GEORGIA-RUSSIA: AMBASSADOR PRESSES DFM KARASIN FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001635 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS GG RS SUBJECT: GEORGIA-RUSSIA: AMBASSADOR PRESSES DFM KARASIN FOR CONSTRUCTIVE RUSSIAN STEPS REF: A) TEFFT/BURNS TELCON 2/17 B) MOSCOW 1536 C) TBILISI 329 D) TBILISI 283 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador on February 17 outlined to DFM Karasin ongoing U.S. efforts to encourage Georgian restraint on South Ossetia, and urged Russia to act constructively. Ambassador expressed appreciation for FM Lavrov's recent message to the Secretary, and said he expected a formal reply shortly. Karasin acknowledged U.S. efforts with the Georgians and called for continued cooperation between the U.S. and Russia. Ambassador stressed the need for communication: a JCC meeting and a successful visit by Georgian PM Noghaideli. Karasin stuck to Russia's insistence on a meeting in Moscow (perhaps not of the JCC per se) as a preparation for the PM's visit -- which he said was still "firmly" on the calendar. Ambassador stressed that Russia should reciprocate Georgian confidence-building measures, both to strengthen the hand of moderates in Tbilisi and also to boost America's credibility in influencing the Georgians. Ambassador and Karasin also discussed Black Sea Fleet negotiations with Ukraine and elections in Belarus. END SUMMARY. U.S. Position -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador outlined ongoing U.S. efforts with Georgia and pushed DFM Karasin for similar restraint and constructive Russian steps. He noted that he expected to be able to convey a reply from the Secretary to FM Lavrov's recent message shortly, but wanted in the meantime to review our main concerns. He added that we are concerned that emotions are running high on all sides of the South Ossetia issue. We needed to strengthen the moderate voices in Tbilisi, and to do so it was important to get the parties to engage in the JCC that had been scheduled for Vienna. We understood that Russia now wanted to change the venue to Moscow, and possibly to lower the level to that of deputy Co-Chairs, but we also understood that the Georgians are not interested in either variant. We hoped that Moscow would reconsider its insistence on a Moscow JCC. If it turned out to be premature to hold a JCC it might unfortunately make more sense to take some time out. We very much hoped, though, that Georgian PM Noghaideli's visit would take place. Noghaideli's was one of the moderate voices that needed to be strengthened, and the visit could do some good. ¶3. (C) Ambassador said the U.S. and Europeans had pushed Georgia hard on unilateral confidence-building measures in demilitarization. The Georgians had agreed to take many of these CBMs. We urged Russia to consider steps of its own, for example withdrawing forces and equipment unlawfully present in the Zone of Conflict, and allowing international monitoring of the Roki Tunnel. Such moves would contribute to easing tensions and would strengthen some voices in Georgia that needed to show moderation was an effective strategy. It also added to U.S. credibility when we urged moderation on the Georgians. Russian Response -------------- ¶4. (C) Karasin replied that Lavrov greatly appreciated his communication with the Secretary and highly valued the level of mutual trust they have developed, which had shown results. Russia perceived the effects of U.S. influence on the Georgian leadership, which has had concrete results. The Resolution adopted by the Georgian Parliament on February 15 was qualitatively different from the one adopted in October of last year -- softer in tone, and not as categorical. Russia knew of Ambassador Tefft's work in Tbilisi, and the close cooperation of Ambassador Kenyaikin (who was sitting next to Karasin) with DAS Bryza. ¶5. (C) With regard to the JCC, Karasin said, the situation was "interesting." Public opinion and the mood of Russia's political class had changed qualitatively following the Georgian resolution. In such a climate, he said, "We cannot go far from the centers of decisionmaking." Vienna is not the place to hold such a meeting. This was discussed February 16 with Georgian State Minister Khaindrava, and the proposal was being considered in Tbilisi. Russia had not yet received an answer from Georgia. Moscow would provide a better nurturing of the political atmosphere than anywhere in Europe. Kenyaikin added that given the new situation, the Russians would have to convene a meeting in Moscow