SOUTH OSSETIA: DEALING WITH A DYSFUNCTIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 002070 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS RS GG SUBJECT: SOUTH OSSETIA: DEALING WITH A DYSFUNCTIONAL RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN RELATIONSHIP REF: A) TBILISI 399 AND PREV. B) MOSCOW 1934 AND PREV. Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Moscow's approach to Georgia is driven by frustration with Tbilisi's defiant attitude to Russian interests, reflected in its pursuit of NATO membership, its championing of anti-Russian alliances in the neighborhood, its strategy of trying to compensate for Georgia's weakness in one-on-one bargaining with Russia by bringing in the U.S. and the Europeans to level what Moscow sees as a playing field tilted by nature itself in Russia's favor, and Saakashvili's incendiary rhetoric. The resultant GOR policy is stick-heavy and, at best, carrot-lite. Russians see little benefit in facilitating an incorporation of South Ossetia or Abkhazia into Georgia at this time, and find it hard to take seriously Western calls for them to surrender the leverage that the status quo gives them. The constant GOR message is that any resolution of those conflicts can occur only over time and will depend on an "improvement in Georgian-Russian relations," which decodes as demonstrated Georgian deference to key Russian interests. ¶2. (C) The U.S. needs to continue to deliver the message that Russia is overestimating its ability to keep a lid on unstable situations and showing recklessness in playing with fire in a region where it cannot afford a conflagration. We must equally keep Georgia focused on the unacceptability -- as well as the dangers -- of any recourse to force. Most immediately, we should press for a re-launch of contacts at all levels between Georgia and Russia, including a rescheduled visit by PM Noghaideli and a renewal of JCC meetings, as well as progress on demilitarization CBMs and economic links. Any expectation of a "quick fix" would be unrealistic, and our stress should be on promoting concrete steps -- and mutual civility -- that point in a constructive direction. A candid discussion by the Secretary with FM Lavrov next week on the need for Russia to show results, and not just injured national sensibilities, could contribute to the process. We also need to ensure that our voice is not the only one Moscow hears on this issue as the G-8 process moves ahead. END SUMMARY. Russia to Georgia: You Can,t Impugn with Impunity -------------- -------------- �0A; ¶3. (C) Russian policy towards Georgia is based on a near-consensus in the political class that Russia is historically a Great Power entitled to expect -- and, if necessary, to enforce -- a substantial degree of deference to its interests from weaker neighboring countries. The Kremlin feels little need to apologize for an approach that others may see as heavy-handed, but that it sees as vital to Russia's future. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union stripped Russia of protective cocoons that have been progressively occupied by NATO. To forestall further strategic retreat and encirclement, Moscow has not shrunk from direct interference in the internal affairs of its neighbors, including in Georgia through support of separatist movements and internal rebellions. ¶4. (C) Moscow,s feelings of Great Power entitlement and concern about strategic encirclement find nourishment in the actions of the Georgian government. Russia,s political class -- not just Putin and the "siloviki" -- regard Saakashvili,s defiantly non-deferential policies as unacceptable. Seen from Moscow, his championing of implicitly anti-Russian alliances within the neighborhood and his headlong pursuit of accession to NATO are gauntlets flung as a challenge. Russians are also deeply alienated by Saakashvili,s anti-Russian rhetoric, as in his "piling on" during the recent Georgia gas crisis, taking advantage of Russia,s self-inflicted wounds in the earlier Ukraine fiasco. ¶5. (C) Most galling of all to Moscow is the Georgian strategy of trying to compensate for the consequences of being weaker than Russia in any one-on-one bargaining by internationalizing the process, bringing in the U.S. and the Europeans wherever possible to level what Moscow sees as a playing field tilted by nature itself in Russia's favor. MFA 4th CIS Director Kelin told PolMinCouns March 1 that any U.S. effort to "mediate" between Russia and Georgia would not be productive. "We need to settle our differences between ourselves, and will do so when the Georgians realize that the key to the problems does not lie in Washington or Brussels, but in Moscow." This desire to control the playing field was reflected in the GOR,s recent refusal to hold a JCC meeting originally scheduled in Vienna, insisting that Moscow was the only proper venue. ¶6. (C) While Saakashvili has sown irritation with him MOSCOW 00002070 002 OF 004 personally across the entire political spectrum in Russia, his policies in many regards (e.g., with regard to NATO and in the neighborhood) show strong continuity with those of Shevardnadze. At bottom, the Russians have a Georgia problem, not a Saakashvili problem. The Ossetian Occasion -------------- ¶7. (C) Against this backdrop, Russia's heel-dragging in efforts to resolve the South Ossetia problem comes as no surprise. The Kremlin sees zero benefit to its interests -- either