GEORGIA-RUSSIA: EXPECT SHARP RUSSIAN REACTION TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001435

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA-RUSSIA: EXPECT SHARP RUSSIAN REACTION TO
GEORGIAN DEMAND TO WITHDRAW PKF

REF: BRYZA/BURNS E-MAIL OF FEBRUARY 14

Classified By: A/DCM Kirk Augustine. Reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. In the absence of DFM Karasin from Moscow,
A/DCM spoke with MFA 4th CIS Department Director Andrey Kelin
to emphasize the efforts the USG has been making to moderate
Georgian parliamentary action on CIS peacekeepers in South
Ossetia (per ref e-mail request). Kelin took careful note of
the information, said the GOR was receiving "different
versions" of what action the Georgian parliament would take
on February 15, and would follow developments closely. He
added that the Georgians had been clearly warned about the
negative consequences of "provocative" actions. In a
separate conversation earlier on February 14, MFA Georgia
Office Director Grigoryev stressed to poloff that the
Russians would likely come out with a strongly negative
reaction to what they expect to be in the resolution. The
planned February 27-28 visit of PM Noghaideli would be in
jeopardy. We stressed that the U.S. has been working hard
with the Georgians to give the GOG maximum flexibility.
Grigoryev asked whether the Georgians had any ideas for
moving forward beyond the resolution. If the Russians
themselves have any ideas, neither Kelin nor Kelin shared
them. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) A/DCM spoke late on February 14 with 4th CIS
Department Director Kelin, informing him of the efforts
Ambassador Tefft had been making in Tbilisi to moderate
Georgian actions. He noted in particular (per ref e-mail)
that Amb. Tefft had been pushing for the resolution to give
the government time and to tie any decision to the South
Ossetian peace plan, to make a statement on the non-use of
force, to make a statement on the need to reconcile the
Georgian and Kokoity's peace plans, and to undertake
unilateral steps on demilitarization. A/DCM added that Amb.
Tefft had been told February 14 that the resolution would not
call for the immediate removal of the CIS peacekeepers and
would give the Georgian government time to find a resolution
to the problem. A/DCM urged that the GOR avoid
over-reactions to whatever parliamentary action is taken.


3. (C) Kelin expressed appreciation for the U.S. efforts,
which he carefully noted. He said the GOR would await
developments in the parliament and especially the reaction of
the Georgian government. He noted that he had recently
returned from Tbilisi, where he had clearly warned his
Georgian interlocutors about the potential consequences of
any rash or "provocative" actions. The GOR was receiving
"different versions" from Georgian political figures about
the likely actions of the parliament and government, and it
could not confirm that no call would be made for the
immediate removal of CIS peacekeepers from South Ossetia.


4. (C) In a separate meeting earlier on February 14 (prior
to the receipt of ref e-mail),a gloomy MFA Georgia Office
Director Grigoryev told poloff that the Georgian
parliamentary resolution would surely pass February 15.
"Then what?" he asked. "Do the Georgians have a plan beyond
the resolution? What do they expect to happen, even if the
deadline is extended a month?" Poloff briefed him on U.S.
efforts with the Georgians to ensure that parliamentary
action give maximum flexibility to the GOG. We noted that we
had pressed the Georgians on ideas discussed by DAS Bryza and
Russian envoy Kenyaikin in Brussels February 6, including
statements on the non-use of force, work on demilitarization,
and progress on a workplan on which both the Georgians and
South Ossetians can take ownership. We said Ambassador Tefft
and other Western Ambassadors had met with DefMin Okruashvili
and later with President Saakashvili on those issues. We
noted that the Georgians had been asking for some sign of
progress to show that this "frozen conflict" was not, in
fact, frozen.


5. (C) Asked about the likely GOR reaction to the expected
February 15 Georgian parliamentary action, Grigoryev stressed
that "it would not be positive." He said Georgian State
Minister Khaindrava had asked to visit Moscow February 16 and
would meet with DFM Karasin. The JCC in Vienna was expected
to go ahead February 21. However, the planned visit of PM
Noghaideli to Moscow on February 27-28 might be in jeopardy,
though the MFA would recommend that it go ahead as planned.
There were "certain forces in Moscow," he noted, who wanted
Russia to "slam the door" and stop all talks with the
Georgians. The MFA would resist those forces, though their
influence might at least limit the agenda for Noghaideli's
visit.


6. (C) Grigoryev said that recemt statements by Georgian
President Saakashvili had "been the last straw" in poisoning
the atmosphere between Russia and Georgia. Asked about the

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exchange of insults between Alksnis and Khaindrava, Grigoryev
said he had no devotion to Alksnis, and Khaindrava's
statements were clearly directed at the segment of Russian
opinion that Alksnis represented. Asked about the
implication in FonMin Lavrov's oral message to Secretary Rice
that the Georgians were responsible for the January
explosions in the Russian gas and electricity lines feeding
Georgia, Grigoryev noted only that it was a closed message
and not meant for the Georgians. Poloff urged that the
Russians be restrained in all their public statements.
Grigoryev reiterated that the Russian government had tried to
be restrained in the last few days, but he expected the
Georgian parliamentary action of February 15 would only
worsen the atmosphere.


7. (C) Comment. All that the Russians appear able to see in
the Georgian Parliament's expected action, it appears, is the
latest in what they regard as a series of Georgian insults to
Russia, and they are prepared for the worst. If the
resolution comes out better than they expect, they will be
pleasantly surprised, but it will probably be up to the
Georgians -- starting with Khaindrava on February 16 -- to
re-focus the GOR on concrete issues, rather than on
resentment for perceived past wrongs. If the GOR has any
concrete plans to turn the situation in a positive direction,
neither Kelin not Grigoryev hinted at their existence.
BURNS