GEORGIA-RUSSIA: AMBASSADOR PRESSES DFM KARASIN FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001635

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS GG RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA-RUSSIA: AMBASSADOR PRESSES DFM KARASIN FOR
CONSTRUCTIVE RUSSIAN STEPS

REF: A) TEFFT/BURNS TELCON 2/17 B) MOSCOW 1536 C)

TBILISI 329 D) TBILISI 283 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador on February 17 outlined to DFM
Karasin ongoing U.S. efforts to encourage Georgian restraint
on South Ossetia, and urged Russia to act constructively.
Ambassador expressed appreciation for FM Lavrov's recent
message to the Secretary, and said he expected a formal reply
shortly. Karasin acknowledged U.S. efforts with the
Georgians and called for continued cooperation between the
U.S. and Russia. Ambassador stressed the need for
communication: a JCC meeting and a successful visit by
Georgian PM Noghaideli. Karasin stuck to Russia's insistence
on a meeting in Moscow (perhaps not of the JCC per se) as a
preparation for the PM's visit -- which he said was still
"firmly" on the calendar. Ambassador stressed that Russia
should reciprocate Georgian confidence-building measures,
both to strengthen the hand of moderates in Tbilisi and also
to boost America's credibility in influencing the Georgians.
Ambassador and Karasin also discussed Black Sea Fleet
negotiations with Ukraine and elections in Belarus. END
SUMMARY.

U.S. Position
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador outlined ongoing U.S. efforts with Georgia
and pushed DFM Karasin for similar restraint and constructive
Russian steps. He noted that he expected to be able to
convey a reply from the Secretary to FM Lavrov's recent
message shortly, but wanted in the meantime to review our
main concerns. He added that we are concerned that emotions
are running high on all sides of the South Ossetia issue. We
needed to strengthen the moderate voices in Tbilisi, and to
do so it was important to get the parties to engage in the
JCC that had been scheduled for Vienna. We understood that
Russia now wanted to change the venue to Moscow, and possibly
to lower the level to that of deputy Co-Chairs, but we also
understood that the Georgians are not interested in either
variant. We hoped that Moscow would reconsider its
insistence on a Moscow JCC. If it turned out to be premature
to hold a JCC it might unfortunately make more sense to take
some time out. We very much hoped, though, that Georgian PM
Noghaideli's visit would take place. Noghaideli's was one of
the moderate voices that needed to be strengthened, and the
visit could do some good.


3. (C) Ambassador said the U.S. and Europeans had pushed
Georgia hard on unilateral confidence-building measures in
demilitarization. The Georgians had agreed to take many of
these CBMs. We urged Russia to consider steps of its own,
for example withdrawing forces and equipment unlawfully
present in the Zone of Conflict, and allowing international
monitoring of the Roki Tunnel. Such moves would contribute
to easing tensions and would strengthen some voices in
Georgia that needed to show moderation was an effective
strategy. It also added to U.S. credibility when we urged
moderation on the Georgians.

Russian Response
--------------


4. (C) Karasin replied that Lavrov greatly appreciated his
communication with the Secretary and highly valued the level
of mutual trust they have developed, which had shown results.
Russia perceived the effects of U.S. influence on the
Georgian leadership, which has had concrete results. The
Resolution adopted by the Georgian Parliament on February 15
was qualitatively different from the one adopted in October
of last year -- softer in tone, and not as categorical.
Russia knew of Ambassador Tefft's work in Tbilisi, and the
close cooperation of Ambassador Kenyaikin (who was sitting
next to Karasin) with DAS Bryza.


5. (C) With regard to the JCC, Karasin said, the situation
was "interesting." Public opinion and the mood of Russia's
political class had changed qualitatively following the
Georgian resolution. In such a climate, he said, "We cannot
go far from the centers of decisionmaking." Vienna is not
the place to hold such a meeting. This was discussed
February 16 with Georgian State Minister Khaindrava, and the
proposal was being considered in Tbilisi. Russia had not yet
received an answer from Georgia. Moscow would provide a
better nurturing of the political atmosphere than anywhere in
Europe. Kenyaikin added that given the new situation, the
Russians would have to convene a meeting in Moscow anyway,
even if the Georgians absented themselves and only the North
and South Ossetians attended. Karasin said that a possible
solution might be a "consultation" with the JCC Co-Chairs --

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not a meeting of the JCC itself -- in Moscow as one part of
the preparations for the Noghaideli visit.


