PRESSING RUSSIA FOR RESTRAINT ON GEORGIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001324

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2016
TAGS: PREL MASS PBTS GG RS
SUBJECT: PRESSING RUSSIA FOR RESTRAINT ON GEORGIA

REF: A. DAS BRYZA 2/10 E-MAIL

B. MOSCOW 1045

MOSCOW 00001324 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4(B & D).


1. (C) Summary: In a February 9 meeting with Chief of
Defense General Baluyevskiy, Ambassador Burns urged that
Russia exercise restraint in its dealings with Georgia.
Baluyevksiy was blunt in complaining about Georgian demands
to withdraw peacekeepers from Georgia and charged Tbilisi
with interference in the implementation of the May 2005
military withdrawal agreement.

-- Ambassador updated DFM Karasin February 10 on U.S. efforts
to work with the Georgian leadership to ease tensions, and
pressed again for Russian restraint. Karasin repeated
concerns about possible Georgian Parliament action, but
acknowledged U.S. efforts and previewed the oral message that
FM Lavrov planned to send Secretary Rice.

-- During February 9 consultations, DFM Grushko told PDAS
Volker that the Kosovo settlement would inevitably set a
precedent for the resolution of Georgia's separatist
conflicts. PDAS Volker explained why the U.S. viewed Kosovo
as a unique situation.

-- MFA 4th CIS Department (Caucasus) Director Kelin provided
a readout of his February 6-7 talks in Tbilisi -- his message
was that Russia did not seek to aggravate the situation in
South Ossetia, but had no intention of withdrawing its
peacekeepers.

-- DFM Grushko said Moscow was planning on hosting Georgian
PM Noghaideli at the end of the month and hoped to avoid
violent incidents in the interim. He dismissed any role for
outside peacekeepers or mediators in the South Ossetian
conflict. Volker said the U.S. was ready to be helpful --
through the OSCE or directly -- to encourage a political
resolution and urged that Russia continue to engage with
Georgia on concrete, positive steps for a settlement.

End Summary.
.
BALUYEVSKIY AND KARASIN: GEORGIANS MAKING RASH DEMANDS
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Ambassador Burns met February 9 with General of the
Army Yuriy Baluyevskiy, Russia's Chief of Defense, to discuss
military cooperation and regional conflicts (septel). In the
meeting, Baluyevskiy was blunt in charging the Georgian
leadership with making "irrational" demands and interfering
with the implementation of the May 2005 agreement to withdraw
Russian forces from Georgia. Turning to Russian peacekeepers
serving in South Ossetia, he complained about Georgian
demands to withdraw the forces. The Ambassador urged that
Russia exercise restraint and work to maintain stability,
noting that we had the same message for the Georgians.
Baluyevskiy argued that independence for Kosovo would have a
direct bearing on the Abkhaz and South Ossetia conflicts.


3. (C) In a separate conversation on February 10, the
Ambassador updated DFM Grigoriy Karasin on U.S. efforts to
work with the Georgian leadership to ease tensions, and
pressed again for Russian restraint. Karasin repeated
concerns about possible Georgian Parliament action, but
acknowledged U.S. efforts and previewed the oral message that
FM Lavrov planned to send Secretary Rice (ref a). The
Ambassador strongly encouraged Karasin to take maximum
advantage of upcoming visits to Moscow by Georgian State
Minister for Separatist Conflicts Khaindrava and PM
Noghaideli.
.
GRUSHKO: KOSOVO AS PRECEDENT
--------------


4. (C) During February 9 consultations in Moscow with DFM
Aleksandr Grushko (other topics septel),PDAS Kurt Volker
emphasized the importance of continued, direct engagement
between Moscow and Tbilisi. The U.S. was concerned that
Moscow's views on Georgia's territorial integrity had
shifted, particularly in light of disagreements in the UN
Security Council over the UNOMIG mandate rollover and
high-level statements about the precedential value of a
Kosovo settlement. Volker explained why the U.S. viewed
Kosovo as unique; attempts to equate the resolution of that
situation with other frozen conflicts had serious,
far-reaching implications. Regarding Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, Volker said, the U.S. was encouraging Georgia to
engage constructively with Russia, to focus on political
rather than military solutions, and to step up political and
economic reforms supporting a settlement.