politically within Russia or internationally -- coming from steps it is called on to take to facilitate the incorporation of South Ossetia into Georgia in the near term. The Russians tell us consistently that the problem can be resolved only over time and in the context of "improved Georgian-Russian relations." By improved relations, Russia appears to mean that Georgia must generally defer more to Russian interests, and specifically to defer both NATO membership and any NATO/U.S. military bases in Georgia. The hardball message is that Russia can ensure that Georgia will for an indefinite period have unresolved territorial issues that would make NATO membership at best problematic from the Alliance,s perspective, and should foreswear such intentions as a first step to gaining sway over its entire territory. ¶8. (C) This is all stick, no carrot. In our view, Russia has strong domestic reasons (along with general support for a tough line) for its failure to offer any real incentives to the Georgians and for its continued support of the South Ossetians. North Ossetia, with its Christian majority, is the traditional bulwark of Russia in the North Caucasus and the one North Caucasus republic not threatened with an Islamic insurgency. It will continue to demand rewards from Moscow for playing that role. In addition, any steps towards Georgia would be viewed with at least suspicion by the already unstable Kabardians, Cherkess, and Adyge -- all ethnic cousins of the Abkhaz. This leaves aside the issue of particular Russians interests not wanting to give up profits from criminal activities carried out in South Ossetia. ¶9. (C) Recognizing that Saakashvili (and perhaps any Georgian leader) will not make a capitulatory deal, the Russians find a prolongation of the status quo to be the next best option. They find it hard to take at face value U.S. calls for them to give up their present leverage on Georgia for (in their view) no real benefit. The main drawback that they see in the status quo is the possibility of a Georgian attempt to overturn it by force. The proper U.S. role, in Moscow's view, is to suppress any such effort, as we have done in the past. Believing that they -- and we -- can swat Georgia like a fly, they are impervious to arguments that Saakashvili has to "show progress" to "calm the radicals" in his administration or protect his own political interests. ¶10. (C) While the GOR appreciated our efforts to tone down the Georgian Parliament's recent call for the removal of Russian peacekeepers from South Ossetia, it saw the Georgian move as a major provocation, the thinly disguised end of a wedge intended to lead to the replacement of Russian troops with an international (perhaps even NATO) force. It also sees a need to head off a further step in July, when the Georgian Parliament will receive and act on a report on Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia. In Moscow,s view, those threats require a response with blunt instruments: Saakashvili and the Georgian Parliament had to be shown that if they stick their fingers in Moscow's eye, there will be a price to pay. For every further step the Georgians may take (e.g., denying visas to Russian peacekeepers, calling in July for Russian peacekeepers to leave Abkhazia),Moscow will again respond to raise the price to Tbilisi. In our March 1 meeting with 4th CIS director Kelin, he predicted "big trouble" -- he would not qualify that further -- if the current dispute with Georgia over visas for Russian military personnel deployed there is not resolved -- and said (equally without specification) that a satisfactory outcome on the visas could lead to "positive" results. ¶11. (C) Russia's calculations presume that the pot can be kept permanently simmering in South Ossetia, but never boil over. If mutual provocations were to spill over into full-fledged conflict, however, the consequences in a highly unstable region would be unpredictable and could change the calculations of the parties and of the international community. Such a development would highlight the failure of Russia's 14-year-old peacemaking activities and lead to greatly increased pressure to take the "peace process" out of Russian hands. To date, however, Russia has shown the same refusal to tamper with the short-term status quo in South Ossetia that it displays in Belarus and Uzbekistan. MOSCOW 00002070 003 OF 004 The U.S. Role -------------- ¶12. (C) In these conditions, the U.S. must continue to work actively on both sides of the quarrel. With respect to Russia, we are continuing to make clear that the GOR is playing with fire, and that Georgia may become a greater focus of the international community's dealings with Russia unless Moscow takes near-term steps to ensure there is a process in play that holds promise for leading to a settlement. Immediate steps in that direction would include rescheduling the Noghaideli visit, agreement to a follow-on JCC meeting, and some modest CBMs. The Ambassador has already told DFM Karasin that Russia would be wiser to set such steps in motion over the next week (before FM Lavrov's March 6-7 visit to Washington). PolMinCouns made the same point to Kelin March 1 (provoking Kelin's sharp rejection of "U.S. mediation," para 5 above, and an insistence that positive steps were first needed from Georgia, starting with a resolution of the visa issue). We will continue to press the Russians hard on these issues. ¶13. (C) We