6. (C) As to the Noghaideli visit, Karasin said, it was
still "firmly" on the calendar -- though of course a week was
a long time in Georgian politics. If a meeting of JCC chairs
took place first, the visit would flow more naturally and
have a greater chance of success, he added. Karasin's
presentation was punctuated by a long discursus from
Kenyaikin on the "consistently hardening position" of Georgia
over the last year and a half, and the "consistently more
open position" of Kokoity during that time.

Stressing the Fundamentals
--------------


7. (C) Ambassador answered Karasin's points by stressing
that there are two separate but related issues: one is the
issue of process and venue, and the other was finding modest,
concrete steps that would help defuse tensions and promote a
settlement. CBMs from the Russian side would encourage
Georgia to set aside its suspicions of Moscow. Kenyaikin
engaged in another discursus on an "un-noticed" CBM already
in effect, the process of mutual inspections. Both sides
have allowed inspections of their deployments, and when one
excess "Zenit" air defense system was found in the South
Ossetian holdings, it was withdrawn. The Georgians were
looking for CBMs such as the removal of trenches. Kenyaikin
was sure that talks with Kokoity would be productive.
Kenyaikin looked forward to meeting in Tskhinvali with
Ambassadors to Georgia from the U.S., UK, France and Germany
-- after the JCC meeting.


8. (C) Karasin finished the Russian response by saying that
a gradual, step-by-step approach was the best, despite
Georgian desire to accomplish everything at once. A meeting
in Moscow, he said, would be one important step. Ambassador
said the U.S. will continue its dialogue with Georgia, and
repeated our hope that PM Noghaideli would have a successful
visit and that Russia would implement its own CBMs.


9. (C) Later on February 17, Ambassador reviewed the same
points with Russian Security Council Deputy Nikolay Spasskiy.
Ambassador also discussed state of play with German, UK, and
French Ambassadors, urging them also to weigh in with the GOR.

Black Sea Fleet
--------------


10. (C) Ambassador asked Karasin for a readout on the Black
Sea Fleet talks in Ukraine February 14. Karasin said they
had been timely and useful. The last such meeting had been
two and a half years before. All basic issues had been
settled back in 1997, but a number of secondary issues had
built up since then, such as how the personnel would live,
how weaponry would be moved, and standards for inventories.
They set up five working groups that would start work in
March. The work had been professional, and had removed
"nervousness and emotionality: slowly, common sense is
coming to the surface." Karasin ventured a few observations
on the upcoming Rada elections -- that the Party of Regions
seems a little ahead, but that the electorate is very
changeable.

Belarus Elections
--------------


11. (C) Ambassador asked about the elections in Belarus,
noting that A/S Fried had still not been allowed to visit.
Karasin regretted this, because it would have been
interesting both for the Belarusians and Americans. He had
himself been surprised to find that Belarus was not the
"horrible totalitarian regime" it had been billed as, and he
thought that when things quieted down after the elections,
Lukashenka would lead the political process in the "right
direction." Ambassador noted that that would show instincts
that Lukashenka has concealed very effectively so far.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Karasin gave no indication that the Russians will go
to Vienna for the next JCC meeting, at least not in February.
They seem dug in on this. Our best course, it appears from
here, is to allow the JCC to take some time out (which would
have no material effect on the peace process) and push
hardest to ensure that the Noghaideli visit goes through. We
have to recognize that the warnings about provocative
confrontations on the ground could take material shape at any
time, and we should continue to press the Georgians as hard
as we can not to rise to the bait. In the meantime, we will

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keep pushing here for Russia to show that it too is capable
of acting responsibly.
BURNS