Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW2020
2006-03-01 15:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

PRESSING RUSSIANS ON HAMAS VISIT

Tags:  PREL PGOV RS 
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DE RUEHMO #2020 0601537
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011537Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1532
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002020 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: PRESSING RUSSIANS ON HAMAS VISIT

REF: A. WELCH/BURNS TELCON 3/1/06


B. MOSCOW 1840

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns, Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002020 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV RS SUBJECT: PRESSING RUSSIANS ON HAMAS VISIT REF: A. WELCH/BURNS TELCON 3/1/06 ¶B. MOSCOW 1840 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns, Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Ambassador spoke separately to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Saltanov and Middle East Envoy Kalugin the evening of February 28, and again on March 1, to stress the importance of sticking firmly to Quartet principles during the Hamas visit to Moscow March 3. Ambassador made clear that any watering down or softening of agreed Quartet conditions would have a very negative effect on the current situation, calling into question Quartet unity, undermining Abu Mazen, and alienating the Israelis during critical pre-election period. ¶2. (C) Both Saltanov and Kalugin insisted that Russia would deliver a clear, direct message to the Hamas delegation, fully consistent with Quartet understandings. Neither expects any breakthroughs. They hope at a minimum to impress upon Hamas the crucial significance of upholding the ceasefire, refraining from violence and terrorism, and showing that they can play a responsible role. The Russians claimed they will underscore that a Hamas-led government must come to grips with the need to recognize Israel, renounce violence, and accept previous agreements. ¶3. (C) Saltanov expects to be the main Russian interlocutor during the discussions with Hamas, although he confirmed that Foreign Minister Lavrov will also meet with them. There will be no meeting with Putin or Kremlin officials. Ambassador stressed the importance of care in crafting any public statements during or after the visit, so that the Quartet principles came across in clear and unadulterated form. Saltanov said he understood. ¶4. (C) Saltanov and Kalugin added that Lavrov hoped to join in a Quartet Principals conference call on March 2, although logistical problems remain given his travels in Hungary and the Czech Republic with Putin, and the Secretary's travels with the President in South Asia. The Kremlin also hopes to hear soon from us on a time for a Putin call to the President on March 4. ¶5. (C) Ambassador also spoke with his Israeli counterpart, who will again convey Israeli concerns to Russians prior to the Hamas visit. The Russians are also attempting to arrange a Putin-Olmert call after the Hamas talks. ¶6. (C) Finally, Ambassador met February 28 with Federation Council International Affairs Committee Chairman Margelov, who said he plans to meet the Hamas delegation during their visit. He insisted that his message would echo the firm line outlined by the Russian MFA. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: The Russians have no doubt about our concerns. We'll see whether they follow through. Continued expressions of concern from Abu Mazen, the Israelis, and other Quartet partners will also be important. BURNS

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