NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR GRAHAM'S MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000018 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV RS SUBJECT: NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR GRAHAM'S MEETING WITH KREMLIN'S MODEST KOLEROV REF: A. 05 MOSCOW 5588 ¶B. 05 MOSCOW 3317 Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary. NSC Senior Director Thomas Graham met December 21 with Modest Kolerov, who was named several months ago to run a new Kremlin directorate dealing with Russia's ties to its neighbors. Kolerov rejected the notion that the U.S. and Russia should engage in a dialogue on Russia's neighborhood. He saw the U.S. role in the region in largely negative terms, noting that the practical results of U.S. diplomacy potentially included greater extremism in Central Asia, tacit support for Georgian efforts to ethnically cleanse South Ossetia, and a ruined Ukrainian economy. He said the USG uses the region as a laboratory to promote our global agenda, but missteps could have tragic results for Russia while they little affect the U.S. Kolerov, a self-described "isolationist," saw only negative effects of globalization for Russia and thought the consequences of instability in the post-Soviet space were largely Russia's business. He rebuffed Graham's arguments that the lessons of 9/11 were clear, that terrorism and extremism anywhere in the world were a problem for all nations, including the U.S. Kolerov described Russia's global interests, beyond its own region, as largely commercial. Kolerov, who comes from an academic and journalistic background, clearly represents those in the GOR who believe Russia should solve Russia's problems -- including with her neighbors -- without outside "interference." End Summary. ¶2. (C) Modest Kolerov, Head of the Presidential Administration's Directorate for Interregional and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries -- a unit created in March 2005, and widely viewed as an attempt to reverse the Kremlin's missteps in Ukraine and elsewhere in the CIS -- met December 21 with NSC Senior Director Thomas Graham in Moscow. Kolerov told Graham he thought Russia and the U.S. have the same main goal in the former Soviet space, namely to combat the spread of extremism and terrorism. But ever since the U.S. decided to widen the list to include our "global priorities," he personally believed, we began to run into conflict with Russia. While Graham encouraged Kolerov to recognize the importance of the U.S. and Russia understanding each others' �00A;interests in the region, Kolerov asked Graham to imagine how the U.S. would react if Moscow demanded the U.S. and Russia come to a common understanding of our respective interests in Mexico. ¶3. (C) Kolerov accused the U.S. of involvement in the region to use it as a laboratory for U.S. "experiments." The consequences of mistakes the U.S. may make in performing those experiments were only theoretical to us, he said, while to Russia they could be tragic. Russia suffers -- either immediately or down the road -- by the imposition of Western modes and solutions, be they imposed in Afghanistan or in the Baltics. Graham disputed the notion that Russia's neighborhood is its own business or that its ills have no consequences for the rest of the world. September 11 proved that the U.S. had to follow and react to events worldwide. While Graham argued for the value of a U.S.-Russia dialogue on the region, Kolerov insisted the only thing to discuss was the "limits on your activities." ¶4. (C) Kolerov firmly rejected any consideration of global interests in the CIS and called himself an "isolationist." He said the region was still encumbered by a Soviet mentality and constituted a burden for Russia, but it was Russia that had to solve the problems. Graham said globalization was a fact that would continue to impact on Russia,s neighborhood. Kolerov, saying he was "not a diplomat," called globalization a "huge burden" for Russia because it had brought with it uncontrollable illegal migration. He said Russia needed to find a legal basis for dealing with the inflow of people from other former Soviet republics, and insisted it was not a political issue. Regarding how Russia should interact in the world, Kolerov said "we were weak, we took a day off; now in the twenty-first century we must protect our own house." ¶5. (C) Kolerov called potential Ukrainian entry into NATO "death for Ukrainian industry," which Russia did not want. European integration offered no great benefits for Ukraine, only negative consequences. He said only the western oblasts of Ukraine were ready for European integration, and only because they have no industry. Graham argued that Russia itself bore some responsibility for the fate of Ukrainian industry, by using the leverage of gas deliveries. Kolerov, who pointedly noted that he had played no role at all in the events of fall 2004 in