HAMAS VISIT TO MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001637


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2014
TAGS: PREL RS
SUBJECT: HAMAS VISIT TO MOSCOW

REF: A. MOSCOW 1323

B. MOSCOW

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affiars
Kirk Augustine, for reasons 1.4 (B & D)



1. (C) SUMMARY. A/DCM met February 17 with MFA Middle East
and North Africa Director Sergey Vershinin to follow up on
earlier discussion (reftel) on the forthcoming visit of a
Hamas delegation to Russia, which will take place March 3.
....

END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Timing and Level. Vershinin noted that an MFA
announcement had said the Hamas visit would take place "at
the beginning of March," but he could not yet provide a
specific date. He was confident, howevere, that it would
take place before FM Lavrov's March 6-7 visit to Washington.
(Note. In a separate telcon, Russian Middle East envoy
Aleksandr Kalugin told Ambassador the Hamas visit was now
expected to take place March 3. End Note) A final decision
had not yet been taken, Vershinin said, about the level at
which the Hamas delegation would be received, but he expected
the "substantive" discussions to be led on the Russian side
by DFM Saltanov. (Comment. We expect FM Lavrov will also
meet with the Hamas delegation, especially in light of the
February 16 meeting of Turkish FM Gul with a Hamas delegation
led by Khaled Mashaal. End Comment)


3. (C) Purpose. Vershinin said Russia would use the visit
to present Quartet views to Hamas unequivocally, and would
inform the U.S. shortly thereafter of the results of the
discussions. He repeatedly stressed the GOR's desire to
bring about acceptance by Hamas of a "continuity of
Palestinian obligations." Although the Russian mission in
Ramallah had had some contacts with Hamas members holding
positions in the Palestinian Authority, such meetings had
dealt with them as local government officials, not as Hamas
representatives. The Moscow visit would provide the first
contact between Russia and Hamas "at a decision-making
level." Asked whether Russia had consulted with Palestinian
Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) about the Hamas
visit, Vershinin said only that Abu Mazen was "positive"
about the visit.


4. (C) Russia did not conceive the forthcoming discussions
as "negotiations," but rather as an opportunity to influence
internal Hamas thinking towards accepting the continuity of
Palestinian obligations. He believed there had already been
"many contradictions" in Hamas' approach, and it was now
confronting a new reality that would inevitably put more
stress on a disparate membership. Many Hamas members were
"pragmatists who do not live in the sky." Asked whether the
GOR had considered how it would react if initial meetings
with Hamas led to no evolution in its positions, Vershinin
said Russia was taking a "realistic" approach. Hamas would,
at best, not change "overnight." The meeting in Moscow was
not a one-off event from which immediate results were
expected, but rather the start of a process.


5. (C) Assistance. A/DCM noted a February 13 interview with
Russian UN Permrep Denisov, who had said that "any ban on the
provision of international financial assistance to the
Palestinians would be counterproductive," and asked how such
statements related to the Quartet's agreement that future
assistance to any new (Palestinian) government would be
reviewed by donors" against its commitment to nonviolence,
recognition of Israel and acceptance of prior Palestinian
obligations. Vershinin said it was not clear yet what the
composition or policies of the new Palestinian government
would be. It would be up to every donor to review those
developments and to determine whether it would stop or reduce
its assistance, or differentiate in its humanitarian,
financial and military assistance. This was a subject for
discussion within the Quartet.


6. (C) Vershinin acknowledged the February 16 public
statement of Yuriy Baluyevskiy, Chief of the Russian General
Staff, who had said that delivery of military goods would be
put on hold until the new Palestinian government was
constituted, after which decisions would be made. Vershinin
agreed that the provision of any military assistance would
"depend on the evolution of the situation" -- and, he added,
the views of the Israeli government. Russia would not
provide assistance that would undermine Israel's security.
(Note. Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister
Sergey Ivanov told the press February 17 that "any supply of
(military) technology to the Palestinians can be implemented
only with Israel's agreement and through its territory." End
Note)


7. (C) Comment. Like other GOR officials, Vershinin
insisted that Putin's invitation to Hamas was consistent with
Quartet undertakings and was intended to promote them. He
also stressed that the GOR wants to consult closely with the
U.S. as the process goes forward. Referring to the
Secretary's forthcoming visit to the Middle East, he said it
would be important for Moscow to have a clear understanding
of the results of her discussions as the Hamas visit and
Lavrov's subsequent trip to Washington approach.


BURNS