would recommend that the Secretary have a candid discussion of Georgia with Lavrov in any event. He will likely raise Russian concerns over Georgian "militarization," i.e., the increasing capabilities of Georgia's armed forces thanks to U.S. assistance and training. He needs to understand, however, that while Russia may not be ready to deal on South Ossetia, it cannot dictate the U.S. level of support for Georgia. If Russia will not even support a serious process to ease tensions, it will face increasing attention from the international community. Promoting a European role in that regard will be key as we head towards the April 24 South Ossetia Donors' Conference and the July G-8 Summit. The G-8 process may temper Russian behavior, but only if the U.S. is not the only G-8 member flagging the point. So far, the Europeans are virtually invisible in Moscow on the Georgia issue, and that gives Russia a wide margin of comfort. ¶14. (C) In the months between the Lavrov visit and the G8 Summit, we need to push for across-the-board contacts between Russia and Georgia that enable business to get done. The cancellation of the Noghaideli visit was a counterproductive emotional reaction; the Georgian Embassy here in Moscow believes the decision was taken against the advice of the Russian MFA. If emotions can be toned down enough on both sides, the outlines of a compromise package can be seen: Noghaideli visits Moscow to meet his Russian counterpart but also with Kokoity to kick off and give impetus to a JCC meeting that could make serious progress on demilitarization and on economic issues. Though the Georgians may balk at holding such a meeting in Moscow, we believe it is a reasonable investment -- if Russia takes responsibility for the meeting, it bears more responsibility for showing results, 4th CIS director Kelin told PolMinCouns that the Russians will not insist on Moscow as a JCC venue once emotions cool; he still balked at Vienna, but thought Brussels might be acceptable. ¶15. (C) Demilitarization CBMs are in Russia's own interest, minimzing the likelihood of an outbreak of open warfare. We should press the Russians hard, stressing that the consequences of miscalculation are unpredictable but potentially grave for Russia as well as Georgia. PolMinCouns made that case March 1 to Kelin in support of a positive Russian response to the unilateral Georgian actions to implement its South Ossetian peace plan (ref A). Kelin,s response was that the GOR was unaware of any such Georgian actions, which may have been trumpeted to the West but were not presented to Russia or South Ossetia. (Comment. The Russian MFA has repeatedly complained about Georgia,s propensity to plead its case to the West, rather than to the South Ossetians or Russia. End Comment) ¶16. (C) The U.S. should foster other Georgian-Russian working contacts as well. Russian Envoy Kenyaikin suggested to EUR DAS Bryza that the Interior and Defense Ministers attend a JCC meeting. A Moscow venue for such a meeting might work, if the Georgian Ministers came with PM Noghaideli and were assured of meetings with their Russian counterparts. ¶17. (C) Economic progress on the South Ossetian front may be harder to sell to the Russians, however clear its benefits may be to us and the Georgians. Fortunately, it appears to be Kokoity's first priority. South Ossetia's economy has always depended on smuggling, which had disappeared after the Rose Revolution (Tbilisi 394 quotes PM Noghaideli as saying the smuggling -- including of narcotics and counterfeit money MOSCOW 00002070 004 OF 004 -- is now going strong again, which suggests that Georgian corruption may have reappeared). Several peace proposals to date have called for a "Special Economic Zone" in effect linking the economies of North and South Ossetia to Georgia. (Comment. In our view, such an initiative could create a major fact on the ground promoting a resolution of the conflict within Georgia's borders. It should be a priority through the April 24 Donors' Conference and in the run-up to the G8 Summit. End Comment) ¶18. (C) Economic ties between Russia and Georgia are likewise worth emphasizing and could build constituencies for a less negative relationship. Russia is the leading destination for Georgian mineral water and wine; both GGMW (Borjomi water) and GWS (wine) have enormous positive brand recognition here. GGMW, especially, is a company that has shown it can talk to the Russians (its travails used to form one case studied at the Harvard Business School). A trade delegation of Georgian exporters to Russia might create some positive impetus. Conclusion -------------- ¶19. (C) We see no quick or easy fix to the South Ossetia problem or to broader Russian-Georgian dysfunctionality. A condition for any movement in the right direction will be to make sure Georgian leaders remain focused on the fact that, whatever their frustrations, any military "short-cut" on South Ossetia would be a ride alone into what might quickly prove to be a harrowing dead end. The Russians need to be equally forcefully reminded -- by Europeans as well as Americans -- that they are playing with fire in a region where they cannot afford a conflagration, and that while the U.S. and Europe cannot substitute for Moscow in promoting a resolution, Russia,s claim to be a responsible power depends on its performance in cases where it has the wherewithal to bring conflicts to a peaceful end. BURNS