Ukraine, said that the psychology of MOSCOW 00000018 002 OF 003 the authorities there had not changed at all. On Belarus, Kolerov insisted Russia does not consider its neighbor through an imperial lens, but rather exactly as the U.S. views Mexico and Canada. ¶6. (C) Continuing his discussion of Russia's neighbors, Kolerov decried "Georgian radicals" who could in the future advocate ethnic cleansing of South Ossetians. Asking rhetorically where South Ossetians would flee, he noted that Russia would end up with a more complicated situation in North Ossetia. He accused the U.S. of exacerbating the situation through its close ties to Georgia. Kolerov raised the issue of U.S. bases in Georgia and said U.S. bases in Georgia did not constitute "cooperation." When Graham firmly denied that the U.S. had plans to base troops in Georgia, Kolerov pointed to the planned presence of U.S. troops in Romania and called it "a matter of definition." ¶7. (C) Graham raised Central Asia, asking how Russia would react to an explosion in the Ferghana Valley, and arguing that the U.S. and Russia have much to contribute to stability through cooperation. In response, Kolerov blamed the U.S. and the West for tensions in the region and suggested that Western grants helped fund extremism. He called "external influences" in Central Asia destructive and said the "so-called" democratic movements in Central Asia are only fronts for narco-trafficking. Kolerov again accused the U.S. of having no basis for being involved in the region; in contrast, he said, Russia views Central Asian nations like family. There were, for instance, 500,000 Kyrgyz living in Russia. Graham noted the large number of Russians living in the U.S. Kolerov complained that emigres from the CIS to the U.S. were talented and smart; they left behind the less educated and poor. ¶8. (C) On Chechnya, Kolerov accused the U.S. of a double standard in demanding that Russia solve an internal problem in the way we preferred, and asked whether we demanded the same of Spain in its conflict with the Basques and of France as it dealt with the Corsicans. Graham said that we of course encourage others to solve their problems, but said the international community could help with the conflict in Chechnya. He offered that the U.S. might even have useful suggestions, based on our experience in Iraq. ¶9. (C) Kolerov narrowly defined Russia's global interests. He saw Russian interests in Africa, and Latin and South America, for example, as largely commercial. He did allow, however, that, in Russia, politics and business are more closely connected than in the U.S. Kolerov decried the "Anglo-Saxon tradition" of seeking to legitimize political positions through whatever means available. He said most Russians do not understand that that is the way the U.S. tries to seek political advantage, but he understands. He said he had been invited many times to speak at seminars or attend other events in the U.S., and he always refuses. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Since Kolerov's directorate was created, it has been unclear to us exactly what he does. References to him in the Russian press this fall -- his trip to Latvia to articulate Russian impatience with the term "occupation" and to keep up the drumbeat about violations of ethnic Russians' rights, and his keynoting November's "Parallel CIS" (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh) conference in Moscow -- reinforce the notion that the Kremlin sees him as an advocate for Russia and Russians in the CIS region -- and not as a negotiator, problem-solver, or a key decision-maker. ¶11. (C) Besides his disdain for participating in discussions in the U.S., Kolerov apparently has no use for Russian critics either. When asked if he had found a quotation (which he cited at the beginning of the meeting) from one of Graham's speeches in a recent article by Moscow Carnegie Center scholar Liliya Shevtsova, he said dismissively that he did not read anything she wrote. Kolerov embodies the view, not uncommon in today's Russia, that Russia can solve its own problems and that U.S. and Western "interference" in Russia or the broader region on its borders works against Russian interests, creating instability, drug trafficking, and extremism that threaten the Russian body politic. ¶12. (C) In parting, Kolerov gave Graham a selection of literature, which he said he helped publish. The books included: "Georgia: Ethnic Cleansing in Relation to Ossetia," "Non-citizens in Estonia," "The Setu People: Between Russia and Estonia," "Around Chechnya: Is Russia's Rear Secure in the North Caucasus?" "The Lusatian Question and MOSCOW 00000018 003 OF 003 Czechoslovakia, 1945-48," and "The Russian Guide to Historical Research on Russia in the 19th and 20th Centuries." The titles reflect the thrust of the outreach effort that Kolerov and his office are trying to intensify. ¶13. (U) Senior Director Graham has cleared this cable. BURNS