MOSCOW 00001324 002.2 OF 003



5. (C) DFM Grushko claimed Russia had not changed it basic
position on Kosovo, but said it was obvious "in real life"
that the resolution of Kosovo would set a precedent. It
would be difficult to argue that Kosovo was unique; Russia's
policy in this case was reflected in President Putin's
January 31 press conference statement. (NOTE: Putin asked
rhetorically in the press conference why South Ossetia and
Abkhazia could not be independent if Kosovo was given
independence).


6. (C) As to the deletion of references to the Boden paper
in the UNOMIG renewal, Grushko argued that the Abkhaz had
never accepted the paper. MFA 4th CIS Department (Caucasus)
Director Andrey Kelin added that Russia supported Georgia's
territorial integrity (Comment: Without further defining
that term). He noted that the February Friends of Georgia
meeting in Geneva had referred to the Boden paper, but had
recalled as well other settlement proposals (such as the plan
put forward by former PM and FM Yevgeniy Primakov). Grushko
urged that instead of pursuing "fruitless" arguments over
final status issues, Tbilisi should follow through on
Saakashvili's three-step UNGA proposal to build trust with
the Abkhaz. Abkhaz "President" Bagasph was under political
pressure from the Abkhaz people as well because he was seen
as too accommodating; Georgia needed to provide security
guarantees and work on economic joint projects to build ties.

.
KELIN IN TBILISI: MAKING IT TO THE END OF FEBRUARY
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Director Kelin briefed on his February 6-7 talks in
Tbilisi with the Georgian government, characterizing his trip
as being prompted by the "artificial" situation created by
Georgian legislation mandating parliamentary review of the
status of Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia. Kelin
spelled out Moscow's message: Russia does not want to
aggravate the situation, but Moscow will not withdraw Russian
forces from the conflict zone and "abandon" the South
Ossetians -- this would lead to fighting. Russia assumed the
Georgian Parliament -- perhaps after some delays -- would
demand the withdrawal of the Russians. The key question for
Moscow would be how Saakashvili would handle this demand.
Georgia could choose to use violence to try to achieve its
aims or could pursue the path of discussion and negotiation.


8. (C) Kelin said he found at least some interlocutors in
Georgia who were prepared to pursue a political path,
particularly State Minister for Separatist Conflicts Minister
Khaindrava. Khaindrava was prepared to attend a proposed
February 21 JCC meeting in Vienna to discuss elements of the
Saakashvili and Kokoity proposals on South Ossetia. Russia
was planning to host Georgian PM Noghaideli in Moscow
February 27-28 to continue discussions on South Ossetia and
perhaps initial a technical agreement implementing Russia's
decision to withdraw it forces from some Georgian bases.
Kelin said there were opportunities to make progress if the
parties could avoid violence until the end of February.
Georgia and Russia had agreed to maintain silence and avoid
provocations until then, but this would be difficult, Kelin
stressed, if Georgia continued to take steps like the
February 8 arrest of Russian peacekeepers for visa violations.
.
MFA: NO TO OUTSIDE PEACEKEEPERS OR MEDIATORS
--------------


9. (C) DFM Grushko said the Russian peacekeepers were in
South Ossetia to carry out a mandated task of keeping the
peace -- they were not present to bring about a political
settlement. He dismissed what he called Tbilisi's argument
that the replacement of Russian peacekeepers with others
would lead to peace and reunification. Grushko said Russia
had a "very negative" view of a multinational peacekeeping
force in Georgia, arguing that what was needed was a
political solution, not a change of peacekeepers. Kelin was
similarly dismissive about suggestions that other OSCE
members, including the U.S., become involved in the JCC
process, arguing that it would be unhelpful and that Georgia
and South Ossetia needed to resolve their problems directly.
Volker noted that Russian actions -- issuing passports and
allowing Russians to serve in the South Ossetian
administration -- created a direct role for Russia that had
to be taken into account. He said the U.S. was ready to be
helpful -- through the OSCE or directly -- to encourage a
political settlement.


10. (C) Grushko reiterated Kelin's hopes that violence
could be avoided before PM Noghaideli was scheduled to arrive
in late-February. He agreed that "reasonable" Georgians
wanted to pursue a political solution, but said that while
Georgians might want to live in a unified stated, Georgia was
doing little to make unification attractive to separatists.

MOSCOW 00001324 003.2 OF 003


Volker disagreed, noting that Georgia was focused on
political and economic reform and integration into
Euro-Atlantic institutions. He stressed the importance of
Russia's direct engagement with the Georgians, focusing on
concrete steps for a settlement and avoiding unilateral
actions.


11. (C) PDAS Volker did not have the opportunity to clear
this message.
BURNS