also noted that the group conditioned observance on Israeli actions. The MFA suggested to Hamas that if it wanted an Israeli partner it could eventually work with, it needed to exercise restraint and avoid provocations in the run-up to the Israeli elections. If Israel elected a Likud government, Lavrov suggested, that would make it that much harder for any Hamas government to succeed. Prior Agreements: Mish'al noted to FM Lavrov, Kozlov reported, that prior agreements between the PLO and Israel had been ultimately unsuccessful. Hamas was reviewing the agreements to determine what had been useful and served the interest of the Palestinians. ¶3. (C) Despite the lack of progress on Quartet principles, Kozlov said that Hamas had indicated to FM Lavrov that it wanted the channel with Russia to remain open, without setting a date for any future meeting. Kozlov said that Mish'al, who spoke throughout the meeting for the Palestinian delegation, struck the Russians as a pragmatic politician who understood accurately the "correlation of forces" that the Palestinians faced and was ready to adapt to the political environment. This made Moscow's engagement "on behalf of the Quartet" worth pursuing. Mixed Reactions in Moscow -------------- ¶4. (C) Reaction to the visit from Moscow's Middle East experts was mixed. Middle Eastern Studies Institute President and former Russian Jewish Congress President Yevgeniy Satanovskiy cast the visit as a public relations "success" for Russia: the GOR positioned itself as a friend to Arab states and as a counterweight to the U.S. He told us that Moscow had also won a concession from Hamas by delinking Chechnya from the larger jihadi cause. (Mish'al had said the situation in Chechnya is an internal Russian matter.) But on the peace process itself Satanovskiy sarcastically expressed optimism in the "30-50 year" time frame. He called Russian financial investment in the Palestinian Authority "impossible" and was equally critical of potentially training Hamas police on Russian territory, observing that U.S.-trained Afghan fighters later supported al-Qaeda's terrorists. In his view, "Russia didn't need that!" ¶5. (C) Oriental Studies Institute Professor Vladimir Isayev, who has ties to former PM and FM Yevgeniy Primakov, said "nothing positive" had come from Hamas' visit to Moscow and noted that Hamas continues touting the same old slogans. MOSCOW 00002212 002 OF 002 The visit lent "no additional stimulus" to the peace process and he predicted only further stagnation in negotiations on implementing the Road Map. He also said much now depends on whether Russia is willing to finance the Palestinian Authority (PA),a prospect he found unlikely. Carnegie's Scholar-in-Residence Aleksey Malashenko was somewhat more upbeat, suggesting that inviting Hamas to Moscow had been a "good idea." But he went on to criticize GOR implementation, characterizing the visit as poorly organized. Malashenko thought it would have made sense to conduct preliminary negotiations before the Palestinians arrived. He also called the delegation's call on Moscow mufti Ravil Gaynutdin "stupid." Malashenko said Gaynutdin, whom he knows personally, is a liberal Muslim and an opponent of Hamas, therefore that official call sent the wrong message. Mish'al also met with Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Aleksey II. ¶6. (SBU) Press coverage of the visit was positive for the most part. Echoing Satanovskiy, the reformist daily Gazeta presented Hamas' visit as a diplomatic coup for the Kremlin, making the familiar argument that the meeting was the message and that, in Russia, process is often more important than results. Business-oriented Kommersant also looked favorably on Russia's role as mediator, but noted that the Hamas invitation had ignited speculation in the West about the GOR's motives; the article also questioned the appropriateness of Hamas' meeting with Patriarch Aleksey II (who has refused to receive the Pope). Articles in the moderate dailies Izvestiya and Vedomosti drew attention to some moderation in Hamas' anti-Israeli rhetoric during the course of the visit. That said, Izvestiya went on to note that the visit brought almost no results. The reformist newspaper Vremya Novostey sounded the theme of Quartet unity, describing close coordination between President Putin and the other Quartet leaders as well as German Chancellor Merkel and Israeli A/PM Olmert. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The Russian public itself -- or at least the small segment that pays attention to Russia's foreign policy -- does not appear completely reconciled to efforts by Moscow to play a greater role in the Middle East as a counterweight to the U.S. For example, at the outset of an Ekho Moskvy radio interview with Ambassador Burns on March 2, moderator Aleksey Venediktov invited the audience to phone in their opinion on whether Russia should be a partner or competitor with the U.S. in the Middle East. By the end of the interview 4065 listeners had called in: 65 percent thought Russia should partner with the U.S. while 35 percent favored competing with us. While in no way a scientific poll, the results do reflect concerns also shared by many in the academic community and some in the media that Russia lacks the capacity and resources to play a significant role in the Middle East and that in doing so, it risks causing greater damage to more significant relationships, especially with the United States. RUSSELL