anyway, even if the Georgians absented themselves and only the North and South Ossetians attended. Karasin said that a possible solution might be a "consultation" with the JCC Co-Chairs -- MOSCOW 00001635 002 OF 003 not a meeting of the JCC itself -- in Moscow as one part of the preparations for the Noghaideli visit. ¶6. (C) As to the Noghaideli visit, Karasin said, it was still "firmly" on the calendar -- though of course a week was a long time in Georgian politics. If a meeting of JCC chairs took place first, the visit would flow more naturally and have a greater chance of success, he added. Karasin's presentation was punctuated by a long discursus from Kenyaikin on the "consistently hardening position" of Georgia over the last year and a half, and the "consistently more open position" of Kokoity during that time. Stressing the Fundamentals -------------- ¶7. (C) Ambassador answered Karasin's points by stressing that there are two separate but related issues: one is the issue of process and venue, and the other was finding modest, concrete steps that would help defuse tensions and promote a settlement. CBMs from the Russian side would encourage Georgia to set aside its suspicions of Moscow. Kenyaikin engaged in another discursus on an "un-noticed" CBM already in effect, the process of mutual inspections. Both sides have allowed inspections of their deployments, and when one excess "Zenit" air defense system was found in the South Ossetian holdings, it was withdrawn. The Georgians were looking for CBMs such as the removal of trenches. Kenyaikin was sure that talks with Kokoity would be productive. Kenyaikin looked forward to meeting in Tskhinvali with Ambassadors to Georgia from the U.S., UK, France and Germany -- after the JCC meeting. ¶8. (C) Karasin finished the Russian response by saying that a gradual, step-by-step approach was the best, despite Georgian desire to accomplish everything at once. A meeting in Moscow, he said, would be one important step. Ambassador said the U.S. will continue its dialogue with Georgia, and repeated our hope that PM Noghaideli would have a successful visit and that Russia would implement its own CBMs. ¶9. (C) Later on February 17, Ambassador reviewed the same points with Russian Security Council Deputy Nikolay Spasskiy. Ambassador also discussed state of play with German, UK, and French Ambassadors, urging them also to weigh in with the GOR. Black Sea Fleet -------------- ¶10. (C) Ambassador asked Karasin for a readout on the Black Sea Fleet talks in Ukraine February 14. Karasin said they had been timely and useful. The last such meeting had been two and a half years before. All basic issues had been settled back in 1997, but a number of secondary issues had built up since then, such as how the personnel would live, how weaponry would be moved, and standards for inventories. They set up five working groups that would start work in March. The work had been professional, and had removed "nervousness and emotionality: slowly, common sense is coming to the surface." Karasin ventured a few observations on the upcoming Rada elections -- that the Party of Regions seems a little ahead, but that the electorate is very changeable. Belarus Elections -------------- ¶11. (C) Ambassador asked about the elections in Belarus, noting that A/S Fried had still not been allowed to visit. Karasin regretted this, because it would have been interesting both for the Belarusians and Americans. He had himself been surprised to find that Belarus was not the "horrible totalitarian regime" it had been billed as, and he thought that when things quieted down after the elections, Lukashenka would lead the political process in the "right direction." Ambassador noted that that would show instincts that Lukashenka has concealed very effectively so far. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Karasin gave no indication that the Russians will go to Vienna for the next JCC meeting, at least not in February. They seem dug in on this. Our best course, it appears from here, is to allow the JCC to take some time out (which would have no material effect on the peace process) and push hardest to ensure that the Noghaideli visit goes through. We have to recognize that the warnings about provocative confrontations on the ground could take material shape at any time, and we should continue to press the Georgians as hard as we can not to rise to the bait. In the meantime, we will MOSCOW 00001635 003 OF 003 keep pushing here for Russia to show that it too is capable of acting responsibly. BURNS